PHILIP OF MACEDON

GEORGE CAWKWELL

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We all know that Philip II of Macedon was the father of Alexander the Great. But few of us would be bold enough to argue that he was the greater man. That is precisely the contention that George Cawkwell makes in this fascinating and intricately researched new biography. Philip was not only a master of tactics and the art of war: he was equally a master of strategy and politics, an area where Alexander could be said to have failed in the long run. Without Philip's extraordinarily thorough consolidation of the weak and disunited kingdom of Macedon after his accession in 359 B.C. and his subtle subduing of the city-states of Greece one by one as a prelude to his planned conquest of the Persian Empire, Alexander might have failed totally. Had Philip not been stabbed to death by an aggrieved courtier in 336 at the age of forty-six, the whole history of the Near East might have turned out differently.

Philip of Macedon traces the rise of Philip and the development of Macedon—a remote and, some would say, semi-barbarous kingdom—into a world power, embracing much of the Balkans and the whole of Greece, that was to prove more than a match for Persia and remain in a dominating position until its final defeat at the hands of the Romans nearly two centuries later. Philip's great Athenian opponent, Demosthenes, author of the *Philippics*, emerges as the hero of a tragedy of his own making, a man whose passion for liberty was not matched by his political judgement. The book is fully documented with notes at the end giving references to the ancient sources.

George Cawkwell, who is a Fellow of University College, Oxford, is widely known as an expert on fourth century Greece, about which he has written many articles.

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GEORGE CAWKWELL

FELLOW OF UNIVERSITY COLLEGE, OXFORD

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PREFACE

The aim of this book is to present an account of Philip II of Macedon that will be of interest to the general reading public and of use to those concerned with the subject in universities. A minor concession which the latter will have to make to the former is some patience with what will often seem otiose explanation, but the most serious sacrifice is demanded in the notes. Nothing has suffered more in times of inflation than the price of works of scholarship, or so it seems to those who have to buy them, and, since it is hoped that this book will be bought by a wider public than that of university libraries and a few specialist scholars, scholarly apparatus has been very severely rationed. The notes at the end of the book aim to give the ancient evidence fully, but rigorously eschew all modern discussions save those which provide necessary archaeological information. This may seem an easy way out. I have found it rather the contrary. I dare say I know my way around the literature of this subject passably well, and to cover myself and pages with references to modern works has been a temptation hard to resist. But once one breaches that dam a flood is unavoidable. So the notes contain no more than the ancient evidence, which after all is what will always matter; the views of professional historians are ephemeral. As to what the 'general reader' should make of the notes I cannot prescribe. He is after all a somewhat Protean character and can on occasion make some pretty sharp observations about us specialists, but there is absolutely no need for him to take any notice whatsoever of the notes at the end of the book. If his eyes stray to the few footnotes, I hope he will not feel the worse for the distraction.

As far as possible, the modern equivalents of ancient place-names are given, but this is not primarily to humour those who have come to an interest in ancient Greece by travelling in modern; rather, it is a protest against the habit of talking

about the countries of the ancient world as if they were somehow quite unrelated to their modern equivalents. For instance, Heraclea Lyncestis on the road that later became part of the Via Egnatia lay very close to Monastir, the strategic significance of which was made plain yet again in 1941, and it is helpful to be reminded that some things do not change.

Names have been Latinized when an Anglicized version would not be familiar. Where I have had to mention names of Attic months, I have given the equivalent Julian date according to W. B. Dinsmoor's *Archons of Athens*, though I do not suppose that that work is free from cavil. I have included only a select bibliography, mostly English, since the vast mass of modern literature on this subject is in German and any full list would cost more than it was worth. The books I most esteem are A. Schaefer, *Demosthenes und seine Zeit*[2] (1885–1887), F. R. Wüst, *Philipp II von Makedonien und Griechenland* (1938), and A. W. Pickard-Cambridge, *Demosthenes and the last days of Greek freedom* (1914). Of different kind, but supremely good, is N. G. L. Hammond, *A History of Macedonia* (Vol. I, *Historical Geography and Prehistory*) (Oxford, 1971); no serious visitor to Macedonia should think of travelling without it.

Experience has taught me that if one does not join the chorus of encomiasts of Demosthenes someone will darkly ascribe dissent to wickedness in one's political views. The connection may not be obvious to outsiders nor is it necessary in fact. It is true that there have been those who have seen in Philip one of those great unifying figures of history that men of vision welcome with hero-worship, and who have supposed that since Demosthenes chose to oppose rather than to submit, he was an impediment to progress. It will, I trust, be evident from my book that that is not my view of either of these men. Since, however, professional Greek historians are sometimes animated by passions that enable them to see in black and white much that is grey, I may as well spell out my villainy. While I hold what I conceive to be a Thucydidean view of politics, viz. that men will always seek to have and extend power over others and so empire in the broad sense is inevitable, I also hold liberty to be one of the greatest of goods and therefore regard it as one of a statesman's prime duties to defend it. In so far as I have criticized Demosthenes as a defender of liberty, it is not because he sought to defend it, but because he did it badly. Likewise, I regard Philip as a great man and so a great menace to the liberty of Greece.

I wish to thank the numerous persons who have helped me, and trust they will not think me ungrateful if I abstain from names. The staff of the Classics Office and the Institute of Archaeology of Oxford University have been notably generous, as have been all those connected with the Ashmolean Museum whom I have approached from the Keeper down. The Board of the Faculty of Literae Humaniores made me a more than generous grant to enable me to visit Macedonia and I feel myself greatly beholden. I also take this opportunity to thank my college for constant indulgence and my friend, George Engle, for his eagle-eyed proof-reading. Like the late P. G. Wodehouse, I do not care to use a whole page for a dedication. If I had done so, it would certainly have borne the name of the Camden Professor, Peter Brunt, whose great kindness and friendship over many years has only been equalled by the stimulus of our disagreement over many of the matters here discussed.

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INTRODUCTION

As Thucydides pointed out, until the Persians attacked Greece, Greek wars were petty affairs between neighbouring states. From the partial unity of 480, and the need to maintain it should the Persians try again, came the Athenian Empire, the rise and fall of which gave the fifth century a central theme. As Athens grew wealthy on the tribute of the subject states and year by year tightened its grip, the city became the intellectual and artistic centre of the Greek world – in Pericles' phrase 'the education of Hellas', a plain proof that democracy worked. Men could see for themselves the effortless superiority of the open society of Athens compared to the effortful inferiority of the closed society of Sparta of which they could only hear, and whereas in earlier ages the *mirage spartiate* had bedazzled all Greeks and especially the Peloponnesians, ever more and more Sparta, confident in her military power, became obsessed with fear of the consequences of her loss of spiritual hegemony. The greatest of wars, in Thucydides' view, was the result.

The Peloponnesian War proved Spartan confidence ill-founded, and the long struggle did not end in Spartan triumph until Athens had disastrously over-committed herself in Sicily and Persian wealth had been deployed to support Sparta's faltering efforts to defeat Athens at sea. The end came when Lysander caught the Athenian navy off their guard at Aegospotami in the Dardanelles and, blocking the city's supply of corn from the Crimea, starved it into total submission. In early summer 404 Lysander sailed into the Piraeus, and to the sound of flutes the Long Walls, which secured for Athens access to the sea, were destroyed by the returning Athenian exiles. One of them was Thucydides bitterly reflecting on the ill leadership of the men who had succeeded his hero, Pericles, but we may be sure that he took no part in the destruction. He at least knew that those 'who thought that that day was the beginning

of freedom for Greece' would shortly discover that empire destroyed is shortly succeeded by empire not necessarily less severe.

The Spartan Empire was severe indeed as the first years of the fourth century proved and might have long held Greece in its grip, had Spartan political judgement matched Spartan

Map 1. Greece and Macedonia

ruthlessness, but, having destroyed Athenian power with the aid of Persian subsidies, the Spartans turned against Persia and gave Athenian imperialists the chance to rise again. This they seized, but with so little sense of the importance of Persian power in determining Greek affairs that Sparta and Persia resumed their formidable concord. The crushing and much reviled King's Peace of 387/6 was the result and, as long as Spartan military power remained supreme, with the promise of Persian support Sparta kept a firm hold on Greece.

In 371 at the battle of Leuctra Epaminondas of Thebes, the greatest general of free Greece, defeated Sparta, and followed up his victory by invading the long-inviolate Spartan homeland. By the foundations of Messene and Megalopolis and the refoundation of Mantinea he turned Sparta from a world power into a local Peloponnesian wrangler, and a decade of Theban domination ensued. Again, confidence in military power exceeded political judgement. Thebes sought to extend her power northwards into Thessaly and, although the forces hostile to Thebes in the Peloponnese failed at the battle of Mantinea (362) to rid the Peloponnese of Theban influence, Epaminondas was killed and Thebes, faced in central Greece by a defiant Phocis, was distracted from pursuing its ambitions. By chance the Great King of Persia in the late 360s was unable to support the Thebans as not long after Leuctra he had undertaken to do, and Philip of Macedon began his reign not only when the future of his kingdom seemed most uncertain but also at a time when all of Greece was, as Xenophon of Athens remarked at the conclusion of his history on the battlefield of Mantinea, 'in confusion and indecision'.

At this low tide in the affairs of Greece Philip succeeded in establishing himself securely. The world of kings and kingship in free Greece had long passed and the prevailing systems of government could no longer secure stability. Athenian democracy stood, admirable if in many ways weak, and Spartan aristocracy, caught in the straitjacket of the ancient discipline, survived. Almost everywhere else, the rising poverty of the age brought disorder and civil strife which underlined the vulnerability of the city-states. Macedon by contrast was in the primitive condition of Homeric kingship, a world of barons rather than of cities, of personal allegiance rather than political principle. It could be won by the man with the quality to win it. In his service the army, which, like the *Comitia Centuriata* of early Rome, was the people on parade, could be held united in loyalty and led into Greece or to the Indus. The army had its powers. Kings were made by its acclamation, and traitors tried before it. For the rest, it was potentially one of the great military instruments of the ancient world once the King was found who could use it. Thus, as the city-states of free Greece fell into disarray and misery, a national state under a single man moved forward some centuries, stood over the Greeks, struck them down and ended their liberty.

I

SOME JUDGEMENTS

The subject of this book is the life and work of the man who at the age of twenty-three acceded to a doubtful throne and who by the time he died by the hand of an assassin twenty-three years later had created a state that comprised the north of modern Greece, the south of Yugoslavia, much of Albania, most of Bulgaria and all of European Turkey, had organized to his satisfaction and in his service virtually all of the rest of modern Greece, and had begun an assault on the Persian Empire.

The most striking survey of Philip's career is contained in Arrian in the speech put into the mouth of Alexander when he addressed the mutinous army at Opis in 324.[1] Whether or not Arrian was right to believe that he was rendering Alexander's own words is not here important; if the speech is not Alexander's, it is certainly enough the version given by one of the contemporary Macedonian historians and reflects what Alexander said. It runs as follows:

When Philip took you over you were nomadic and poor, the majority of you clad in skins and grazing sparse herds on the mountains, putting up a poor fight for them against Illyrians, Triballians and the neighbouring Thracians. He gave you cloaks to wear in place of skins. He brought you down the mountains to the plains, making you a match in battle for the neighbouring barbarians, trusting for your salvation no longer in the natural strength of places so much as in your own courage. He made you dwellers in cities and graced your lives with good laws and customs. As to those very barbarians by whom previously you had been constantly plundered and pillaged, both your possessions and your persons, from being slaves and subjects he made you their leaders and he added most of Thrace to Macedon. Seizing the best-situated places on the sea-board he opened up the land to trade, and he made it possible to work the mines without fear. He made you rulers of the Thessalians – you were once scared to death of them – and by humbling the Phocian

people he made the way into Greece for you broad and easy instead of narrow and difficult. The Athenians and the Thebans, who used constantly to look for any chance against Macedon, he humbled to such an extent (and by now he had me to share in his efforts) – to such an extent, I say, that, instead of us paying tribute to the Athenians and being at the beck and call of the Thebans, they have to depend on us for their security. He went into the Peloponnese and set things in order there, and was appointed Leader with full authority for the campaign against the Persians. By this he brought as great glory on the Macedonian state as on himself.

This book is largely an extended gloss on this speech.

Judgement of Philip has varied. To a recital similar to that of Alexander's speech, Ephorus who was Philip's contemporary and a major historian added that 'his achievements were not due to luck but to his own excellence; for this king was outstanding for the sharpness of his strategic sense, for his courage, and for the brilliance of his personality.' Another major historian, Theopompus, engaged on a *History of Greece* for which it would appear he had collected material for at least the first four decades of the fourth century, was so impressed by the rise of Philip that he cut short his projected history at a somewhat unlikely point and turned to writing the *History of Philip*, a huge work which ran to fifty-eight books and made the reign of Philip the central fact of fourth-century history. In the Proem he declared that Europe had never produced anyone to match Philip and in his *Encomium of Philip*, which must have been written at much the same time as the Proem, he predicted that, if Philip continued to comport himself as he had begun, he would become king of the rest of Europe as well.[2] Although Theopompus tempered his admiration after seeing Philip and his court for himself, both these historians took a view of Philip markedly opposed to that of Demosthenes, for whom Philip succeeded almost entirely because Greeks were corruptible. Generally speaking, the Demosthenic view prevailed. At Rome the speeches of Demosthenes were studied and imitated; histories had less appeal. Although a Polybius might dissent, and others follow Theophrastus, on whom the mantle of Aristotle fell, in favourably contrasting Philip with his murderous son, the Romans generally accepted that Philip 'much more bought the Greeks than beat them'.[3]

Thus Demosthenes the orator had his way in antiquity. In modern times it has been Demosthenes the champion of liberty and democracy over whom historians have differed, reflecting attitudes to contemporary events. For some, Philip

was the Philip of Demosthenes and those whom Demosthenes denounced as traitors to liberty were traitors. For others, Philip was the unifier and saviour of Greece, the great leader who saved it from itself, despite the efforts of Demosthenes to prevent salvation.

This dichotomy is crude. To be sceptical about Demosthenes does not necessarily argue indifference to liberty or hero-worship of great men. Demosthenes was not necessarily the only or the wisest champion of liberty, and historical judgement need not follow what he said of himself and his opponents. Yet if Philip was not the contemptible figure Demosthenes made of him, that does not mean that Philip should not have been resisted.

It is the theme of this book that Philip transformed the ancient world, confronting the city-states of Greece with the national state of Macedon, that he was therefore a serious menace to the liberty of Greece, but that the policies of Demosthenes were almost entirely misconceived and caused Philip to be opposed less effectively than he might have been.

MACEDON BEFORE THE ACCESSION OF PHILIP

The fifth century

By the late fifth century Macedon, a term to be used for the political unit as opposed to Macedonia the territory, consisted broadly speaking of the valleys of the Haliacmon, and the Axius (modern Vardar). The central plain around the Thermaic Gulf was inevitably the source of political unity, but it was literally an uphill struggle. The cantons of Upper Macedonia were at once not so inaccessible that they could not be controlled from the central plain nor so easily accessible that they could not constantly aspire to independence, and Macedonian history in the 150 years before the accession of Philip was in large measure an alternation of centrifugal and centralizing movements.

The fifth century was spanned by three great reigns, of Alexander I 'the Philhellene' (*c.* 485–440), of Perdiccas II (*c.* 440–413) and of Archelaus (413–399). By the efforts of these kings the unity of the kingdom attained under the three decades of Persian vassalage was generally maintained, and the account given by Thucydides of the invasion of Macedonia by the Thracians in 429 and of the campaigns of Perdiccas and Brasidas the Spartan in 424 and 423 adequately represents for us the state of the kingdom at that period. 'Lower Macedonia', i.e. the plain by the sea, was directly under the King. 'Upper Macedonia' consisted of what Thucydides calls 'tribes' (*ethnē*) ruled by their own kings but allied with and subject to the King of Macedon. These tribal kings had to be kept on their good behaviour or removed if their independence went too far. In 424 Perdiccas sought to rid himself of Arrhabaeus, the king of the Lyncestians. (Lyncus was the plain of Monastir on the Erigon River – modern Crna Reka, tributary of the Vardar – then as now of great strategic importance. Through it later

was to run the Via Egnatia, the great Roman road which linked the Adriatic with Byzantium, and it was the main highway, in the Macedonian period, for the Illyrians coming into Macedonia.) Arrhabaeus, threatened with expulsion by Perdiccas, sought help from Illyria, and Perdiccas had to beat a hasty

Map 2. The Macedonian Kingdom

retreat. Thucydides' interest in the affairs of Upper Macedonia stopped at this point, for that was the end as far as the Spartans were concerned, but we may presume that Perdiccas did not leave the Lyncestians independent. His successor, Archelaus, was strong enough to intervene in Thessaly, which he probably would not have been minded to do had Upper Macedonia still been in disorder. Perhaps in late 423 Athens acted as mediator, but, however the return of Arrhabaeus to proper submission was accomplished, it doubtless happened. The normal state of

affairs was that delineated by Thucydides, kings subordinate to the King.[1]

The greatest of these three Kings of the fifth century was Archelaus. His name has been blackened for ever by the manner in which Plato referred to him in his dialogue the *Gorgias*, and perhaps in some degree deservedly; Socrates declined Archelaus' invitation, because of Archelaus' reputation for cruelty to those near the throne. But his services to Macedon were immense. In the judgement of Thucydides, he surpassed all his predecessors put together. Thucydides concentrates on his military works, the building of fortified posts, the development of both the cavalry and the infantry and the construction of roads, and these were indeed important, for they greatly helped a strong King to keep control of the kings and to defend his realm. But in other respects too Archelaus greatly influenced Macedon.[2]

The Macedonians were Greeks. Their language was Greek, to judge by their personal names and by the names of months of the calendar; Macedonian ambassadors could appear before the Athenian assembly without needing interpreters; in all Demosthenes' sneers about their civilization there is no hint that Macedonians spoke other than Greek. But it was a distinct dialect not readily intelligible to other Greeks; linguistically as geographically, Macedonia was remote from the main stream of Greek life. King Alexander 'the Philhellene' had been allowed to compete in the Olympic Games only after his claim to being Greek had been fortified by the claim that the Macedonian ruling house had originated in Argos in the Peloponnese, which really conceded that those who sneered at Macedonia as 'barbarian' were right. The sneers went on. The sophist Thrasymachus at the end of the fifth century referred even to King Archelaus as a 'barbarian'. Isocrates in the fourth no less than Demosthenes spoke of the Macedonians as 'barbarians'. The truth was that Macedon was as culturally backward as it was linguistically remote, and even the exact Thucydides classed it as 'barbarian'.[3] Archelaus began to change all this and to make clear the Greekness of his country. It was under him that the city of Pella began to be not only the 'greatest city in Macedonia' but also a show-place which Greeks desired to visit, a centre of Greek culture. Archelaus was a generous patron of the arts, and the leading literary figures of the age were happy to reside at his court. Euripides spent his last years in Macedon, and wrote there the *Bacchae* and the *Archelaus*. At Dium in the foothills of Mount Olympus a Macedonian Olympic Festival

was instituted which included a drama competition. There must have been an appreciative audience. Under Archelaus, Macedon had ceased to be culturally a backwater.[4]

Despite the work of Archelaus Macedon remained triply vulnerable. First, there was the constant menace of the Illyrians, ready to exploit any periods of weakness or preoccupation. The campaign of 423 is the only attested Illyrian intervention but in view of what happened in the first half of the fourth century it was doubtless typical. Like his predecessor, Archelaus had to fight against the Lyncestians under Arrhabaeus who probably sought Illyrian aid.[5] Secondly, after the withdrawal of the Persians in 479, Macedonia became prey to Athenian imperialist ambitions. As early as 465 an Athenian general was prosecuted for not having seized part of Macedonia, and after a number of attempts the area at the mouth of the Strymon River, which Alexander had held, was occupied by the Athenian colony of Amphipolis. At least one other colony was founded in Macedonian territory, and Greek cities on the Thermaic Gulf, i.e. on the plain of Lower Macedonia, which the Kings might reasonably have considered part of their kingdom, were included as tribute-paying members in the Athenian Empire. The Kings, especially Perdiccas, who reigned when Athenian power was at its greatest, had a hard time keeping the Athenians at arm's length. By an adroit mixture of support for Athens' opponents and military assistance for Athens' generals Perdiccas achieved for himself a reputation for mendacity, and for his country comparative independence. As Athens declined, the same game had to be played by his successor with Sparta, and at the end of the Peloponnesian War he was threatened with invasion because he had not joined Sparta against Athens. The truth was that Macedon was in danger from whichever power controlled the Aegean.[6] Thirdly, the king of Macedon could never be secure from the efforts of a pretender to the throne. One such attempt was fully described by Thucydides; in winter 429 a pretender with the promise of Athenian aid and accompanied by a huge Thracian army invaded the kingdom. The attempt failed but such attempts were always to be feared.[7]

All monarchies in less advanced societies are liable to the disorders caused by pretenders, but Macedon was particularly vulnerable by reason of the practice of polygamy. Speaking generally, polygamy was not practised in Greece. At Athens, although the evidence does not put the matter beyond doubt, it seems clear enough that polygamy was not permitted. Elsewhere the exceptions proved the rule. A Spartan king who took

a second wife but kept the infertile first, acted 'in a quite un-Spartan manner'. The tyrant Dionysius I of Syracuse married twice almost simultaneously, but plainly for political purposes. Things were different in Macedonia. At least Alexander's policy of intermarrying Macedonians and Orientals does not seem to have outraged Macedonian sentiment at the time of the Susa marriages in 324; in 330 he had 'permitted his soldiers to take as wives the captive women they were consorting with' while they retained wives in Macedonia. So polygamy may not have been practised in Macedon by the ruling house alone, where it was regular. Philip had seven wives, none of whom appears to have been divorced (save perhaps the mother of Alexander on grounds of adultery). His father Amyntas married at least twice and there was respectable precedent for his son Alexander doing likewise. The purpose was generally political. Philip was said to have had 'a marriage a war', and one can trace the expansion of his empire in the list. Archelaus was said to have been murdered by a man who was disappointed of a marriage with one of Archelaus' daughters, both of whom were needed for strategic matches, and this practice of political marriages was early established. The subordination of the kingdom to Persia in the 490s had been sealed with the marriage of the King's daughter to a high-ranking Persian, a precedent for the later unions of Macedonians and Orientals,* and political marriages became the regular method of confirming political settlements. There was of course nothing peculiar to Macedon in such marriages other than polygamy which allowed the Macedonian Kings more frequently so to marry without offending those previously placated. But polygamy increased the number of heirs to the throne and the rivalry of factions at the court. The one pretender of whom the limited evidence for fifth-century Macedon happens to afford knowledge bore the royal name of Amyntas, the son of Philip. The Philip concerned is not known. He may have been a younger brother of King Perdiccas, and not the son of a polygamous union. But the

* Behind the highly suspect story in Herodotus (5.18ff.) of seven Persian envoys being murdered as they reclined on couches by Macedonian men dressed as women, may lie a multiple marriage ceremony akin to that at Susa in 324. It is more likely that marriages could be disguised from the Greeks than that the disappearance of the envoys should be left unavenged by the Persians. So the precedents for Alexander's policy of fusion of races by intermarriage may include more than just the marriage of a Macedonian princess to a Persian grandee.

effects of polygamy are plain in the fourth century, and no doubt were felt in the fifth.[8]

The fourth century

Despite these threats from outside and in, Archelaus left at his death in 399 a kingdom strong enough to intervene in Thessaly and advanced enough to be attractive to Greeks, but he had not prepared for the succession. Four brief reigns in seven years followed before Amyntas, father of our Philip, began in 392 his twenty-two-year reign. In the course of those seven years much that had been achieved was undone, and Amyntas nearly lost his kingdom within months of his accession, for an invasion of some Illyrians swept right down into the central plain. Amyntas had to leave Pella and to entrust some of the eastern portion of the kingdom to his allies, the Chalcidians of Olynthus. Within three months he had regained control. Presumably the Illyrians had come merely to maraud. He then found that his trusted Chalcidian allies would not return the territory he had entrusted to them. Powerless to recover it on his own, he had to wait until the extension of Chalcidian power moved Sparta to intervene. By 382 the Chalcidians had moved so far westward that even Pella had fallen to them, and Amyntas joined in a general appeal to Sparta. The Chalcidians were duly dealt with and Amyntas resumed full control of his kingdom. As Spartan power declined, he found it expedient in the mid-370s to enter into alliance with Athens, but with the rise of Jason of Pherae he had to ally with him. Macedon seemed to be back in the insecurity of the reign of Perdiccas. Although Amyntas kept the kingdom together and died of old age in 370, there had been little progress since Archelaus and there was little reason to suppose that Macedon would not continue with its precarious and insignificant existence. Nor was the reign free of internal troubles. It is alleged that for a period of two years a pretender, Argaeus, ruled as king, until Amyntas regained his power. This was probably enough in 384–2, when the Chalcidians advanced into the east of the central plain, and Argaeus was perhaps installed by them.[9]

Worse was to follow. Amyntas had, it would seem, re-established control over the canton of Perrhaebia, and Alexander II, his successor, began with a flourish intervening in the

affairs of Thessaly at the invitation of the people of Larisa, seemingly a return to the power and influence of Archelaus. Within a very short time the rising power of Central Greece, Thebes at the head of the Boeotians, asserted itself. Pelopidas was sent with an army to settle Thessaly. Alexander's garrison was besieged in Larisa and expelled. Alexander was faced with a rising led by one Ptolemy of Alorus, a city near the mouth of the Haliacmon, and Pelopidas was called in to arbitrate. Alexander was re-established in secure tenure of the throne, but his younger brother, our Philip, was carried off to Thebes as a hostage. Macedon had become a sort of client of the Thebans. A few months later in 369 Alexander was murdered by Ptolemy.[10]

Alexander's brother, Perdiccas, who was still in his teens, was the rightful successor, but Ptolemy established himself as regent. Pelopidas again intervened, took Ptolemy's son and fifty leading Macedonians as hostages, and exacted recognition of Perdiccas' right to the throne. In 368 a pretender, supported by the Chalcidians of Olynthus, advanced into the eastern part of the Kingdom, and the Athenian general, Iphicrates, who had just begun Athens' long struggle to recover Amphipolis, was called on for help. The pretender seems to have retired, but in 365 Perdiccas got rid of the regent by murdering him and ruled until 359, hardly with success. The Athenian general who succeeded Iphicrates captured two of the cities on the coast of the central plain, Pydna and Methone. In a final disastrous venture Perdiccas set out to attack the Illyrians. He was defeated and four thousand of his army were killed. Macedonia was exposed on all sides to enemy attack.[11]

Philip before 359

This record has been necessary to show the melancholy condition of Macedon in the first four decades of the fourth century and to make clearer how much Philip II achieved. Indeed, these events must have powerfully influenced the young man's conception of what had to be done and his attitude to the Greeks who had plagued his country.

The mother of Philip, Eurydice, was a Lyncestian princess, grand-daughter in all likelihood of that Arrhabaeus who to save himself in 423 had sought Illyrian aid, and one may presume that Amyntas married her to help repair the damage

done by the Illyrian incursion of 392.[12] The reigns of her two elder sons, Alexander and Perdiccas, have just been briefly described. Philip, her youngest, was born in 383 or 382 and so missed the more troubled part of his father's reign, but no doubt he was used to hearing from his mother and his brothers talk of what had nearly befallen them all. Of the events following his father's death he must have been acutely aware. The exact date when he was taken hostage to Thebes has been disputed, but hardly matters. The important thing is that he was there for three impressionable years at the time when Theban ambition to control the north of Greece was at its highest and when 'the greatest of the Greeks', the general Epaminondas, was supreme in the state in glory and influence. The lessons, political and military, were not lost on Philip. When he returned to Macedon at about the time his brother Perdiccas assumed full power, he was installed as ruler in some part of the kingdom where he could observe and reflect on the disasters of the 360s.[13] The enemies of Macedon were plain. Above all, there were the peoples of Illyria who had so often caused havoc, but there were at hand the powers of Greece, the noble city of Olynthus so often the base for exiles and pretenders, the Athenians bent on restoring Athenian empire in the north, principally at Amphipolis but also within the coastal cities of the central plain, Thebans and Thessalians for whom Macedonia was there to be exploited. Whatever he thought of the culture of the city-states, Philip could have nothing but apprehension at their political ambitions, and he owed them nothing but the deceits which had enabled his father and the great Kings of the fifth century to keep their kingdom free. If he was minded for revenge, there was much to revenge and practically nothing else.

In 359 Philip was in his twenty-fourth year, young by modern notions, but older than Octavian at the death of Julius Caesar, and Alexander the Great at his accession, older too than his own brother Perdiccas in 365. So his age was no disqualification. Nor were serious contenders at hand; both the pretenders to the throne who made their bids in 359 were in exile. Perdiccas had left a son who was a very young child and, if he had become king, someone would have had to be regent for anything up to twenty years. Philip was the obvious successor for this critical year.

In Macedon kings were acclaimed by the army on parade, an assembly comparable to that of the Greek army before Troy or to the *Comitia Centuriata* of Rome, and oaths of loyalty and

lawful intentions were exchanged.[14] But this was largely formality. Some connection with the dead king was no doubt necessary, but what in effect happened was what Alexander the Great was frank enough to declare on his deathbed. Asked to whom he bequeathed the throne, he said 'to the strongest'. In 359 Philip was the strongest. One source, and one source alone, Justin, asserted that Philip was for a long time regent and only became King under popular pressure. Justin also declared that Perdiccas was assassinated. Neither story deserves credence. From 359 Philip was assuredly King, though his prospects of remaining so must have seemed far from assured.[15]

III

THE CONSOLIDATION OF MACEDON AND THE SUBJECTION OF THE BARBARIAN NORTH

The crisis of 359

The situation that confronted Philip at his accession was grave. Four thousand Macedonians had been killed along with Perdiccas in his disastrous advance against the Illyrians, and the army can have been in no condition to ward off the attack which the Illyrians were preparing to make. The people of Paeonia, which was situated on the head-waters of the Vardar, seeing Macedon defenceless began contemptuously to ravage. One pretender to the throne, Pausanias, having persuaded the king of western Thrace to support him, was marching in, presumably by the route followed by the Thracian horde in 429, i.e. from the north-east down the middle Vardar. Another pretender, Argaeus, conceivably the man installed as King by the Chalcidians in the 380s, had secured the support of the Athenians, who despatched to the task 3,000 foot, presumably mercenary to a large extent, and a considerable naval force. An attack in the central plain itself based on the port of Methone was to be expected. Philip, like Caesar, would have to do everything at once.[1]

He promptly withdrew the garrison Perdiccas had installed in Amphipolis and got together what army he could. The Paeonians he bought off with gifts and promises, and likewise the Thracian king supporting Pausanias. Argaeus was landed at Methone and set off with the mercenaries for Aegae, the ancient capital of Macedonia, about thirty kilometres distant on the foothills of Mount Olympus (at the modern site of Vergina).* He appeared before the city and called on the

* The orthodox view that the ancient Macedonian capital and burial place of the Kings, Aegae, was situated at Edessa must be abandoned for various reasons. How could, for instance, Argaeus have thought to make from Methone a surprise attack on Edessa?

inhabitants to accept him as king. They declined, and he had to set out on the return march to Methone, during which Philip appeared with a force of soldiers, defeated and captured him. Philip then took his army against the Paeonians, who ceased from that moment to be in any sense independent, and prepared to deal with the Illyrians.

The chronology of this crowded year is quite uncertain. What is described first in our chief source is the re-creation of the army, but that needed time, a matter one would suppose of some months. Perhaps the Paeonian expedition was to give the new army battle experience before the real test of the Illyrian campaign.

A few months were sufficient to produce an army to fight the Illyrians. They had to be, for the campaign could not be deferred. But the real work of Philip in organizing and training the Macedonian army extended over a number of years, and although it will be convenient to deal with it as a whole at this point it must be remembered that the army that fought and defeated the Illyrians in the early part of the reign, perhaps in 358, must have been only a shadow of the great Macedonian army bequeathed by Philip to Alexander.

The reorganization of the Macedonian army

The cardinal parts of that great army were the infantry in massed aray – the so-called phalanx – armed with the long pike (the *sarissa*), and the cavalry units formed by the so-called Companions, and it has been much discussed whether Philip inherited and developed or himself created them. The debate centres on a celebrated fragment of Anaximenes' *History of*

The crossing places of the Haliacmon would presumably be guarded; the journey could not have been completed in the course of a night and would have been across a populous and easily observed plain. Plutarch clearly thought of Edessa and Aegae as two quite separate places, and there are other powerful considerations against the identification. At Palatitsa-Vergina we have the remains of a large palace and a tomb of regal splendour containing a marble throne, but we do not know the ancient name of the site. So Hammond (*Macedonia* I, pp. 156f.) is very probably right in his varied arguments that it is Aegae. For a compact statement about the discoveries, see M. Andronicos, *Vergina* (Keramos Guide – Lycabettus Press 1972). [The debate is ended if Andronicos' interpretation of the latest excavations at Vergina reported in the press in November 1977 is accepted; he claims to have found the tomb of Philip.]

Philip which was used by a late lexicographer to explain the word *pezetairoi* (Foot Companions).[2] The entry may be translated as follows:

Foot Companions. Demosthenes in the *Philippic Orations.* Anaximenes in the first book of the *History of Philip* speaking of Alexander says 'Then, having accustomed those of highest repute to ride, he gave them the title "Companions", whereas to the majority, i.e. the infantry, having divided them into companies and sections of ten and the other formations, he gave the name "Foot Companions", intending that each group having a share in the King's companionship should continue to be at their keenest.'

Now, since Demosthenes used the term 'Foot Companions' in a speech of 349, Anaximenes cannot have been talking about Alexander the Great. There are only two other Alexanders, Alexander the Philhellene of the period of the Persian Wars, which seems much too early for the Macedonian army to assume the formations used in Asia after 334, and Alexander II the brother of Philip who reigned for a single year, in which he seems to have been indeed busy. Many have therefore supposed that 'speaking of Alexander' is a mistake by the lexicographer or in the transmission of his text. Some have thought that Anaximenes was, as would not be surprising in his opening book, describing the military reforms of King Archelaus, who according to Thucydides 'cut straight roads and otherwise put the kingdom on a better footing as regards horses, heavy infantry, and other war material than had been done by all the eight kings that preceded him' (Crawley's translation). The poor performance of the Macedonian army in the four decades after Archelaus' death in 399 perhaps argues nothing against making Archelaus the creator of the army of Companions and Foot Companions, in which case Philip would have realized the full potentialities of what he found. But there is a potent argument against attributing the reform to Archelaus, or for that matter to Alexander II.[3]

Our principal source for the reign of Philip is the sixteenth book of the *Library* (*Bibliotheke*) of Diodorus of Sicily. Diodorus, a contemporary of Cicero, has earned both the contempt and the gratitude of posterity, the former for his capacity for muddle, the latter for his method which was to epitomize histories that are lost to us. The discernment of the Diodoran in Diodorus is a matter of nice judgement, in which scholars can differ, and the determination of which historian Diodorus is at any moment epitomizing has caused even greater differences. It would be idle to pretend that we know the source of

Diodorus' account of Philip's first years, but there can be no doubt that it is a source well-informed about that period. Now, in describing Philip's measures to meet the crisis of 359, Diodorus speaks of Philip's frequent morale-raising speeches and goes on:[4]

> . . . and having reformed the military formations to give greater strength and equipped them with the weapons suitable for these formations, he was constantly parading and training them for combat. He devised both the close array of the phalanx and its equipment, in imitation of the close shield formation of the heroes before Troy, and he was the first to put together the Macedonian phalanx.

If the writer from whom Diodorus drew this passage knew what he was talking about, it seems very likely that the fragment of Anaximenes' first book was part of the description of these very reforms. The lexicographer may have erred in saying that Anaximenes was talking about Alexander, and on the whole this seems more likely than that it was Philip's brother who instituted the reforms.[5] It is at any rate here assumed that Philip was the author in every sense of the Macedonian army which Alexander the Great inherited.

The King of Macedon had always had a body of leading Macedonians as his somewhat informal council, and they were called the Companions. Although the council which is to be met with frequently in the course of Alexander the Great's campaigns in Asia, about one hundred in number, continued to bear this title, Philip began in 359 to use it for the much larger body of the Macedonian cavalry. They were organized on a territorial basis in squadrons (*ilai*) and became the main striking arm of the Macedonian army. They were especially formidable not because of any novelty in their armament of spear and short heavy sword (for these were regular with Greek cavalry) but by reason of their superb training, which is what perhaps Anaximenes is really alluding to; neither Philip nor anyone else before him had any need to train Macedonians to ride; what he did in the way of training must have been to accustom them to ride in formation and despite the lack of stirrups* more effectively to use their weapons. One squadron, the Royal, fought beside the King in Asia: its commander

* For the view that the stirrup, unknown to classical antiquity, was evolved in Siberia not long before the fifth century A.D., see A. D. H. Bivar, 'The stirrup and its origins', *Oriental Art* N.S.I., 1955, pp. 3ff.

saved the life of Alexander at the battle of the Granicus in 334. Presumably it had been singled out for this role by Philip.[6]

The Foot Companions were organized likewise on a territorial basis in regiments (*taxeis*). Their armament was novel and revolutionary. The spear (*sarissa*), according to Theophrastus who visited Macedonia during Philip's reign, was up to twelve cubits long, i.e. five and a half metres, and required the use of both hands, and so the shield had to be small enough not to impede; either it was held in position on the left forearm by means of a loop or, as an account of the battle of Pydna in 168 suggests, it was slung over the shoulder and not even used. This was indeed a change. The defence of the Macedonian foot-soldier was provided in large measure by other units. It would appear that he did not even have a breast-plate, and, while the economic backwardness of Macedon in 359 may have dictated this, Philip perceived that Greek conceptions of hoplites defending themselves impeded mobility; the phalanx of Foot Companions was to be formidable in attack and secure in defence because it was a unit.[7] The individual's whole effort was concentrated on maintaining formation and using the *sarissa* effectively. In Philip's day the phalanx may have been ten men deep; the term 'sections of ten' certainly continued in use in Alexander's army although the normal depth seems to have been eight; perhaps experience had shown that ten deep was wasteful, but the title remained convenient; it therefore seems likely that Philip's 'sections of ten' were in fact files of ten men. The normal formation used in advance was called 'compact order' (*pyknôsis*) and allowed an interval of two cubits between files; the formation adopted in defence, the so-called 'locked-shields' (*synaspismos*), which was literally impossible for the Macedonians with their small shields, halved this interval. Since an ordered concertina movement of the line is inconceivable, we must suppose that to adopt the 'locked shields' formation the rear half of the 'sections of ten' moved to fill in the gaps. Thus maintaining formation in advance was all-important and required a great deal of drilling. No amount of training, however, could secure automatically the maintenance of formation in battle. The individual Foot Companion had to devote himself to this first of all, and, lightly protected though he was in comparison with the Greek hoplite, he could not at the same moment have been trying to defend himself. He got some protection against missiles from the *sarissae* of the rear files projecting overhead. For the rest, other units had to protect him.[8]

There is, undeniably, some uncertainty about how the phalanx of Foot Companions fought in Philip's day. The explicit account of Polybius describes what happened in the second century B.C. It is sure enough that the length of the *sarissa* enabled the phalanx to present a wall of spikes to the enemy, but there is no evidence of exactly how the Foot Companion used his weapon. One must guess. But it may not be a bad guess to postulate that the *sarissa* was used not unlike the bayonet in modern training; i.e. there was not just a wall of spikes steadily advancing, but a wall of jabbing spikes. Hence at the battle of Pydna Roman shields and breast-plates were transfixed and the advancing phalanx was a terrifying spectacle as the Roman commander afterwards constantly recalled. To achieve such a result must have required superb physical fitness and endless battle drill.[9]

Separate from the Foot Companions were the so-called hypaspists, a term for which one hesitates to furnish a translation. In Greek armies the hypaspist was shield-bearer for a hoplite, and no doubt the word had at one stage borne something of the same meaning in Macedon, but in the great Macedonian army the hypaspists are of first importance as a fighting force. Scholars have disagreed about whether their armament was different from that of the Foot Companions; the passage commonly cited to prove that they were lighter armed admits of a different interpretation, and the debate continues. But it is clear that they formed up in the phalanx with the regiments of Foot Companions and, if they were in some way lighter-armed, their use of the *sarissa* seems fairly likely. It is their constant employment beside the King for tasks where speed was necessary which shows that they were exceptionally mobile, the result of training if not of lighter equipment. They certainly enough were established by Philip, for they are seen constantly to the fore in 335, but at what date he gave them their special role we can only guess. It could even have been in 359. To be 'shield-bearer' to the King could have been an honourable position that did not need any appellation of 'companionship'.[10]

Other units were created in course of time. To the regiments of Foot Companions of 359 were added regiments of the mysteriously titled *Asthetairoi* (Companions of some kind that cannot be determined by etymology). If the conjecture that they were the infantry units of Upper Macedonia is right, they will have been very soon added to the army organized and trained in 359, their status as Companions distinctive because

the cantons of Upper Macedonia were still in the state described by Thucydides 'allied and subject, but with monarchies of their own'.[11] In Alexander's army there was a force of Mounted Scouts (*prodromoi*), who principally operated in the vanguard and in reconnaissance, but in battle had a role as skirmishers. They were armed with the *sarissa*, a curiously unsuitable weapon for a cavalryman if he had to use both hands to control it, and if it was short enough to be used like the spears of the Companion Cavalry the appellation '*sarissa*-bearing' is odd. Perhaps they were armed with a shortish *sarissa* so that they could, if necessary, be used unmounted. One may guess that they were the invention of Philip for of such a vanguard force he would no doubt quickly have perceived the need. It was not purely auxiliary (in the sense of 'allied'), for there is once mention of Macedonian cavalry apart from the Companions and these were probably the Scouts. So perhaps Philip at an early date created a unit of Macedonian Scouts.[12] But in general the specialist units were provided by the subjugated peoples. The Paeonians provided troops who are frequently used with the Mounted Scouts. The Agrianians, who lived on the headwaters of the Strymon River (i.e. west and south-west of modern Sofia) were said to have 'rendered the greatest services to Philip and Alexander'; their part as javelineers in Asia is prominent indeed in the pages of Arrian – it is to be presumed for Philip's campaigns. Thracian cavalry and Thracian javelineers were incorporated in the army as the kingdom expanded.[13] Alexander lacked no specialist unit. We have no reason to think that Philip did. The army seen in action in 335 had all that Alexander needed, archers, slingers, artillery, and above all the engineers, of whom more anon.

Unfortunately no adequate picture of the development of this army can be given. One would like to know at what stage Macedonian power was really secure. Undoubtedly the submission of Thessaly in 352 was an immense increase of power in Philip's struggle with Athens. Earlier, mercenaries perhaps played a very important part. As we have seen, 4,000 Macedonians had died with Perdiccas in 359. Philip got together an army of 10,000 infantry and 600 cavalry, but that was to meet a crisis. The regular call-up over the next few years may have been less, mercenaries supplying the balance of what was needed.[14] In his early years Philip must have been more easily checked than at any time later when the Athenians had everything to fear if he was not.

The securing of the kingdom

In the first twelve months of his reign Philip had secured his kingdom from attack from outside and was then free to turn his attention to consolidating his authority. The Illyrians are said to have occupied Macedonian cities, but it is quite unclear how far they had penetrated the cantons of Upper Macedonia. Once they had withdrawn from these cities, Philip reasserted the King's authority. Though details are denied us, from 358 onwards no more is heard of revolt or independent action by the minor kings. Perhaps they continued to be so styled and the term *asthetairoi* may, as already noted, mark the special status of their kingdoms. But Lyncestis, Eordaea, Orestis, Elimia, Tymphaea, proud names all, were now properly subordinate to the King of Macedon. Just as his father had married a Lyncestian as a means of cementing the loyalty of Lyncestis (which was invaded in 359 but not, as far as we know, disloyal), Philip early in the reign married a princess of Elimia.[15]

In the following year, 357, he moved to the eastern bounds of the kingdom. The city of Amphipolis had for over a decade defied Athenian attempts to recapture it. While Athens was preoccupied with troubles in Euboea, Philip took it by siege, the first triumph of his corps of engineers. The strategic importance of the city was immense, for its capture opened the way to expansion of the kingdom eastwards, as events would shortly make clear, but in 357, more importantly, it marked the consolidation of the kingdom in the east. There is no evidence of how he dealt with the peoples of the Strymon valley or of the high country between the Strymon and the Axius (Vardar). Apart from a minor campaign of Alexander against the Maedi on the middle Strymon when he was left in charge of Macedonia in 340, nothing is heard of the area during Philip's reign: presumably there was nothing to hear. Like the rest of Macedonia proper, at the accession of Alexander the area was loyal (the king of the Agrianians, a king as much and as little as the kings of Upper Macedonia, being notable for his loyalty to Alexander).[16]

From Amphipolis, Philip returned to the central plain and promptly besieged and took Pydna which the Athenians had captured in the 360s. Some Athenians were taken prisoner. Treachery was alleged, and the loss of the city formed for Demosthenes one of the melancholy list of Athenian failures in the rise of Philip. The truth was that the city was by this

date a Macedonian city. With Athenian help King Archelaus had in 410 dealt with the refusal of the city to accept his authority by moving it four kilometres inland, after which Pydna was again as fully Macedonian as it had been before Athenian imperialism disputed it. Less than forty kilometres separated the city from the palace at Aegae. Its capture was easy, its 'traitors' loyal.[17]

The case of Methone, eight kilometres north of Pydna, was different. Its exact site has not been determined but it is clear that it lay on the coast and for this reason had been able to maintain itself against the Macedonian Kings, although its territory was at times denied it and corn had had to be imported. It had served as a base for Athenian operations against Macedon in the fifth century, and, whatever the status of the city was in the period after the destruction of the Athenian Empire, its recapture by Athens in the 360s exposed Macedon once more. As already noticed, the pretender Argaeus was landed there in 359. Philip had to take it for the security of the kingdom. But he had to attack when the winds prevented Athens from helping the city. In August 356 and 355 he was occupied elsewhere. In 354 he laid siege to the city (in the course of which he was blinded in one eye) and it fell before the Athenians could arrive. The kingdom was beyond dispute his.[18]

Methone was destroyed and its territory distributed to Macedonians. To some extent this must have been precautionary, but as Philip's power increased and there was less and less chance that Greek cities near the kingdom could diminish it, he continued to deal with them as he had dealt with Methone.[19] At the end of his war against the Chalcidians of Olynthus, Olynthus was destroyed, which was prudent, and so were all the other thirty-one cities, which was by no means necessary. Their territory too was distributed, and it is plain that in some measure Philip was seeking to concentrate the kingdom on Pella and in the coastal areas. It is a curious fact that of the eight squadrons of Companion Cavalry that crossed to Asia with Alexander (one, the Royal Squadron, being presumably a *corps d'élite*), four had territorial designations indicating some connection with these coastal areas. This, of course, does not mean that over half the Companions were by 334 settled in Lower Macedonia, for roughly half the cavalry was left in Europe, but when one considers the areas of plain in the cantons of Upper Macedonia one is surprised that even a quarter to a third of the Companions had domicile near the coast, many on the territory of the conquered cities. The great

historian Theopompus, who visited Macedon in the late 340s, remarked on the amplitude of the estates occupied by Companions; there is preserved from the forty-ninth book of his *History of Philip* (which appears to have included events of the year 340) a fragment which runs thus: '. . . and they had, as it was, a respectable part of Europe. For the Companions were at that time, I think, no more than 800 in number but they enjoyed the fruits of as much land as 10,000 of the Greeks with the best and amplest estates.' Now by 340 the Companions must, to judge by their number in 334, have been far more than 800. If the text is sound and Theopompus to be taken seriously, there are only two explanations that seem at all likely. Either 800 was the number of Companions settled by Philip in the newly conquered lands, or it was the number of the Greek adventurers who had gone to Macedon to seek service in the cavalry and share in Philip's largesse, which would have been in the new lands. So the impression gained from the territorial designations of Alexander's squadrons of Companions is strengthened. A large proportion of the cavalry was drawn from Lower Macedonia and the newly conquered lands.[20]

Even where physically the Macedonians remained remote, emotionally Philip drew them to the throne. The King had always had his Companions, his trusted councillors, who, if they pursued dark and treacherous designs, knew that they could always fly to their own loyal supporters in areas far from the throne. Given a momentary setback for the King, the kings would go their own way, and the centrifugal forces would defy the central authority of the state. Philip changed all that. All the cavalry would be his Companions, and all the Foot too. No longer would they prefer allegiance to local barons; they were the King's Companions and they would accompany him to the bounds of Persia and beyond. The striking thing about the relations of Philip's son Alexander and the Macedonian soldiery is not that there was trouble but that the trouble was so trifling. They had much to put up with – their King in Iranian garb, trying out a court procedure that had Macedonians grovelling on the ground in the Persian mode, declaring himself not son of his Macedonian father but son of the god Ammon. Despite grumbles, they stuck it. Only when he proposed to give some of them their long-earned discharge and replace them with young Persians did they mutiny; he was their King and they were his Companions and they would not have un-Macedonian men replace them. But the mutiny came

to nothing. Alexander sulked. The Macedonians cast down their arms around his tent, wailed, and begged forgiveness. A spokesman explained that they felt that they were being displaced in his affections. Alexander assured them otherwise. There were kisses all round. There was a great feast of reconciliation, and he proceeded to send home the same men as before and incorporate the young Persians in the army, and all was well. Of course much of this was due to the remarkable love for Alexander as Alexander. In a world of brave men he was the bravest and much else. But that the trouble took so long to come to a head was due to the work of Philip. Dissident barons, who did not like the young King's orientalizing, made no appeal to the soldiers, who equally did not like it, to get the King to stop it. They made no appeal, for beside the King of Macedon they had no appeal. The men were his Companions, no longer theirs. Philip had seen to it.[21]

In any case, dissidence among the barons was probably rare under Philip. In the expanding kingdom and its army there were commands to hope for as well as positions of honour and power at court, and Philip was generous to those who served him well. He was, like his son, brave, and his body bore the marks for his subjects to admire. His policies raised no great issues of the sort his son's would raise. The country prospered. The court was a lively place to be in, not just for its drinking bouts. Philip began the practice of having the sons of leading Macedonians at court, to serve and to learn. These teenage boys, the so-called Pages, were in a sense hostages for their father's good behaviour, but more importantly they received an education not only in Greek culture but also in loyalty to the King. There would appear to have been well over one hundred of them, and from their number came the generals of the future, an institution most apt for binding the leading Macedonians to the King.[22]

Philip thus drew the Macedonians out of their highland fastnesses to the centre of a great empire. But this social revolution was accompanied by another of considerable importance for the future, whereby the Macedonians of the upland cantons were brought down from mountainous places to live in the plains. This, as Alexander in 324 declared, was because they had ceased to fear the barbarians on their borders. It meant that Philip made them 'dwellers in cities'. Unfortunately it is not possible to be precise about Philip's cities in Macedonia. The history of Rome's Macedonian Wars reveals many names of cities, but when, for instance, Celetrum (modern

Kastoria), situated where one supposes men had fished for centuries in Lake Castoria,* became a city able to defend itself, or when Bylazora on the Vardar (modern Titov Veles) 'the largest city in Paeonia and very favourably situated in relation to the pass from Dardania into Macedonia' according to Polybius, was founded, we can only guess, and guess with no great confidence. One might, for instance, imagine that Heraclea Sintica which has been tentatively located on the right bank of the Strymon, south-west of Serrai, about forty kilometres from Amphipolis, was one of Philip's foundations, if it were not that a late lexicographer speaks of Philip's father founding a Heraclea – which makes a scruple against ascribing to Philip the most celebrated Macedonian Heraclea, that in Lyncus, two kilometres south of Monastir/Bitola, although probably enough Philip did found it. But there can be no doubt that when Alexander founded his cities in the East, the majority of which were, in the Ciceronian phrase 'bastions of empire', he was following where his father had led, not just in Thrace where his most celebrated Philippopolis survives today as Plovdiv, but in Macedonia itself. In 351 Demosthenes spoke of rumours that Philip was 'placing fortified cities amongst the Illyrians'. So he was known as a founder of cities to Athenians, and indeed to historians lost to us. The late *Epitome* of Justin speaks of his shifting around 'peoples and cities at his pleasure', filling or abandoning as suited him. It should be needless to add that Philip's cities in Thrace and Macedonia were Macedonian cities, not the comfortable resorts dreamed up by Greeks like Isocrates for the exploitation of Asia, and, when Alexander carried on his father's work, he was founding cities as Greek as the cities of Macedonia were Greek, and no more. In short, Alexander was civilizing the East, not Hellenizing it, just as his father had civilized Macedonia. 'He made you dwellers in cities, and adorned your lives with good laws and customs'. Before Philip many had lived like barbarians. After him they lived like Greeks.[23]

* The fishing boats of curious design, which are to be seen on the lake today, are perhaps of immemorial antiquity. The name of the city in ancient times, Celetrum, was also the name of a sort of fishing boat (cf. Hesychius, *Lexicon*). Just as the modern name Castoria derives from the Greek word for 'beaver', so too perhaps the Macedonian name was derived from the boat. But no doubt the fur-trade is no less ancient.

The subjection of the northern neighbouring peoples

This development of Macedon was only possible because the country ceased to be at the mercy of the barbarians beyond. Illyrians towards the Adriatic, Triballians towards the Danube, Thracians towards the Black Sea were by constant campaigning kept too weak to menace Macedonia. But it took the whole reign, and for the Kings of Macedon, as much as for the Roman governors of the later province in Republican times, there was no end of trouble.

Although for Hellenists the relations of Philip and the Greek city-states are the most interesting, one must remember that by comparison with his barbarian neighbours the Greeks were easy. Once dealt with, they remained in submission, and one may guess that the actual warfare was easier. Greek arms were superior to barbarian, but the terrain in which the barbarians had to be fought presented great difficulties, as Arrian's description of Alexander's campaign of 335 shows. Two of the three serious wounds sustained by Philip were at the hands of barbarians, and Philip might well have said that that was the measure of his wars.

Undeniably, however, these wars are of minor interest, and only a brief account of them will be given, and that by areas rather than chronologically. First will come the Illyrians, then the Thracians. The Triballians, serious enough for Alexander to include in the curses of Macedon before Philip,[24] will appear momentarily later on.

There was in the fourth century no single political unit of Illyrians to the west and north-west of Macedon. Different tribes became important and militarily dangerous at different times, and were described by the Greeks as 'the Illyrians', a convenient term which matched either ignorance of the area or lack of interest. When Philip acceded, one people under a ninety-year-old king, Bardylis, had attained widespread power and considerable wealth from plunder. It was they who had defeated and killed Philip's predecessor, Perdiccas, and occupied western Macedonia. Philip's great victory of 358 drove them out and meant an extension of Macedonian power along the route of the later Via Egnatia to Lake Ochrid (which today lies on the border of Albania and Yugoslavia). At the same time Philip extended his power beyond the north Pindus into Dassaretis, the country around the upper Devoll River (ancient Eordaicus). From then on the Upper Macedonian

cantons of Orestis and Lyncus could feel secure, and Philip could begin building cities 'amongst the Illyrians' and transferring population. He was also well placed to threaten other Illyrian peoples. Another king, Grabus, in fear made an alliance with the Chalcidians of Olynthus whereby each party undertook to attack Macedon if the other was attacked, and in 356 he entered into a grandiose military alliance with a Thracian and a Paeonian king as well as with Athens. The Athenian decree recording the alliance dated to late July 356 survives, a piece of irony. At almost the same moment Grabus was defeated by Philip's great general and right-hand man Parmenio; the news of the victory was said to have reached Philip at the same time as two other pieces of news, a victory for Philip's horse at the Olympic Games and the birth of Alexander; which shows that the defeat almost coincided with the Athenian decree.[25]

Grabus was compelled 'to attach himself to the Macedonians' and this phrase presumably meant 'to become an ally'. There were Illyrians in Alexander the Great's army, spoken of in the same breath as the other outlandish peoples, the Triballians (down the Morava and along the Danube) and the Thracians; perhaps they were allies rather than subjects of the Macedonian King, though the distinction might have been too nice for most Macedonians. The question therefore arises how near to the Adriatic did Philip's power extend. In 346 Isocrates wrote that Philip had become 'lord and master of the mass of Illyrians except for those living beside the Adriatic', but this cannot mean very much. The term 'Illyrians' was used of much of the whole of the later Roman province of Illyricum, and clearly Isocrates cannot have thought that Philip had gone as far as that. The truth would seem to be that two arms of Macedonian power reached out around Lake Ochrid, to the north and north-west along the Drin, to the south along the Devoll and its tributary the Osun (on which at the site of modern Berat the son of Philip's close counsellor and Alexander's deputy in Macedonia later founded in memory of his father the city of Antipatria), but the arms never met in Philip's day or reached the sea. Philip looked east, not west. He only came west to secure his kingdom from over-powerful Illyrian dynasts.[26]

One further expedition was necessary. A new menace arose in the power of Pleuratus, king of the Ardiaei who lived on the lower Drin. In 345 Philip attacked and defeated them, himself sustaining a serious wound. He proceeded to ravage their territory and pillage their towns, but that was all. The defeat of Pleuratus was what he had intended, not the extension of

Macedonian power to the Adriatic, and he returned to Macedonia – to find a letter from Isocrates telling him to avoid getting wounded, and adding 'as to the barbarians you are now fighting against, it will suffice for you to master them enough to secure your own realm'; which was exactly what Philip had himself done. One can only guess what he thought of Isocrates.[27]

Philip's work against the Illyrian peoples was successful enough. In the time of his father and of his elder brother Macedon had had to pay tribute to Illyrians to postpone the disastrous irruptions of which the worst was that of 359. By the time of his death his kingdom had been free from attack for over twenty years and the one-time marauders were part of the Macedonian army. Not, of course, that there was an end to trouble for Macedon. When the youth of Alexander and his absence in 335 on the Danube offered a chance, a son of the Bardylis defeated in 358 rose again, occupied Dassaretis, and so threatened Upper Macedonia, until Alexander defeated him. Realizing that the death of Philip had not weakened Macedon's will to defend itself, the peoples on the western borders returned to submissiveness for the rest of Alexander's reign.[28]

Expansion eastward was in every way more attractive. In the fifth century the Kingdom of Thrace had excited Thucydides' admiration for its magnitude and its wealth, extending as it did from the Strymon to the Black Sea and in its more easterly part from the Aegean to the Danube, and producing for the king in tribute and in gifts almost twice the city revenues of Athens. In addition, by the fourth century, trade with the Greek world in time of peace was considerable, perhaps largely in grain. When the kingdom was firmly ruled, given the warlike qualities of the Thracians, it was formidable indeed.[29]

Philip did not find it so. The strong king, of unprecedented prosperity, Cotys, had been murdered in 360. His sons divided the kingdom and proceeded to war against each other, the eldest, Cersobleptes, who ruled the most easterly section, aiming to reunite his father's kingdom. Philip was able to take over section by section.[30]

The takeover can be briefly recounted. When Philip took Amphipolis in 357, he gained the mining area on Mount Pangaeus controlled by that city. Even more alluring were the mines immediately to the east, to exploit which the Thasians had in 360 installed a colony. Within months of taking Amphipolis Macedonian colonists had displaced the Thasians, and the city was renamed Philippi; in due course it would produce

for Philip an enormous revenue of over a thousand talents a year. This should have united the wrangling kings. It did not. The western king, Cetriporis, entered into the grandiose and ineffectual alliance already noticed with Grabus the Illyrian, the Paeonian kings and the Athenians who all swore to help in the destruction of the colony. If in place of these vain words the kings of Thrace had joined in war against Philip, he might have been stopped, at least temporarily. As it was, the western king found that the submissive role of client king was all that remained to him and Philip was free for the next advance.[31]

That advance is somewhat obscure. In perhaps early 353 Philip with a naval force had moved well within the realm of the next king, Amadocus, as far as Maronea, despite that king's hostility; his motives and means are debatable; it seems unlikely that Philip would commit an army of any size to the sea when Athenian ships were to be expected. There is, however, no doubt that late in 352 Philip took the Macedonian army right through Thrace into the portion controlled by Cersobleptes and laid siege to a Thracian fort on the Propontis (the Sea of Marmara). It was a momentous event for Athens as will be later remarked. It was momentous for the Thracian kings as well. Cetriporis was then, if not earlier, expelled. His brother Amadocus fell into line, joining forces with Philip, and from that moment became a puppet. Cersobleptes was saved from the same fate for the moment because Philip was taken ill, but complete independence was a thing of the past. Probably at this time his son was taken off to Pella as a hostage, and what shadow of independence remained to him was removed in 346. In the middle of Philip's peace negotiations with Athens in that year he moved east and within a matter of a few weeks had captured the Sacred Mountain (wherever that was) where Cersobleptes had his treasury. Cersobleptes too was now a complete puppet. But he did not remain so. In 342 Philip began his final Thracian campaign, which must be described in a later chapter, and Cersobleptes was expelled from his kingdom. Probably now Thrace was placed under the control of a governor, 'the general in charge of Thrace'. Cities were founded, principally Philippopolis, (modern Plovdiv, derived from the ancient Thracian name Pulpudeva); another, Cabyle, can be sited near Jambol; a third, Beroe (modern Stara Zagora) has been attributed to Philip. The rest are unknown, but it is clear that the whole valley of the Hebrus (Bulgarian Maritza) was brought under Macedonian control. The only evidence about the sort of person settled in these

cities is comic and abusive. We need not doubt that the two thousand sent to Philippopolis were at least in good measure Macedonians, a further precedent for Alexander's foundations in the East.[32]

We can only guess how the Macedonians regarded this great expansion. The capture of Amphipolis gave security to eastern Macedonia, but the occupation of Philippi was surely for its mines. The extension of influence over the kings seems very much like what happened in the history of Upper Macedonia and with the Illyrians – the kings were to be subordinate to the King. But did Philip regard the sort of arrangements he made down to 346 as abiding or transitional? Cetriporis, the most westerly king, was probably expelled in 352. We do not know that he was not replaced with someone more amenable, and it may well be true that down to 346 Philip sought to apply in the east the method followed in the west. He could so easily have removed Cersobleptes in 346, if not before the Peace with Athens, certainly directly afterwards. But the campaign of 342 onwards was clearly intended to put an end to any semblance of Thracian independence. Apologists might try to explain why Philip attacked Cersobleptes and perhaps with some justice in their apology. That wily dynast seems in 352 to have been pressing Byzantium and Perinthus hard (whence their alliance with Philip) and if he was at it again in 342 it would not be surprising. But Philip could have replaced Cersobleptes (and he had a royal Thracian with him in his army), and Cersobleptes had nothing to do with the great plain of the Maritza between Rhodope and the Great Balkan Range. The decision to incorporate Thrace within the Macedonian state might have been influenced by plans to attack Persia, but puppet kings were unlikely to hinder the army's march or its line of communications and could be counted on to produce the required cavalry and light-armed troops. The simplest explanation is therefore the most probable. After he got peace with Athens, Philip resolved to make Thrace wholly Macedonian and with its wealth and population increase his power.[33]

Construction of roads, etc. and physical resources of the kingdom

Of the system of communications, necessary for the maintenance of a kingdom stretching from Albania to Bulgaria, there is little evidence. The work of constructing roads had been begun

long before Philip. In their advance westwards in 480 the Persians had had to cut roads, as had at a later date a Thracian king entering Macedonia from the north-east; and these roads had been maintained. Part of the road which later became the Via Egnatia existed in 423 when the Macedonian army used ox-carts in their advance into Lyncus, and it is reasonable to suppose that the main roads linking Upper and Lower Macedonia were formed in the fifth century. King Archelaus is explicitly attested as active in this regard. He was perhaps responsible for the 'military road' by which King Perseus fled in 168 from Pydna 'to the Pierian forest' and on to Pella, Archelaus' new capital, which had to be linked to the old capital Aegae by a good road. Such a route probably existed earlier and Archelaus may merely have improved it, but he is said to have 'cut straight roads' connecting a large number of fortified places. So he may have adequately provided for Macedonia. Similar work is to be presumed for Philip in the conquered territory. For instance, from Heraclea Lyncestis (Monastir/Bitola) to Lychnidus (Ochrid) a 'military road' was as important for him after 358 as for the Romans later. No doubt he attended to the matter. Again, the route followed by Alexander in 335, which took him through the peoples on the upper Strymon across the Vardar and along the Erigon (Cerna Reka) to Monastir, is likely to have been provided with a military road: the Macedonian army needed and used waggons for transport; presumably Alexander had them with him on this campaign, and since he was in a hurry to prevent the invasion of Macedonia he was probably travelling on properly constructed roads. When he set off for Asia in 334, his route took him down the Strymon valley to Amphipolis; there must have been a well-made road there. No doubt there were roads in the Thracian kingdom, which made it possible for Philip to plant his colonies at Philippi and in the Hebrus valley. No doubt, too, he saw to it that the roads were adequate for the swift transit of his army.[34]

In this connection one would greatly wish to know more about how the great rivers of Macedonia were crossed in Philip's day. The Persian method in the fourth century and probably earlier was to form a pontoon bridge. The Athenians at Amphipolis had a proper bridge of some sort. But the modern visitor to Macedonia cannot help wondering how the Macedonians of Philip's day managed. The Strymon at Amphipolis is narrow enough to be bridged by the use of tall trees laid from pier to pier, but even the Moglenitsa, which is

the ancient Lydias, is too wide for such a method to be conceivable. The Vardar, at any rate to English eyes, is a mighty river over which a pontoon would at times be very unreliable. Yet we do not hear of delays at river crossings. The explanation must be that in ancient times the major rivers were bridged either where, as with the Strymon at Amphipolis, they narrowed and allowed the use of long trees to form a base for planks, or where they spread out so wide as to divide into a number of channels which could be each bridged with logs and planks. It is to be presumed that Philip made his contribution here too in strengthening the system of communications.[35]

Another physical change may be noted. According to Theophrastus who visited Macedon during Philip's reign, the plain of Philippi, which had earlier been covered with trees and swamp, had been drained and brought under cultivation. What Philip did there he may be presumed to have done elsewhere. The ample forests of Macedonia, which today are largely on the mountainous slopes of the upland cantons, were in ancient times much more widespread and appear to have extended to the central plain. The great downward movement from hills to plains and from Upper to Lower Macedonia was no doubt accompanied by the sort of work recorded for the plain of Philippi. Alexander included in the list of his father's achievements the change of dress from skins to cloaks. In so far as he meant it literally, he alluded to a change from hunting to grazing of sheep, i.e. from forest to pasture.[36]

Certainly the state prospered. This was partly due to trade, and every territorial advance increased the revenues of the state. More important was the huge increase in wealth brought by the acquisition of mines of precious metals. Macedonia itself was rich in mines. Alexander I, the Philhellene, in the fifth century received from one mining area in the north-east of the country a talent of silver a day, in Greek terms a very large sum indeed, and there were other mines within the Kingdom. To these Philip added in 358 the mines of Damastion, which were located somewhere at the northern end of Lake Ochrid, in 357 the mines of Amphipolis, and in 356 the mines of Philippi which in time produced over 1,000 talents a year. A balance sheet is not possible, but it is abundantly clear that Macedon under Philip was, financially speaking, many times stronger than Athens or any single Greek state. Nor did it, like Athens, need to import food. Philip was famously prodigal and when Alexander invaded Asia in 334 there was almost nothing in hand. It did not matter, for the King's revenues

were enormous. In a world abundantly supplied with mercenary soldiers, Philip could afford as many as he needed.[37]

In the early part of his reign he had some need of mercenaries, and later he kept a force that was available for use where he would not employ Macedonians, viz. for garrison duty. How far the various mercenary forces which Demosthenes asserted came from Philip actually did so is to be discussed, but it is clear that Demosthenes could say what he said because there was known to be a corps of mercenaries. Philip had the wealth to keep as many as he wanted. But by far the greatest asset he had was the manpower of Macedon itself. The figures for the Macedonian army that crossed to Asia in 334 were, by Greek standards, indeed large. Of the strictly Macedonian and Balkan troops there were 12,000 infantry, 8,000 light-armed, 1,800 Companion cavalry (and 900 cavalry of various sorts). To these were joined the Macedonian element in the advance force of 10,000 sent to Asia in 336; their number can only be guessed. But 12,000 infantry and 1,500 cavalry were left behind to defend the realm. So by the death of Philip the Macedonian part of his army included at least 24,000 infantry, 4,000 cavalry, and a great number of supporting troops. From 352 he could use against Greece the Thessalian cavalry, of whom 1,800 crossed to Asia, only a portion of what Thessaly could provide.[38]

The manpower available to Philip, at any rate by the later 340s, was thus far greater than that of any Greek city-state. Athens' regular expeditionary force in the fourth century was 5,000 hoplites (the number recurs several times). On one occasion they are alleged to have sent to the Peloponnese a force of 12,000, which is credible enough when fifth-century strengths are considered. But even if Athens had sent out every man she possessed to fight in the north, Macedon would still have been at least twice as strong – quite apart from her strategic advantages in such a conflict. The great Theban victory over the Spartans at Leuctra in 371 was won with 6,000; an army of 13,000 was sent into Thessaly in the mid-350s. Plainly no Greek city-state could with confidence engage Macedon on its own.[39]

With the Macedon of Philip a new dimension came into Greek affairs. The first battle of Mantinea in 418, which involved on both sides a total of about 15,000 at the most, was said by Thucydides to be the 'greatest' battle in the history of wars between city-states. For the size of army necessary to confront Macedon they would have had to go back to the

Persian Wars, when at the battle of Plataea the Greeks put in the field nearly 39,000 hoplites. The days of city-state politics and wars were coming to an end. Over against the world of the city-state stood the national state (to use a not entirely satisfactory term), and Greek history could not continue on the same terms. The feudal state of Persia had been vast and therefore fragile, remote enough to be repelled. Macedon, compact and adjacent, presented a problem that would not grow less. The city-states would have to combine against Macedon or under it. Philip had transformed Macedon and the rest of Greece as well.[40]

IV

'THOROUGHLY GREEK'

Philip was a man of wit, to judge by various remarks that have been preserved, and of great intelligence, as those who visited Pella as ambassadors discovered. He showed himself affable, and a great many seem to have enjoyed his society. The Athenian orator, Aeschines, in early 346, was denouncing Philip as the enemy of Greece, and returned from his first visit to Macedonia a few weeks later declaring that he was 'thoroughly Greek, an outstandingly good speaker, a very great admirer of Athens'. Demosthenes would have it that Aeschines' judgement was corrupted by money. It is more likely that it was corrupted by charm. But there is no doubt that Philip was a warm admirer of Greek culture and so inevitably to some extent of Athens.[1]

As already remarked, the Macedonians were Greeks, but in 359 remote and backward Greeks with a form of kingship still Homeric, and with Homeric values. Bravery was most highly esteemed. There was a custom that at dinner only those who had speared a wild boar without using a net could recline; the rest had to eat sitting up. A famous mosaic discovered at Pella depicts two almost naked men armed only with spears attacking a lion. The nakedness is artistic licence, but the picture reminds one that there were lions in Macedonia, as too lynxes (whence the name of the canton Lyncus), bears, panthers and leopards, though the evidence for the last two has been questioned. Hunting such animals required, and made, brave men, but inevitably the arts of civilization were less esteemed. There was indeed a harshness about Macedonian life. When a man was found guilty in a trial before the army, forthwith the army hurled its javelins and killed him – no time for the thoughts of the *Phaedo*. The man who in 336 murdered Philip had, as an act of revenge, been made drunk by a leading Macedonian and given over to the grooms for homosexual debauch. Above all

Macedonian drinking habits appalled Greeks by their grossness. Alexander's march through Asia was punctuated by infamous drunken brawls, the most notable being that which ended in his murdering one of his two cavalry commanders. Nor was this due simply to the corrupting affects of his losing touch with the ethos of Macedonia. Such excesses happened under Philip. Although the censorious Theopompus was pleased to denounce drunkenness in many places and persons, his frequent denunciations of Philip's drunken habits were probably justified. Not long before his death Philip was only prevented by his own intoxicated condition from murdering Alexander.[2]

King Archelaus by his patronage of poetry and drama had done much to civilize the life of the court. Philip's father Amyntas had had Nicomachus, the father of Aristotle, at his court as physician and friend, and in the reign of Philip's brother, Perdiccas, Plato sent one of his school, Euphraeus, to instruct the King and, as it would seem, run a school; one of the Platonic *Epistles* was addressed to Perdiccas and declared that Euphraeus would prove useful for his understanding of the principles of a monarchic constitution. At the court Euphraeus was given something of a free hand; rumour had it that only those who could talk philosophy or geometry were admitted to the King's table.[3]

One might wonder how deep it all went. The dramatic contests established by Archelaus at Dium went on year by year, attended presumably by the King and the court when he was not otherwise engaged, as he must frequently have been. But what did it all mean to Philip? Was it just a splendid occasion which advertised the power and magnificence of the King of Macedon? It was alleged that Philip's mother, the Lyncestian princess, had to work hard learning the alphabet to be able to teach her sons. This need not be taken literally; the same source called her 'Illyrian and utter barbarian'. But it suggests that Philip may have been, culturally speaking, somewhat deprived in childhood, while the preoccupations of winning and ruling his vast kingdom might be thought to prevent his acquiring later what he had missed. Many Greeks were to migrate to Macedon during his reign, not all of them the ruffians depicted by Theopompus and Demosthenes. For instance, Nearchus the Cretan, who commanded the fleet commissioned by Alexander to sail down the Indus and back to Babylon and who wrote a history of the voyage, migrated to Macedon during Philip's reign. Eumenes of Cardia, probably a relative of the great Hieronymus, the historian of the period

after the death of Alexander, and himself an educated man, became Philip's secretary. The orator Python, a distinguished pupil of Isocrates, was another. Like many other cultured Greeks, these men found the Macedon of Philip congenial enough. But they were all beneficiaries of Philip in one way or another and may privately have thought of the King with contempt.[4]

None the less it may be safely enough asserted that Philip deserved Aeschines' description of 'thoroughly Greek', and since it affects understanding of his relations with the Greek city-states it is worth discussion. The most obvious mark was Philip's great love of the theatre and various forms of public performance. He had within his train even on campaign musicians and comedians, and gave such performers a warm welcome in Macedon; 'players of mimes and composers of scurrilous songs,' Demosthenes sneered. A number of well-known actors received by him are named in various places. Anaxandrides, a leading writer of the Middle Comedy, who experimented with plots about love affairs and seduction of maidens, and who had been very successful at Athens, competed in Philip's dramatic contests; either he resided in Macedon for a period or he was well enough received to keep on going there. Most telling is the fact that, to secure the release of Athenians captured at Olynthus in 348, the Athenians sent as ambassador an actor 'because Philip knew him and because he was so well-disposed to the dramatic art'. Philip was not just patron of literature and drama. 'Thoroughly Greek', he loved it all.[5]

The choice of Aristotle as tutor to the prince might be dismissed as not much more than the choice of the son of his father's friend and physician, but other Greeks of intellectual distinction were received at Pella. Speusippus, Plato's nephew and the head of the Academy after Plato's death, visited Macedon, having earlier written to Philip a letter of recommendation for a historian friend; presumably he went in expectation of welcome. The historian Theopompus was at the court in the later 340s, not liking what he saw (as was his custom). Theophrastus, who was to succeed Aristotle as head of the Lyceum, pursued his study of natural phenomena in Macedonia, as various allusions in his works show.[6] No doubt all three found it advantageous for their work if not for their purses, and their going does not necessarily mean that they approved of Philip. They may have been less high-minded than Socrates who spurned to visit King Archelaus. But what was Philip doing with them? He is said to have honoured Theophrastus as well

as Plato. Had he some interest in the matters that concerned Athenian philosophers?

One suspects that he had. One of his friends would seem to have been Hermias of Atarneus, who is one of the most interesting figures of the fourth century. Atarneus was a small city near the coast of Asia Minor opposite the island of Lesbos, and Hermias, by origin a Bithynian according to his critics but arguably Greek enough to be allowed at a later date to enter pairs of horses at the Olympic Games, had been the slave of the ruler, then his partner, finally heir to his power. He extended his rule over the surrounding territory including cities in the south of the Troad, and he seems to have assumed something of the influence earlier exercised by Mausolus of Caria over the Ionian cities to the south. His expansion northwards brought him into contact with the joint rulers of a small city in the Troad with whom he entered into some sort of friendly agreement. Both these rulers had studied philosophy in Athens under Plato and it is possible that Hermias himself had attended the school at a time when Plato was away. Not long before his death Plato addressed a joint letter to the three of them urging them to cooperate in a spirit of true philosophic friendship which he held so necessary to successful and just monarchy. Theopompus was pleased to give a sour account of Hermias and sneer at his philosophizing with the Platonists, but Aristotle and his nephew Callisthenes were warmly disposed to this example of Platonic kingship; for Hermias in accordance with philosophic advice modified the severity of his rule. On the death of Plato in 348/7 Aristotle had left Athens and accepted the invitation of Hermias to reside in one of his cities. There Aristotle established a school of philosophy and taught for three years. Hermias was thus enabled to 'philosophize with the Platonists'. Aristotle married Hermias' niece and also formed a very favourable opinion of him, as the sequel showed. For in 342/1 Hermias, deceived and taken captive by the Persians, and subjected to barbaric torture until he died, comported himself with true philosophic courage, and Aristotle was moved to extol his memory in poetry and to erect a monument at Delphi. Callisthenes too wrote an encomium. Hermias was, in short, a philosophic and a philosopher's hero. He had remained steadfast to the end and his last message to his 'friends and companions' was that 'he had done nothing unworthy of philosophy, nothing disgraceful.'[7]

Hermias was tortured by the Persians because he was suspected of complicity with Philip in the latter's plans for

attacking Persia. Demosthenes in his *Fourth Philippic* of 341, in advocating an Athenian initiative to win the help of Persia against Philip, counted it a piece of good luck that 'Philip's agent and accomplice in all his preparations against the King of Persia has been dragged off up to the Persian court and the King will hear the whole business . . . from the very person who carried it out and is responsible for it.'[8] Behind these allusive words has been supposed to lie a plan of Philip's to use the territory of Hermias as a bridgehead for the crossing into Asia. That is hardly satisfactory. That coast was not suited, strategically speaking, as a bridgehead, nor would such a plan require that Hermias should be fully informed of all Philip's 'preparations'. Hermias was suspect to the Persians and expected by Demosthenes to be fully in the know, we may presume, because he was known to be on terms of friendship with Philip. But what was the bond between them? Was it just the friendship of two monarchs who both hated Persia? Or was there more to it?

It may well be that the bond was an interest in Platonic philosophy. When Plato sent to Perdiccas Euphraeus who provided the Macedonian court with conversation in philosophy and geometry, it was to advance in yet another area the Platonic principles of monarchy. In the fourth century the ideal of democracy had lost its charm. Greece had been unable adequately to develop that least objectionable of systems, representative government, and there was widespread disillusion with that proven weakling, pure democracy. In an age when the city-state seemed in great danger of falling apart in its dissensions, many looked for some other system which would save it from itself and found an answer in monarchy enlightened by philosophy. Theorizing about monarchy became the fashion. Plato had argued earlier that until kings became philosophers and philosophers became kings there would not be a truly just society. Time had not produced philosophers as rulers, but one might still hope by philosophy to mitigate the ways of rulers. The Syracusan version had failed, but there were many monarchs to convert and members of the Platonic school could be sent out to do their best. Euphraeus in Macedon was one such apostle, and the so-called 'Companions' of Hermias two others. When Plato died, these two saw their chance and persuaded Hermias to seek to secure the man who really ought to have become the head of the Platonic School. Aristotle went. Philosophy and philosophic monarchy thrived, and the next hope was Macedon. Shortly before Hermias died, Philip

showed his colours. The greatest of Plato's disciples was invited to Macedon to tutor the prince, for, like Hermias, Philip, his friend, was interested in what philosophy could do for monarchs. Again Aristotle went, and in his train the young Theophrastus. Philip, like Hermias, would get the best that philosophy could give. Unlike Hermias, he was not a eunuch, and philosophy could be applied in the education of his heir, where it would do the most good and, perhaps, where Philip saw it would be much needed. Philip and Hermias were one in their view of the matter. Theopompus could sneer at the origins of the one, and Demosthenes of the other. But here at any rate they were 'thoroughly Greek'.

Nor was Aristotle the only philosopher engaged by the King. Another happens to be mentioned as running a school attended by the future murderer of Philip. There may have been others. It would be false to suggest that all these high-minded endeavours originated with Philip. Euphraeus had been running a school before Philip acceded, and there were perhaps quite a number of Macedonians who were 'thoroughly Greek', Antipater for one. He was about forty when Philip acceded to the throne and his tastes had been formed long before. In this regard the striking thing about him is his close friendship with Aristotle, who named him in his will as executor, and whose writings included *Nine Books addressed to Antipater*; he presumably shared Aristotle's interests. His son Cassander, attempting to defend his father's conduct before Alexander, was put down, the story goes, with the remark 'these are just the well-known sophistical arguments of Aristotle for a contrary case', which suggests that at least Antipater's son had had the benefit of Aristotle. Again, there is enough to suggest a fairly wide familiarity in Macedon with Greek drama for which Philip may not have been responsible. In the famous drunken brawl that ended in Alexander murdering Clitus the latter delivered his final insult by quoting a line from Euripides. Another story assumed that the murderer of Philip also knew his Euripides. Such interests may be due most of all to what Archelaus, rather than Philip, had done.[9]

Still, it is notable that when Philip chose Aristotle to tutor the prince he assigned him a place somewhat remote from the court in which to do so. The Royal Pages were with the King to serve him. No doubt they received an education there. When they conspired against Alexander, one of them was thought to have become interested in philosophy. But for Alexander, Aristotle was installed at Mieza, which was just below modern

Naoussa, on the edge of the central plain and on the road from Aegae (Vergina) through Beroea to Pella. The stone seats and shady walks which Aristotle haunted were still on show four centuries later, and recently archaeologists have uncovered the probable site, one of the most enchanting in northern Greece. A colonnade cut into the limestone has been uncovered and in the middle and at each end there is a cave with stalagmites, naturally appealing to Aristotle the scientist, and not without some piquancy for Aristotle the pupil of Plato – that he should descend into the Cave to instruct the prince in the Good. Aristotle was twitted for preferring to be stuck in the mud of Macedonia when he could have been at Athens in the Academy, but this Nymphaeum at Mieza must have been a delightful place in which to get on with his work and his library. Its remoteness perhaps explains how the *Politics* neglects the real problem for fourth-century political theory, viz. what was to be the relation between city-states, however just, with kingdoms like Macedon. It also shows Philip's attitude towards the education of Alexander. The prince no doubt had companions; surely enough Hephaestion, to whom he remained immoderately attached, was one; who else can only be guessed. But for two or three years he lived largely apart from the court, its excursions and intrigues. The effect is well-known. Alexander came to love Homer and read freely. When short of reading matter in the heart of Asia, he sent for the works of the Athenian tragedians. The collection of exact geographical information seems to have been undertaken in an Aristotelian spirit of scientific inquiry. But to achieve these results Philip saw that the tuition of Aristotle would need to be given away from the court, and because he believed in the value of what Aristotle had to impart the prince was schooled at Mieza. It may be added that if the future ruler of Egypt, Ptolemy I, who was perhaps not much older than Alexander, was a fellow pupil, he too turned out well, as the Library and the so-called Museum of Alexandria testify.[10]

The description 'thoroughly Greek' was not without justification, and since Athens was the cultural centre of the Greek world Philip was no doubt in some degree an admirer of Athens. He never visited the city. Earlier it was not safe to do so and after the defeat of Athens it was prudent not to try, although he sent his son when the chance of an embassy offered in 338. Like many Athenian intellectuals, he had no respect for Athens' popular leaders and said so. We may surmise that he spurned its democratic constitution, and if the 'good laws and

customs' with which he adorned the Macedonians were at all influenced as Hermias had been influenced, by philosophic theory, it was not the theory of democracy. Still, as Pericles had remarked, the city was an 'education for Greece' and Philip had perhaps a proper admiration for it. It is said that once when his advisers counselled him to treat the Athenians with severity he remarked that he was surprised at them bidding a man who did everything and endured everything for the sake of honourable repute (*doxa*) to throw away the place where that repute was judged (the *theatron*). Certainly he treated Athens and Athenians with leniency.[11]

Others fared less well. 'Greek' feeling in the King of Macedon could not save them. Alexander, who professed to be taking on behalf of Greece vengeance on the Persians and having defeated them sent home, 'in his desire to be honoured by the Greeks', grandiose proclamation of mission accomplished and liberty restored, had not hesitated in 335 to raze to the ground the city of Thebes, nicely exempting the house where the poet Pindar had lived, nor to sell into slavery thirty thousand of its inhabitants. Nor did sentiment impede his father from treating similarly the Chalcidian cities of the north. Had not imperial Athens done likewise and worse? Such severities were themselves thoroughly Greek.[12]

Of Philip's personal appearance there is practically nothing to say. There were statues at Athens, Olympia and elsewhere, but no identification is secure. He and Olympias are represented on a mosaic from Baalbek, but it is of no help.[13] It is presumed that the bearded horseman, wearing the characteristic Macedonian felt hat, on the silver Tetradrachms of Philip is a representation of the King himself, but even if this is correct the figure is too small to be of assistance.*

* M. Andronicos is now, in November 1977, reported to believe that one of the ivory heads found in a tomb at Vergina is of Philip. Cf. p. 30n.

V

THE SUBMISSION OF THESSALY

Philip in Thessaly 359–352

At the start of his reign Philip had much to occupy him in Macedon itself, but he lost no time before he began to intervene in Thessalian affairs. One might wonder therefore what drew him. In the Grand Army that Alexander took to Asia there were as many in the Thessalian cavalry as there were in the Companions, and in the three great battles of the Granicus, Issus and Gaugamela the Thessalians played an important part, which Alexander himself recognized. In Philip's operations being less fully attested, they are less prominent, but for his military power perhaps more important. Until the Companion cavalry had been built up to the numbers he required, the Thessalians could be used against Greeks and barbarians. For Thessaly had by far the best cavalry in the Greek world until the Macedonian eclipsed it. Thessalian horses were the fastest and much prized (Alexander's famous mount Bucephalas was Thessalian and cost, it was alleged, the staggering sum of thirteen talents), and Thessalian horsemanship was greatly admired and feared. The numbers of cavalry are astonishingly large compared to those of the city-states. Boeotia, which also prided itself on its cavalry, was numerically strongest with 1,100, but a mere nothing compared to that of united Thessaly of which estimates ranged between 6,000 and 3,000, but never less. Clearly the cavalry strength of Thessaly was worth the seeking, and so too was the wealth that cavalry implied. In Thessaly things were done, because they could be done, in the grand manner. Before the troubles of the first half of the fourth century it had been the richest place in Greece, as far as the fertility of the soil was concerned. United, it was indeed worth having.[1]

So one might suppose that Philip was drawn by ambition

into Thessaly. But it would be wrong. At the start of his reign he was struggling merely to establish himself in Macedonia, and his first intervention in Thessaly must have been part of that struggle. The previous forty-five years had shown that if



Map 3. Thessaly

Macedon did not have a controlling interest in northern Thessaly, Macedonia was not safe from Thessaly. The passes from Thessaly into Macedonia, most notably the Volustana Pass which separated the canton of Perrhaebia from the middle valley of the Haliacmon River, did not present insuperable difficulties, and had been used successfully in both directions. At the end of the fifth century King Archelaus, who as already noted was the most successful Macedonian King before Philip,

had not only taken control of Perrhaebia but also intervened in Larisa, taking ten sons of leading citizens hostage. Within two decades Philip's father Amyntas was restored to his kingdom by the Thessalians and, for a period at least, part of Macedonia was a Thessalian protectorate. Alexander in 324 spoke of the Macedonians as being at one time 'scared to death of the Thessalians', and in the late 370s the young Philip must have been well aware of what there was to fear, for in that period Jason of Pherae, having attained great power within Thessaly, was giving utterance to the most grandiose ambitions in which control of Macedon played an important part.[2]

Jason of Pherae was an outstanding, if somewhat enigmatic, ruler. The city of Pherae in south-eastern Thessaly (modern Velestinon) had had little part in the early struggles of Thessalian politics but, since with its port Pagasae it controlled virtually the only outlet for maritime commerce which was considerable, in the first half of the fourth century it was prosperous and powerful. During the 370s, while the states of Greece to the south were preoccupied with their struggles, Jason, whose father had sought but, despite a famously bloody victory over the Larisans, failed to gain control of the whole of Thessaly, extended his influence over the entire country and got himself appointed *tagus*, a curious office which was not always filled but, once held, was maintained, it would seem, for life. He had already assembled and trained a mercenary force of 6,000. As *tagus* he had at his disposal the full military resources of Thessaly, which under his reorganization were said to amount to over 8,000 cavalry, 20,000 hoplites, and abundant peltasts. Jason talked, as he lived, in the grand manner and these figures may be much inflated, but certainly his military power was formidable. He extended his authority over various peoples living on the fringes of Thessaly including Perrhaebia. He 'made alliance with Amyntas', which must have meant a sort of subjection but with no guarantee that he would stop at alliance. He spoke in the most ample terms of his plans for attacking Persia, and in one account declared that the crossing of the sea would present him with no difficulty, since he would build a very much larger fleet than the Athenian, when he 'had Macedonia whence even the Athenians get their timber'. He died in 370 by the hand of an assassin before he had shown whether his deeds could match his words, but Macedon had had good reason to fear and Philip could not forget it. If his Macedon was to be secure, he could not neglect Thessaly.[3]

The menace to Macedon was also its salvation. The successors

of Jason as ruler of Pherae were sufficiently powerful to get themselves appointed *tagus* and so harsh in their exercise of the office as to unite the rest of Thessaly in the desire to find a champion and saviour. In the 360s the rising power of Thebes under Epaminondas and Pelopidas gave protection. Pherae was militarily checked and, it would appear, some sort of constitutional change was made whereby a Council of the Thessalians presided over by an official entitled the *archōn* ran Thessalian affairs. (The office of *tagus* seems by the 360s to have become hereditary to the rulers of Pherae, and, although they continued to hold it, the supreme constitutional power was with the *archōn*.) Thus for the moment the ambitions of the successors of Jason were frustrated, but as the Thebans became more and more concerned with maintaining their position to the south in central Greece, the Thessalians were increasingly threatened from Pherae, and by the time Philip had dealt with the crisis of his accession year they were ready to seek his help. So it was that Macedonian and Thessalian interests took him into Thessaly.[4]

In 358 he made some sort of foray into Thessaly, in which presumably he secured control of Perrhaebia. Whether, like his brother Alexander II, he occupied Larisa is unknown, but it is unlikely. His methods were more subtle. Perhaps his marriage at this time to a Larisan may be taken as a measure of his relations with her city; at any rate his two Thessalian marriages were said to be made out of a wish to make the Thessalian people friendly to him. For the moment that was all that Philip could spare time for and probably all that the opposition to Pherae required of him, for by 357 the assassination of Alexander of Pherae, *tagus* since 369, who had shown himself aggressive and ambitious, seemed to free Thessaly from danger. By 353 Philip was needed again. Pherae had found a strong ally in Phocis, and threatened to dominate all Thessaly once more. Philip was summoned by the Thessalians to help in war against the ruler of Pherae, who responded by summoning the Phocians. Philip defeated this Phocian force, 7,000 strong, which had to withdraw from Thessaly, but Onomarchus of Phocis came with the full Phocian army. Philip was outnumbered and twice defeated; in one engagement he was taken by surprise in an ambush. He retired to Macedonia and was said to have claimed 'I didn't run away but, like a ram, I pulled back to butt again harder.' In 352 he returned to the attack. First he laid siege to and took Pagasae, thus depriving Pherae of any hopes of help from the sea. The masters of

Pherae summoned the Phocian general Onomarchus, who promptly came with an army of 20,000 infantry and 500 cavalry. The number of mercenaries kept by Pherae at this date had by now sunk as low as perhaps 2,000, but the Pheraean and Phocian armies combined must have been a formidable enough array. The future of Thessaly and the future of Philip were about to be decided.[5]

Both realized the danger. Philip called on the Thessalians formally to join with him in the war. The Thessalians appointed him *archōn*. The office was held for life, gave him control over all the revenues of the state, and, most importantly, put him in command of their military forces – an immense increase in power. In fact, if not in theory, Thessaly would be part of the Macedonian Kingdom for the next 150 years.[6]

At the head of his new army of 20,000 infantry and 3,000 cavalry Philip confronted the Phocians, probably in the plain on the west side of the Gulf of Pagasae, where the crocus flower flourished – hence the modern name of the Battle of the Crocus Field. There Philip's heavy superiority in cavalry gave him a decisive victory. Six thousand Phocian mercenaries and with them Onomarchus were said to have been killed, and over 3,000 taken prisoner. The masters of Pherae promptly handed over the city and departed with their mercenaries. Thessaly was safe – for Philip.[7]

The Sacred War

The Battle of the Crocus Field closed one chapter in Philip's career and opened another. Phocis, the ally of Pherae, was also the chief opponent in the Sacred War of Thebes, and Thessaly, the ancient enemy of Phocis, supported Thebes. As new *archōn* of Thessaly, Philip could not have stayed clear of the war if he had wanted to. But he did not want to, for he saw that if he could settle the Sacred War, he might be able to settle Greece.

Pelopidas, the agent and perhaps architect of the extension of Theban influence northwards, died in 364 in battle against the army of Pherae, and Epaminondas, the author of Theban independence and proponent of Theban empire, died in 362 in battle against the anti-Theban coalition of the Peloponnese. They left little of a problem about the Peloponnese. Thebes had cut Sparta down from world power to local wrangler by

the foundations of Messene and Megalopolis and it was her plain interest after 362 to sustain them, which indeed she proceeded to do. To the north things were different. Even before Epaminondas died, Phocis had insisted on the letter of her treaty with Thebes and declined to take any part in what many hoped would be the final resolution of the differences of the Greeks. Phocis had to be dealt with, but the way to do it was not obvious. In itself Phocis was not a serious military problem for the Thebans at the head of the Boeotian army. The twenty-two cities were too small to resist for long, the population too small to produce an army that could match the Boeotian, which was moreover at the apogee of its military greatness. But, if the Thebans sought to reduce the Phocians, help might be forthcoming from Sparta, Athens and the ruler of Pherae, and Thebes could well find herself on the defensive, a situation which those cities of Boeotia forced to accept her leadership would exploit to the full. As early as autumn 363 the citizens of Delphi had divided in their allegiance, some for and some against Thebes; the leaders of the latter were exiled, their property confiscated and put up for sale; they were received with honour and given refuge at Athens. This reflected the division in Central Greece generally between Phocis and Thebes. Conflict could not be long avoided.[8]

By autumn 357 Athens found herself involved in war against her allies of the Second Athenian Confederacy, the dangerous Alexander of Pherae had been assassinated, and Thebes judged the moment suitable for action. The affairs of the Delphic sanctuary were controlled by the Delphic Amphictyony, an organization of twelve peoples which included the Ionians and Dorians but was for the rest composed of the peoples of Central Greece ranging from the Perrhaebians and the Thessalians in the north to the Phocians and the Boeotians in the south. Thus while both Athens as Ionian and Sparta as Dorian were represented, the majority of the members were at this period much under the influence of the Thebans of Boeotia. At the autumn meeting of the Amphictyons of 357 Thebes had both Sparta and Phocis denounced, the former for having in time of truce seized the citadel of Thebes twenty-five years before, the latter for occupying and working part of the sacred plain below Delphi. Both actions could be regarded as formal breaches of the rules governing the conduct of Amphictyonic states. So both Sparta and Phocis were heavily fined. By the spring meeting of 356 neither, predictably, had paid, and the fines were doubled and penal action threatened. Not content

with this decision of the Amphictyons, Thebes sought to buttress her action by having the Amphictyonic decree approved by the organization of the Greeks set up under the Common Peace of 362, and doubtless thought that she was setting about the isolation of Phocis by a method unassailably legal. Phocis responded by occupying Delphi, erasing the Amphictyonic decrees, and announcing that she would, by ancient right, take charge.[9]

The Greeks did not, however, as Thebes must have hoped, assemble in force to crush the usurper. They recognized all this as shabby Theban politics and waited on events for over a year, in the course of which only the Locrians, who were nearest to Delphi, and the Boeotians made any moves to expel the Phocians. The Locrians attacked, were repulsed, and themselves suffered ravaging by the Phocians. The Boeotians decreed 'help for the shrine', and sent a force which did nothing of note. In the course of 355 both sides gathered support. The Phocians sent out embassies to justify their action, and were rewarded with formal alliances by Athens and Sparta. The Boeotians sent out embassies to the Thessalians and the other Amphictyons, and at a meeting – presumably the regular autumn meeting held near Thermopylae – a majority of the Amphictyons voted for war against Phocis. So the Sacred War began.[10]

The Thessalians played their part by sending a force of 6,000, perhaps in early 354. They were promptly defeated and for some time stayed out of the war.[11] Then in 353 as Philip moved against the Pheraeans, the Phocians went to their help, as already noticed, and defeated Philip. In 352 Philip returned to the attack, but now as formally appointed *archōn* of Thessaly, and, when he defeated the Phocians at the Battle of the Crocus Field, he both freed Thessaly from the threat of Pherae and led one of the Amphictyons against the usurpers and the temple-robbers. Now for Philip the Sacred War had begun.

The general Greek view of the Sacred War

When Phocis first occupied Delphi, there were many Greeks who sympathized. Thebes had used her influence with the members of the Amphictyony to advance her own political purposes, and the trouble at Delphi was of Theban making. Sensible and pious men like the historian Xenophon wished to

see Delphi independent of both parties. If, however, it came to full-scale war between Thebes and Phocis, the interests of Athens and Sparta required them to support the Phocians, and this imposed no strain on their consciences, since the Phocians had announced that they would respect the temple and refrain from its treasures. The feeling in Greece completely changed when the Phocians began to help themselves in order to pay the mercenaries required for the war.[12]

The use of temple treasures to finance war was no novelty. Athens had so conducted her financial policy in the second half of the fifth century; monies were paid over to the goddess Athena on the presumption that they would be available for the state to borrow in time of war, and they were borrowed at interest to help finance her operations in the Peloponnesian War. At the same time her opponents did not scruple to talk of borrowing from the sacred treasuries at Delphi and Olympia. So there was to the Greek mind nothing inherently wicked in the Phocian action. But of the vast sums borrowed from Athena only a fraction had been repaid and in the fourth century the use of temple treasures was regarded with some disapproval. In the 360s the Arcadian league had divided over the use of the treasures of Olympia to pay for mercenaries; some argued in the league assembly that 'they must not use the sacred monies or bequeath to their descendants forever this reproach of the gods against themselves'. Xenophon was plainly shocked by the idea. When after the Phocians began to use the Delphic treasure he was writing his account of Jason, he distinguished between managing the temple and using its funds; the latter would be attended to by Apollo himself according to an oracle, and Xenophon implied that the murder of Jason shortly after was the penalty for what Jason had in mind. Such scruples were probably very widespread. Every year the pious gifts of individuals, often no more than the trifling amount of a single *drachma*, were inscribed at Delphi on stone, and to such people the Phocians responsible were temple-robbers who could only come to a bad end. None of the accounts we have of the Sacred War are contemporary, but they all directly or indirectly reflect the widespread feeling of the Greeks of the fourth century that the Phocians had most grievously sinned and that the disaster which befell them was their due reward. Death was at Athens the penalty for temple robbery; death was all the Phocians could expect. They had perhaps begun by borrowing or professing to borrow, but the scale of their 'borrowings' was by 352 enough to convince all

pious observers that this was plain temple robbery. Some outraged Greeks even tried to compensate the god.[13]

It is fruitless to ask whether Philip shared any of this feeling, although one may suspect that his comparative leniency to the Phocians after 346 argues that he did not. As *archōn* of Thessaly, which was a member of the Amphictyony and animated by ancient and bitter hatred of the Phocians, he had no alternative. In the name of all that was holy Phocis must be crushed, and when his army took the field at the Battle of the Crocus Field in 352 'Philip, as if he was the avenger not of the Thebans but of sacrilege, ordered all his soldiers to wear crowns of laurel and he proceeded to battle, under the leadership, as it were, of the god'. The Phocians 'at the sight of these divine symbols, terrified by their guilty consciences, threw away their arms'.[14] The same pious source does not recount what the Macedonian part of Philip's army thought about it all. Philip for his part must have seen that under the banner of the god he could win the goodwill of all right-thinking Greeks, all the better himself to master them.

The defence of Phocis in 352

After the battle Philip had to deal with Pherae. The two leaders of its last days were allowed to leave the city under truce with their 2,000 mercenaries. This must have engaged Philip for some days, and to reach Thermopylae and the Phocians he had a march of over 140 kilometres. By the time he got there the Phocians had been able to organize a defence. The Pheraean mercenaries joined them, a minor compensation for their losses in the battle, and the Phocians summoned their allies, principally the Spartans, the Achaeans from the north-west Peloponnese, and the Athenians. The 3,000 troops from the Peloponnese were too late to help, but the Athenian force of 5,000 infantry and 400 cavalry travelling by sea arrived in time and occupied Thermopylae. Philip had the good sense not to try and pass the unpassable, and retired to Macedonia.[15]

Thermopylae was the key position. Today the silting-up of the gulf by the Sperchius River has produced a wide, flat area, and this process was already under way by the beginning of the second century B.C. But in the fourth century the ground was probably very much the same as it was when Herodotus

described it in the third quarter of the fifth. At its two narrowest points there was room between the nearly sheer mountainside and the sea for a mere cart track, and to reinforce nature a wall had been built in which there was a gate. Here the Phocians in ancient times had checked the southward expansion of the Thessalians, and the Greeks in 480 had obliged the Persians to seek a mountainous way round. In the third century it was the point where the Aetolians confronted the Gauls (279) and in the second where the Syrians confronted the Romans (191). In the *pax Romana* it was no longer important, but with the coming of the Huns in the time of Justinian it again became the decisive position (559 A.D.).[16]

Thermopylae could not be forced, but only by-passed through the most formidable mountainous country, along routes which could be easily defended by the Phocians. Not being prepared to risk failure, Philip retired. In 346 and in 339 he would make the necessary preparations. The incident induced some complacency in the Athenians; Philip could be kept out of Greece, provided their fleet could get them there. They did not reflect that next time the movement of the Macedonian army might be so managed that they would be too late.

All in all, 352 was for Philip an *annus mirabilis*. Formally Thessaly was an independent state. The Thessalians who fought in Asia under Alexander did so as members of the League of Corinth, and save for the few who volunteered for further service in the East they returned to Greece with the other Greek contingents after the defeat of Persia. The Thessalian Council could pass decrees critical of Philip, or which Demosthenes could represent as critical. Philip had to consider Thessalian feelings in his conduct of policy towards the Greeks to their south; Phocis had to be 'punished'. But for the rest the Thessalians were docile and would be so for the next two decades. Demosthenes would have his audience believe that the country was very insecurely held. Others took quite the opposite view, and, although Isocrates and the historians on whom Diodorus drew may have been no less biased in their judgement, they seem to have been right here. The Thessalians were constantly trusted and preferred to other Greeks in Alexander's army. How far all this was due to the influence of leading Thessalians is unclear. The Thessalians joined the Athenians in the Lamian War after the death of Alexander, but only when it looked as if the revolt would succeed; again much may have depended on their leaders. The truth is perhaps that Thessaly, being still the world of the landed gentry and big

estates, followed where it was led, and that the leading Thessalians found Philip and the Macedonian way of life very congenial, as Theopompus was pleased to sneer. With skilful handling Thessaly could be relied on and Philip did not lack skill. So 352 brought him an enormous increase of power. It also pointed him the way into Greece. Delphi was the centre of the world and spiritually the centre of Greece. The guardian of Delphi could become the master of Greece.[17]

VI

ATHENS AND THE WAR FOR AMPHIPOLIS

Origins and course of the war to 352

Through the tangled affairs of the first four decades of the fourth century there is to be discerned one clear theme, the theme of Athenian imperialism. Having lost her own empire and become part of Sparta's at the end of the Peloponnesian War, Athens sought to use whatever aid she could get in throwing off the latter to recover the former, and by 392/1 Sparta was forced to recognize that Athens was again independent and must be allowed to rebuild her navy. If Athens had been content with that much, some sort of empire might have been gradually restored, but so strong was the desire for a speedy restoration of former glory that all discretion was abandoned. Persia, with whose friendship and by whose power Athens had seen the Aegean freed of Spartan control and opened to the quiet resumption of fifth-century alliances, would not suffer any further Athenian intervention in Asia Minor. Athens on the other hand would accept no such limitation, not even for the time being. She wanted the whole of her old empire back and back quickly. In the late 390s and early 380s some considerable progress was made with the inevitable result. Persia rejoined forces with Sparta. Athens was threatened for a second time with blockade and starvation. Forced in 387/6 to submit to the King's Peace, she lost almost all she had regained and for the present all chance and all hope of empire. But she had also learned that Persian power could make all the difference and so the cities of Asia must be regarded as utterly lost.

After the King's Peace, the theme was repeated. Sparta again excited revolt against her severe exercise of power, and the Second Athenian Confederacy flourished for seven years as champion of liberty and independence. It made little progress

until Athens forswore all claims on the assets of the fifth-century empire within member states; i.e. land belonging to a member-state could not in future be held by Athenians or the Athenian state, and all records of such claims were to be destroyed. This was in theory the end of imperialist hopes, but when Sparta had been defeated by Thebes at the battle of

Map 4. Thrace

Leuctra in 371 the liberal principles of the Confederacy were cast aside; the Confederacy itself, though left secure in its privileged status, received no new members; the main aim of Athenian policy became once again the recovery of her imperial power; cleruchies (i.e. settlements of Athenian citizens in the territory of subject cities) which had been forsworn for the

Confederacy were established in at least two of the cities of the fifth-century empire, and members of the Confederacy itself began to fear. In 357 rather than wait for Athens to convert the Confederacy into the nucleus of a new Aegean empire, the major states of Rhodes, Chios and Byzantium renounced their membership, and secured their independence in the Social War of 357/6 and 356/5. For a second time Athens was turned back on itself.

The mainspring of Athenian imperialism was the belief that only through empire and the tribute it exacted from the member-states could the Athenian people be rich. The revenues of the state itself as opposed to the empire were no more than sufficed to maintain administration. The tribute provided pay for those employed in the navy and on the costly building programme, and hopes of greater prosperity led the Athenians to seek new sources of tribute: in 415 the mass of citizens were moved by the departure of the Sicilian expedition to thoughts of 'endless pay from the state'. Not until the city was nearly bankrupt at the end of the Social War was the idea advanced that peace and trade could produce prosperity. Xenophon in 355 began his *Revenues*, in which he argued this revolutionary thesis, with the statement that those who sought to extend the empire did so 'because of the poverty of the majority', and at about the same time Isocrates in his speech *On the Peace* spoke of the war-party leading the Athenians to expect that through war they would get back the assets they formerly had in the cities of the empire.[1]

On two places in particular were these dreams concentrated, the city of Amphipolis and the Thracian Chersonese (the Gallipoli peninsula), and, although after the Social War anything else was out of the question, thoughts of recovering these two places continued to entrance the Athenians. Both had acquired a special status. After Leuctra a general congress of the Greeks had passed a decree recognizing the Athenian claim to Amphipolis, and the war to recover it had begun in 368. In 366/5 another congress reaffirmed Athens' right to the city and added its recognition of the claim to the Chersonese, and the war for it began in 365.

The Chersonese was of strategic importance. Athens depended, still in large measure in the fourth century, on imports of corn from the Crimea, and, although the Chersonese was not absolutely essential for their safe passage (for throughout the period, no matter who controlled the Chersonese, supplies were never interrupted), it was a very great convenience to

merchants to be able to use the port of Sestos on the Hellespont (the Dardanelles). Variation in the level of the Mediterranean or else sedimentation has obscured for modern eyes the port's usefulness, but it was so much in use in the classical period that an orator could refer to it as 'the corn-table of the Piraeus'. But it was not just, or necessarily primarily, to safeguard the corn-supply that Athens wanted the Chersonese. In the fifth century cleruchies had been sent out partly to rid the city of surplus population, and in the fourth the need was perhaps even more pressing. When Samos was captured in 365 a cleruchy was established, and, although the island was useful as a naval base, Athens sought to keep it after its naval importance was past. Clearly its value lay in the land on which cleruchs could be settled. So too in the Chersonese which Athens had controlled all through the fifth century and defended against marauding Thracians, it was space for cleruchs that Athens sought to regain.[2]

The lure of Amphipolis was different. The city had been founded by Athens in 437 but lost in a revolt in 424, from which time onwards its population had shown no inclination to return to Athenian control. The Athenians' claim to it was weak indeed, but their longing for it constant and extreme. No doubt if they had succeeded at any point in their long struggle to regain it they would have installed a garrison and perhaps also settled cleruchs, but their interest in it in the fourth century was quite simply in the forests and mines which it possessed. From the former they could get a sure supply of ship-building timber and from the leases of the latter a large revenue.[3]

To gain the Chersonese the Athenians had to contend with the Thracian kings who drew from it at the best of times a puny revenue of thirty talents a year, and to whose political interests it was of no great consequence. To gain Amphipolis they had first to overcome a populace fiercely resolved not to return to Athenian domination and supported by the Greeks of the north Aegean who were similarly resolved, the chief being the powerful Chalcidians of Olynthus. Secondly, the city was of immense importance to Philip. He too wanted its wealth, but above all he wanted it for its strategic position. The city, through which later the great Roman trunk road, the Via Egnatia, was to pass, controlled the only crossing place on the southern reaches of the river Strymon. North of the city Lake Cercinitis extended for a long way, and, although there was a route which passed between the lake and Lake Prasias (just south of the Rupel Gorge), the plain was at that date so swampy

that it appears not to have been regularly used. When Xerxes marched west in 480, he crossed the Strymon near its mouth by a specially prepared bridge – presumably, in the Persian style, a bridge of boats – after which he split his forces for the march to the Macedonian plain; had the route between Lakes Cercinitis and Prasias been convenient, he would have sought at an earlier stage the logistic advantages of not having the whole army use the same route. So it was at Amphipolis or south of it that for practical purposes the main road had to cross the Strymon, and, since Amphipolis was the only strongly defensible natural position, it was on the permanent bridge at Amphipolis that the whole eastward expansion of Macedon largely depended. The bridge in the fifth century served the Athenians as a check point for any movement by land from Greece to the Hellespontine area of the empire, its importance being signalled by the elegance of its marble piers (though of course as the arch was not then in use in Greece, the span must have been of timber). In the fourth century it opened the direct road to Byzantium and Philip had to have it. So Philip and Athens were brought into direct conflict.[4]

When Philip acceded, there was a Macedonian force in Amphipolis which Perdiccas had sent to help the city maintain its independence from Athens, a state of affairs which no doubt suited him well, for Macedon too had much to fear from a return of Athenian power. But in his troubled first months Philip both needed all his forces to defend Macedonia itself and had to buy off the Athenians from supporting the pretender to his throne, Argaeus. He therefore withdrew his troops from Amphipolis, sent an embassy to make peace with Athens, and even raised the question of alliance, which would have given Athens the help she needed in recovering Amphipolis. Gulled by the prospect, Athens ceased for the while to trouble him. A decade of fruitless military effort seemed to be over; Philip's father, Amyntas, had shared in the congress of the Greeks which had recognized the Athenian claim, and now Philip would help enforce it. By 357 Philip's position in Macedonia was secure and he deemed it opportune to resume the friendly relations with Amphipolis which had virtually put the city in Macedon's keeping. Athens was preoccupied with suppressing the revolt of the Euboean members of the Second Athenian Confederacy, and her navy was in some disarray. She must have seemed in no position to resume war with Philip. In Amphipolis, however, the humour had changed. The city was a democracy. There were two factions, those who

trusted Macedon and those who did not. The former must have been much discredited by Philip's withdrawal in 359 and his making peace with Athens. The latter naturally represented Philip's renewal of interest as sinister; either he would cede the city to Athens or he would incorporate it fully and formally in the Macedonian state. Philip responded by laying siege to the city, and the Amphipolitans promptly sent an embassy to Athens, requesting help and offering to hand over the city and its territory; which meant that Athens would be able again to profit from the mines and forests. After nearly seventy years of hostility, with dramatic suddenness the Amphipolitans decided for Athenian domination. They saw that Philip was no ordinary Macedonian King, that his ambitions would never leave Amphipolis in any real sense independent.[5]

Given the whole history of Athenian efforts to recover the city, why did the Athenians not seize the opportunity? When the ambassadors made their offer, the Euboean war was over after a miraculously quick campaign. The general Chares had just been sent to the Hellespont with a force of mercenaries. The Social War had not yet begun. Why did they not act? Two reasons may be considered. First, the diplomatic exchanges with Philip in 359 may have led them to hope that Philip would actually hand over the city to Athens, and, although common prudence should have made them sceptical about his undertaking a siege on their behalf, Philip sent a letter during the siege in which he declared that when he had completed operations he would hand over the city; not for the last time gulled, the Athenians waited to see whether he would.[6] Secondly, they could perhaps not do anything else, for Philip began his attack at the season of the year when the prevailing winds made it impossible for Athens to count on being able to get a large force to the north Aegean.

Throughout the summer months pressure falls over the Levant, the Red Sea, and the Persian Gulf area, and navigation from south to north is always somewhat adverse, but by mid-June the steady northerly winds known in antiquity as the Etesians (and today as the Meltemi) render navigation ever more difficult, blowing from the north in the central Aegean and from the north-east in the eastern, and continue strongly for anything up to three months, frequently exceeding Force 5 and sometimes reaching gale force (as Xerxes learned to his cost in 480). The Etesians were to prove one of Philip's strongest allies in his war with Athens, a compensation for his lack of navy. He would attack when any force sent from Athens could

not arrive in time to oppose him. So perhaps it was in 357. Athens sent Amphipolis no help because no help was possible.[7]

It is not clear at what moment the Athenians realized that Philip had no intention of handing over the city and that they would have to fight him to get it. A famous fragment of Theopompus, the exact context of which in his *History of Philip* cannot be determined, speaks of two obscure Athenians on an embassy seeking to persuade Philip to hand over Amphipolis in return for Pydna on the coast of Pieria; the proposal is said to have been reported to the Council at Athens, but, in order not to alert Pydna, not to the Athenian People, and in 349 Demosthenes alluded to 'that secret business that was at one stage all the talk'. Since Philip proceeded directly from Amphipolis against Pydna, a suitable context for this affair, whatever exactly it was, would be in the later stages of the siege of Amphipolis. Secret diplomacy had no place in Athenian public life, but ambassadors were on occasion given a fairly wide brief 'to persuade whatever of advantage they could' as a decree of 377 put it. If ambassadors knew that Philip was about to attack Pydna, they may well have suggested that if Athens got Amphipolis she would raise no difficulty about Pydna. The whole affair is shadowy, but it is perhaps proper to see in it the reflection of a period during which Athens waited in hope. By late 357 the revolt of the leading members of the Second Athenian Confederacy had fully engaged her resources in the Social War, in the course of which she must have realized that she was not going to be given Amphipolis, and from 355 onwards it was again war between Athens and Macedon.[8]

The war between Athens and Philip for Amphipolis divided into two distinctive enough phases. In the first, Athens, continuing to use the island of Thasos as her base, watched over events with a small naval force and hoped for a miracle which would present her with the city, and did what damage she could to Philip. The operations were so trivial that they have left very little trace. We hear of Chares operating with twenty ships at Neapolis (modern Kavalla) on the coast opposite Thasos, and elsewhere of him winning a minor success against a force of mercenaries commanded by a Macedonian. Philip's ports were blockaded according to Demosthenes, and if blockade had been complete the effects would have been not inconsiderable; in the late 360s tax on imports and exports had produced for his predecessor forty talents a year. But Athens' naval forces in the area were probably too small to be very effective, and it is unlikely that the trade in pitch and timber

between Macedon and Olynthus was much impeded. Indeed, although Macedon had nothing much of a navy, piratical raids by Macedonian ships became a considerable nuisance to Athens. Ships bound for Athens were seized off the southern tip of Euboea, and on one occasion a daring raid on Marathon was crowned with the capture of the Athenian sacred trireme. On sea Philip gave as good as he received. This was partly due to the fact that Athens was at the same time trying to take the Chersonese, a lesser but more attainable prize, but even more because she could not afford to take further action, as will shortly be explained.[9]

The second phase opened in 352. Chares captured Sestos on the Chersonese; the king of eastern Thrace, Cersobleptes, who had successfully disputed Athens' attempts to recover the Chersonese, switched his policy and conceded Athens' claim; Athenians were settled as cleruchs in early summer 352. These events were highly significant. It was not just that they set Athens free to concentrate on the war with Philip. The real point was that Cersobleptes had woken up to the serious danger of Philip and realized that he would need Athenian aid if he was to keep his independence. Nor was he the only one to wake up. Athens had had long experience of the fickleness of Thracian kings, but a decree was passed to secure for Cersobleptes' general, Charidemus, who had caused Athens a great deal of trouble, protection against assassination. This man was declared before the People to be alone able to take Amphipolis. The truth was that not only Cersobleptes but also leading politicians at Athens had come alive to the real danger of Philip: Athens had to fear that Philip might control the whole area of the Bosporus through which the corn-ships passed. The second phase of the war had begun.[10]

352 was the vital year for others too. The Olynthians, whom Philip had drawn into alliance by promising help against Athens, broke with Philip and made peace with Athens. Instead of a useful ally Philip had become a menace to independence, and the events of 352 confirmed it – the defeat of Phocis at the Crocus Field and the march to Thermopylae already recounted, and then late in the year the campaign to which we shall come, right into the heart of Cersobleptes' kingdom and near to Athens' new cleruchy in the Chersonese. From 352 on things were different. As Demosthenes declared in 351 'the war at the outset was concerned with taking revenge on Philip, now at its conclusion with not suffering at Philip's hands'. The 'conclusion', however, was to prove painfully long drawn out.[11]

Athenian policy and the opposition of Demosthenes

When Philip turned back from Thermopylae in 352, Athens seemed to have cause for great satisfaction: Philip could in future be kept out of central Greece, provided Athens did not involve herself in unprofitable military ventures far from Greece. In November came a new crisis. Philip was reported to be besieging Heraeum Teichos in Thrace. This fort cannot be located for certain, but it was probably the same as the Heraeum mentioned by Herodotus as near Perinthus (Marmaraeregli on the Sea of Marmara), and about one hundred kilometres from the Chersonese. For Athens that was dangerously close, and a decree was promptly passed despatching a fleet of forty ships manned by citizens of ages between twenty and forty-five, and to be financed by a capital levy of sixty talents. Then came word that Philip was seriously ill. The naval expedition was stayed. The Chersonese remained untroubled, and the decision not to proceed with the expedition seemed justified. Not until September 351 did a force leave Athens for the Hellespont and that was a mere ten ships manned by mercenary crews. The commander was Cersobleptes' former general Charidemus, now an elected Athenian general. He took with him to the place he knew well a mere five talents. He would have to live on his wits, but, since Cersobleptes needed all the help he could get, he could be expected to pay.[12]

In all this there was policy – to act strenuously in a crisis in defence of vital interests, but for the rest to leave the war to run itself. There was at Athens no government in our sense of the word, but politicians with a policy could be of great influence over a number of years. Two were preeminent in the second half of the 350s, Diophantus and Eubulus. Another, Demosthenes, has been made to seem important, because literary preference preserved a number of his speeches and buried those of almost all whom he attacked. He played a very minor part, and must be considered after the important people.

At the end of the Social War in 355, Athens had lost a large part of the probably not very substantial income she had received from the Second Athenian Confederacy and her own city revenues were down to a mere one hundred and thirty talents, that is about a quarter of what had been normal in the fifth century. The resident aliens (metics) had left in large numbers and there were many vacant properties in the city. Clearly all but the most necessary wars were luxuries and the

nearly hopeless war for Amphipolis was the wildest luxury of all. Only in peace could the city's fortunes be restored, but a peace that abandoned Amphipolis was unthinkable. It was this dilemma that Diophantus and his associate Eubulus resolved.[13]

Athenian finance was essentially a matter of a number of separate accounts earmarked for specific purposes, but any money in these accounts unused by the end of the year was available for the People to use in other ways. The regular method of financing wars, at Athens as generally in the Greek world, was to impose a capital levy (*eisphora*). In the fifth century the tribute had made such levies rare, and in the fourth, perhaps from the early days of the Second Athenian Confederacy onwards, the contributions of the members being comparatively small, a military fund, the so-called Stratiotic Fund, was created to which were devoted the annual 'surpluses' from the various accounts. Diophantus and Eubulus changed all that. A law was passed creating a new fund, the Theoric Fund, which received these 'surpluses' and which was used in very small measure for distributions at the theatre and in very large measure on 'developing' the city and its port, the Piraeus, for the purposes of trade. Most importantly, the 'surpluses' could only be used for other ends if the law was repealed, a process possible once a year but not on the spur of the moment or of some sudden military necessity. The policy succeeded handsomely. The law was not repealed until 339/8 after the outbreak of the final war with Philip, and enabled Athens to face the war with confidence in its resources. In 351 the Theoric Fund was not worth Demosthenes' thinking about; by 349 it was. The city's revenues had risen to 400 talents by 346 and whereas in the mid-350s the richest citizens had to be combined in groups of up to sixteen persons to provide the running costs of a single trireme, by 339 one man might be called on to fund two ships by himself. Demosthenes in 349 denounced the Theoric Law as a disgraceful impediment to the city doing what it ought to do, but by 341, when he was pressing hard for all-out war with Philip, he advocated the maintenance of the law.[14]

The real bite of this law was in foreign policy. The war for Amphipolis had to be left to run itself; small forces of the sort sent out under Charidemus in September 351 were all that would confront Philip as he built up his power. There was obviously good sense in the policy elsewhere. For instance, Eubulus opposed, successfully, Athenian help in 351/0 for the democrats of Rhodes when they were seeking to regain control

of the island; which was all very sensible, for Athens had nothing to gain and much to lose including the cost of help. But was it not the policy which allowed Philip the maximum opportunity for his aggressive designs? That was at any rate the view of the young Demosthenes, to which we may now turn. Before doing so, however, one must point out the important corollary of this policy. Where vital interests were involved, Athens could and must act with a will: hence in 352 the swift move to Thermopylae and the large preparations to stop Philip attacking the Chersonese, and in 348 the prompt defence of Euboea. Nor did it stop there. On a number of occasions Eubulus and his associates responded to dangerous situations by seeking to bring the Greeks together in a sort of national organization that would confront an aggressor with united military action. The policy as a whole might be summed up thus – 'avoid imperialist dreams in pursuit of which we would inevitably fight alone and beyond our means, and keep our power for wars in which our vital interests are challenged and for wars in which all Greece is endangered'.[15]

It was the view of Demosthenes that this policy was ruinous in that it left Philip free to build up his power, and, although before 348 when Demosthenes became a supporter of Philocrates he was of little importance, it is vital to consider his criticism. If he had had his way, could the growth of Philip's power have been checked?

In 351 when Demosthenes attacked Philip for the first time in *The First Philippic*, he was only thirty-three, probably well known as a man who could write an effective speech for someone else to use in the courts but little regarded for the speeches he himself made in the assembly. Attacking Eubulus and his policy was perhaps bound to be unpopular, but two of his speeches suggest a serious lack of judgement. Thebes was Athens' main enemy in Greece itself, and it was all-important that Thebes be checked by Phocis in Central Greece and by Sparta in the Peloponnese, but in his speech *For the Megalopolitans* of spring 352 he could advocate Athens opposing Sparta in the Peloponnese but entirely neglect to consider the effect on the balance of power in Central Greece; his policy would have been disastrous and it was rightly rejected. Later in 352 the speech *Against Aristocrates* was argued in the belief that Cersobleptes, not Philip, was Athens' enemy in the north. As has been already pointed out, Aristocrates, who moved the decree honouring Cersobleptes' general, and those who supported it, saw things more clearly. Admittedly the speech

was written for someone else to deliver, but it is inconceivable that the Demosthenes of *The First Philippic* could have written it, if he had appreciated what was happening. What he lacked in judgement he made up for in morose severity, to judge by the familiar, admittedly stylized representation of him. Unlike the genial Aeschines he did not drink wine, and was an unsociable and slightly comic figure. Those who disagreed with him were in his view 'corrupted'. It is instructive to read his concluding remarks in the speech *On the liberty of the Rhodians*, a matter far removed from the passions aroused by Philip and the bribery of which he was constantly suspected, and in which there seems very little indeed to be said in favour of Demosthenes' proposed course of action; his opponents have 'chosen to act contrary to the interests of the city'. Some found him lacking in common modesty, and it no doubt caused general satisfaction when in 348 before a theatre audience he was punched in the face by an exasperated supporter of Eubulus. His whole temperament was nervous. During his audience with Philip in 346 words literally failed him. He was generally regarded as ill-humoured and ill-mannered. A difficult character surely enough, but such a man can sometimes be right; especially if he was, as Theopompus asserted, inconsistent. Was he right about the war for Amphipolis?[16]

Philip's campaign against Cersobleptes of later 352 in which he laid siege to Heraeum Teichos, was at least partially successful to judge by the fact that Cersobleptes surrendered his son as a hostage. If he intended to turn and attack the Chersonese, he was prevented by illness and 351 was a fallow year as far as operations against the Athenians were concerned. But it was to be feared that in the autumn he might again approach the Chersonese, and as a precaution the small force of ten ships under Charidemus was sent out in September. Before that, possibly in June, there was a debate in the Athenian assembly, perhaps on a proposal quickly to send out a force before the Etesian winds made it impossible – indeed it could have been the proposal to send Charidemus, who did not manage to leave before the weather worsened. In this debate Demosthenes delivered his *First Philippic* in which he expounded his views on how the war for Amphipolis should be conducted.[17]

Demosthenes made two main criticisms of what was happening. First, Athens was always too late; Pydna, Potidaea, and Methone had all been taken before the relieving expeditions could get there. Second, she had put her trust in mercenary forces ill-supplied with money; to supply themselves, they had

devoted their energies to getting pay from the easiest sources, either Greek states that could not resist them or foreign paymasters. To prevent all this, Demosthenes proposed the creation of two forces, the one of fifty ships manned by Athenians with an appropriate number of supply ships and with transports for half the Athenian cavalry which totalled 1,000 horse,[18] and the other of ten ships, 2,000 infantry and 200 cavalry, one quarter of each of which would consist of citizens. The larger force would be ready for an emergency; the smaller would 'wage war constantly' and 'damage' Philip, and it would receive as pay enough to enable those serving to buy their food, although the detailed statement is lost of how the ninety-two talents this would use up each year would be provided. As to strategy, he had no more to say than that 'the war itself would find out the weak spots in Philip's affairs'.

All this sounded well, but there were serious flaws. If the larger force was to be constantly ready for, say, seven months of the year with crews hired, the cost would be enormous, about one hundred and sixty talents, and, if Philip continued to exploit the advantages of campaigning in the winter and during the Etesian winds, it would all be quite useless. As for the smaller force, perhaps ninety-two talents could have been found, but that figure seems not to have included the cost of the sailors of the fleet. Given the financial condition of the city, the total expense would have been crippling to the chances of the city's financial recovery. Having a quarter of the fighting troops citizen would have been some advantage although it is not clear that that would have been sufficient to restrain mercenaries demanding operations which would supply full pay without too much effort. But the real weakness of the plan was that 2,000 infantry and 500 cavalry would do little to restrain Philip. His forces were large enough to allow him to police the Macedonian plain against marauders and to carry on with his military plans. If he chose to attack the Chersonese, Demosthenes' smaller force was too small to save it. Nor could Demosthenes' proposals do anything towards regaining Amphipolis.

The sorry truth was that, given Athens' resources in men and money, she could not stop the progress of Philip in the north Aegean, a situation roughly comparable to that of Great Britain in the post-war world in relation to former interests east of Suez. In the fifth century when Athens was strong and the king of Macedon weak, she had been unable to reduce Amphipolis. In the 350s when the position was reversed, she could only lose

what she still had. It would have been best to accept that Amphipolis was lost for ever, but, since the Athenians could not face that fact, the policy that Demosthenes attacked was the best that could be done. By miracle Amphipolis might fall into their hands but there was no sense in impoverishing the state while they waited. (It may be added that the miracle would have to be the collapse of the new Macedonian state; otherwise if Athens ever did chance to get Amphipolis, Macedonian siegecraft would be likely to take it and all its defenders.) The great *First Philippic* was greatly wrong-headed.

Throughout 351 and 350 Philip left the Greek cities alone. In mid-349, when the Etesian winds were due, he began to attack Olynthus and a new phase in Athens' war opened.

The war for Olynthus

The extensive remains of ancient Olynthus are to be found on two flat-topped mounds nowhere more than twenty-five metres higher than the plain around them, about two and a half kilometres from the head of the Gulf of Torone. Obviously the fourth-century city was populous and one can readily credit statements that it had a population of 10,000 (i.e. 10,000 male citizens). But the reader of Demosthenes' *Olynthiac Orations* might well be surprised that the city should have caused either Athens or Philip such excitement.[19]

The city was indeed important both economically and strategically. Its natural resources were enviable – ample corn and ship-building timber and an export trade, which produced large revenues. An early fourth-century treaty with Amyntas, the father of Philip, shows that there was considerable trade with Macedon, as is suggested also by the fact that during the period of peace with Philip the output of silver coins seems to have greatly increased. By the 360s the city stood at the head of a union of cities which had grown by 349 to the number of thirty-two. The nature and even the extent of this union are uncertain. In the 380s Olynthus had extended her influence by making a series of agreements with cities to have the same constitution and joint citizenship, involving the right to intermarriage and to holding property in any member-city's territory. This system was dissolved by Sparta in 379, but may have been restored. Although the fourth-century literary sources generally speak of 'Olynthians', inscriptions show that the

proper title was 'the Chalcidians'. As to the extent of 'Chalcidike' in 348 one may say in broad terms that it corresponded to the modern Nome of that name. It included to the east Stagira, birthplace of Aristotle, and to the west, by gift of Philip in 357, Anthemus (about twenty-five kilometres south-west of the Hellenistic foundation of Thessalonica) as well as the peninsulas of Pallene and Sithone, all together a powerful polity on the very border of Macedonia.[20]



Map 5. Chalcidice

The people of Olynthus had long been at odds with Athens and although, after the shock of Spartan intervention in 382, they had in the 370s joined the Second Athenian Confederacy, the Athenian reassertion of her claim to Amphipolis led to a new breach with the Chalcidians, who in the 360s allied with Amphipolis and even sent some of their number to settle in and help defend the city. The Athenian general, Timotheus, deemed it a necessary preliminary to an attack on Amphipolis to deal with the Chalcidians, and succeeded in capturing Potidaea on the neck of the Pallene peninsula, only a few kilometres from Olynthus itself. In 361 a number of Athenians

were settled at Potidaea as cleruchs to help it defend itself against the Chalcidians.[21]

The rise of Philip changed their minds. They had feared the resurrection of Athenian power in the north; they now feared still more a strong and united Macedon. Not only did they form an alliance with the Illyrian king, Grabus, whom Parmenio defeated shortly afterwards, but also while Philip was besieging Amphipolis in 357 they sent an embassy to Athens to concert plans about the new danger in the north. The Athenians repulsed these advances, perhaps fondly hoping that Philip was really conducting the siege on their behalf. Hostility to Macedon was, however, implied, and a hostile Chalcidian state was in Philip's early years a danger he was not ready to face. So with two seemingly generous gestures he won them over to an alliance. First, he promised to capture and restore to them Potidaea, which would give them what they might have sought but probably would not have got from Athens. Second, he let them have Anthemus, which the Chalcidians had unsuccessfully been claiming, seemingly a reassurance that he did not aim to attack them. So Philip had them as allies, and could rest content that they would not join with the Athenians in attacking him while his control of the Kingdom was still insecure. Despite the Athenians' alleged blockade of his ports, trade with the Chalcidians could, and probably did, flourish. The party hostile to Philip in Olynthus was discredited, and their leader driven into exile.[22]

By 352 the humour had changed. The Macedonian ally had become far too powerful for Chalcidian comfort, and, perhaps without realizing the serious implications of their action, the Chalcidians in clear breach of the terms of their alliance with Philip made peace with Athens; they even talked of alliance. Philip would not and could not allow that, and from that moment the Chalcidian state was doomed.[23]

The territories of the Chalcidian state were a rich prize, and perhaps from the start Philip envisaged the settlement of Macedonians that happened after the destruction of the state. It is equally possible that he saw the Chalcidians in the way that he saw the Thessalians, i.e. as loyal and useful clients, and that he was obliged to attack when the Chalcidians themselves chose to be disloyal – and even hostile. The pretender Pausanias in 368 had, to judge by the places in Macedonia which he captured, made his attempt from Chalcidian territory. In the late 350s two exiled stepbrothers of Philip found asylum in Olynthus. Philip tried diplomacy, followed perhaps by a military

demonstration towards Olynthus, to no avail. The tradition preserved in Justin even makes these exiles the reason for Philip's attack on the city. But this is perhaps tendentious. Whatever Philip had intended before the Chalcidians broke with him and made peace with Athens, afterwards whether or not they harboured pretenders Philip had to act. His declaration of war in 349 made it clear: either the Olynthians could not continue to live in Olynthus or else he could not live in Macedonia.[24]

The war, which was dealt with in detail in four books of Theopompus' *History of Philip*, is for us a very shadowy affair. The Chalcidians sent their first appeal for help from Athens, which must have very shortly followed the Macedonian attack, in July 349 or thereabouts. By September 348 it was all over. Philip's method was to pick off the thirty-two cities one by one, leaving Olynthus to the last. By spring 348 all the western part of the state was lost, for the Olynthians at that date were actually ravaging what had been their own territory. For the rest we are largely uninformed. Perhaps there was not great resistance. With the Macedonian army operating so near its base and against scattered cities in generally open terrain there was little hope, and some decided that there was no sense in trying. Torone on the Sithonian peninsula abandoned the cause perhaps when most of the more accessible cities had fallen, as did Mecyberna, a tiny place but important as the port of Olynthus: the Greeks represented this as due to treachery, but the citizens of each of these places may well have concurred in despair. As Philip tightened the noose around Olynthus, the Olynthians sent Athens a last desperate appeal for help, to which Athens responded by voting to send a large force, which they probably would not have attempted had Philip already begun the attack on Olynthus itself. This force was delayed by the Etesian winds. So the siege began at, say, the end of June 348. It was preceded by what is described as the betrayal of 500 Chalcidian cavalry, arms and all, by the two cavalry commanders, one of whom was certainly in a position of some influence in Macedon at a later date, and it was claimed that Olynthus fell by treachery. The reverse may be the truth; nothing could save Olynthus from siege, not even 500 horsemen, and they knew it. But it is not to be denied that as the richest men in the state they probably kept their horses on large estates and hoped for some money from Philip. So perhaps treachery was an apt description. At any rate the siege began shortly afterwards, and in a matter of two months Macedonian siegecraft finished it off.[25]

The Athenian share in these events can be exactly, if briefly, described. The Chalcidians thrice appealed for help. In response to the first appeal, made in, say, July 349, the Athenians made alliance and sent 2,000 light-armed mercenaries, the so-called peltasts, and thirty-eight ships of which thirty were already out on service under Chares, based perhaps on Thasos, and eight from Athens for which citizens formed part of the crew. Whether they did anything is not known. The second appeal was made early in 348 and the city instructed Charidemus, the general stationed at the Hellespont – probably continuously since September 351 – to give aid with 4,000 peltasts and 150 cavalry and eighteen ships, of which ten were probably the ten already under his command and the remaining eight the ones which the city had sent to Chares. This force joined with the Olynthians in ravaging the lost western portion of the Chalcidian state. The third appeal was in urgent terms, begging the Athenians not to stand by and watch the total defeat of the Chalcidians. A further seventeen ships were sent out with 2,000 citizen hoplites and 300 citizen cavalry on horse transports. This force was delayed by bad weather – probably, as already noted, connected with the Etesian winds – and arrived too late. So in effect Athens did very little to help.[26] Could she and should she have done more?

Athenian help for Olynthus

Demosthenes' views are only partially known to us. His three *Olynthiac Orations* were all delivered, it would seem, in the early months of the war. The first urged the Athenians to send forces to help the Chalcidians (although he always referred to them as the Olynthians) and was perhaps delivered as part of the debate on the first appeal. In it he revived the idea of *The First Philippic* – one force 'to save the cities for the Olynthians' and another to ravage Macedonia; if Athens would not use the monies devoted to the Theoric Fund, there would have to be a capital levy. In *The Second Olynthiac* there were no precise proposals. It was merely to encourage the Athenians; Philip, who had deceived everyone, would now pay the price; without his allies Macedonian power was weak and his allies could now be got to desert him. In *The Third Olynthiac* (also delivered probably in the very early days of the Attic year 349/8, as is shown by his demand for the repeal of laws, a process which

could only be initiated early in the year) he demanded that Athens help 'with all her might to the best of her ability' and to that end the law about the Theoric Fund and other unspecified laws about military service be all now repealed. All three speeches seem inspired by the idea tentatively advanced in *The First Philippic* and now confidently asserted. Either Athens must fight Philip in the north or she must fight him within Greece.[27]

Unfortunately Demosthenes in the *Olynthiac Orations* never said exactly what he wanted. A force to ravage Macedonia would have done no more in 349 to distract Philip from his objective than it could have done two years earlier, and may be dismissed here again. But was he right in thinking that Athens could 'save the cities'? That could hardly have been done by occupying them. They were mostly inland, and any forces that Athens could conceivably have sent would have been besieged and captured. He must have been thinking of his large force cooperating in the field with the Chalcidians, and defeating the Macedonian army. But the dangers were immense. If the Macedonian army dealt with the Chalcidians as it had dealt with the Phocians at the Battle of the Crocus Field, the cause would have been lost and a large part of the Athenian army as well. If the Chalcidians were at first successful, Philip, near to his base, could attack again. The initiative lay with him, and there was a serious danger, if not a likelihood, that Athens would so greatly weaken herself that she would be very much less in a position to keep Philip out of Greece. Far from it being the truth that if she did not fight Philip in the north, she would have to fight him in Greece, the position was that if she did heavily commit herself to the defence of the Chalcidians, she would fight him less effectively in Greece.

Athens did finally vote a very large force. The expedition to the Peloponnese of 362 excepted, 2,000 hoplites was two-fifths of the largest number of hoplites Athens ever sent out in the fourth century before the battle of Chaeronea in 338. Three hundred cavalry was three-tenths of her total cavalry force. It might be argued that if this force was to be sent at all it should have been sent in 349 when Demosthenes appears to have demanded it. But that would be an argument based on the presumption that Philip's strategy would have been the same no matter what happened. If Athens had sent this large force in the early days of the war, Philip could have delayed his attacks on the Chalcidian cities and let the Athenians wait and pay. His army was large enough to act elsewhere without

endangering the security of Macedon, to attack the Chersonese or even to march south.

The unpalatable strategic fact was that the Chalcidians could not be saved and the Athenians were fortunate that no large number of their citizens was ever landed to attempt the impossible. The only hope for Athens was that they could unite the Greeks in defence of Greece itself, and Demosthenes was here as elsewhere without the true statesman's strategic sense. But, it will be asked, were those whom he opposed any better? A substantial force was finally sent. If it was useless, why was it sent at all? If it could accomplish something, why was it not sent earlier? Was not the policy of Eubulus exposed as at least inconsistent? The answers to these questions can only be given in terms of the crisis at Athens in 348 over Euboea.

The island of Euboea was of vital strategic importance to Athens in its war with Philip. Thermopylae and the Phocian alliance were a barrier sufficient to keep him out of Central Greece if he approached by land, but if he were able to get an army across into Euboea, there was a serious danger of his being able to cross into Boeotia where he would be welcomed as Thebes' ally in the Sacred War and thence to march into Attica. It depended largely on the attitude of Chalcis which controlled the bridge across the strait,* and it was important for Athens to do all she could to make sure that those in power at Chalcis were not hostile to her. In February 348 Athens was suddenly confronted by a serious deterioration in her influence in Euboea. The leading politician of Chalcis, whom we shall meet later, Callias, was seeking to unite the cities of the island in some sort of Pan-Euboean League. Since that would inevitably mean that they would leave the Second Athenian

* To avoid being helpless against Athenian naval reprisals, the Euboeans in 410 narrowed the channel between Euboea and Boeotia (the Euripos) at Chalcis sufficiently to allow passage to no more than a single trireme, and bridged the gap (D.S.13.47, Str. 9.2.8). At the time that Alexander crossed to Asia, the bridge was fortified more effectively and made part of Chalcis (Str. 10.1.8). The bridge was there in 167 B.C. (Livy 45.27) and was seen by Strabo in the first century B.C. Pausanias the geographer in the second century stuck to the mainland and so happened not to mention it, but Justinian rebuilt it and the bridge by which one crosses to Chalcis today is just the latest of quite a series. (However, the Venetian name for Euboea, Negroponte, has nothing to do with the bridge, but is a corruption of *ston Euripon*.) The bridge is never mentioned by any Athenian orator, but it made a very great difference strategically, for whoever controlled Chalcis controlled the passage.

Confederacy, their independence might work badly for Athens. As early as 351, Philip had been sending letters to 'the Euboeans' and, although he had no part in the events in Euboea of 348, he would be expected to exploit any decline in Athenian influence. The danger of Philip controlling this island was therefore considerable. Opposed to Chalcis under Callias was, by age-old rivalry, her neighbour Eretria, and when Chalcis sought to coerce Eretria to join in her plans, Eretria appealed to Athens for help. A small force went and won a minor victory, but, when Chalcis gathered mercenaries, a larger force was needed. Thus in the spring Athens was in no position to send a large citizen force to help the Chalcidians of Olynthus, and there is no need to ask why it was not sent earlier than it was. But the war in Euboea also explains why it was sent too late to be of use. This war appears to have been the especial concern of Eubulus and his supporters. It turned out disastrously, with the Athenian commander taken prisoner. A lame peace had to be concluded with the Euboeans. The island was lost to Athens, and the friendship with Philip grew. In these circumstances it would not be surprising if the influence of the Eubulus group which had insisted on the war was for the moment diminished and the final appeal of the Chalcidians answered in a way that all good sense should have counselled against. The Chalcidians could not be saved. Athens must keep her strength to meet the real danger of Philip intervening in Greece.[28]

Demosthenes took the contrary view of the Euboean War, counselling the assembly against it, presumably because he was pressing for a large force to be sent to the north. Since Euboea was so vitally important to Athens, his view was paradoxical. He claimed to have been unsupported in his opposition. Since, however, the war turned out badly, one might wonder whether there was not something to be said for his policy. One may note that Euboea could only be useful to Philip if he could cross to it by sea. He did not attempt to use it in 346 when, although the Euboeans were no less friendlily disposed to him, the Athenian general Proxenus was stationed at Oreos in the north-west of the island with a squadron of ships. So did it matter who controlled Euboea, if Athens controlled the sea? But control of the sea required a base and where other than on Euboea could Athens base a force that would guard the narrow crossing? Control of the sea but not of Euboea would not suffice to keep Philip out. So Demosthenes' policy here too was ill-conceived and it is no wonder that no one supported him. It may be added that in all these debates

he was a very minor participant, as is shown by the fact that, when in 330 Aeschines reviewed his political career, he began with the year 346. Prior to that Demosthenes did not count.[29]

The fate of Olynthus

The fate of Olynthus was cruel. A good number managed to escape, but the mass of the inhabitants were carried off to slavery in Macedonia itself. The city itself was razed to the ground, as were the other cities which had not chosen to come to terms. Aristotle was later able to persuade Alexander to restore his native city of Stagira but for most there was no reprieve. The land of the Chalcidic cities was distributed to members of the Companion Cavalry, as the titles of the cavalry units in Alexander's army show. Philip's two step-brothers whom Olynthus had sheltered were put to death, and Philip retired to Dium to a notably splendid celebration of the Macedonian Olympic Festival.[30]

VII

PEACE WITH ATHENS AND THE END OF THE SACRED WAR

Abortive peace feelers

With the destruction of Olynthus the Athenians' hopes of recapturing Amphipolis should have been completely extinguished, and, since their settlers in the cleruchy on the Chersonese could well be the next victims, all good sense should have prompted them to seek peace with Philip in the winter of 348/7. They were well aware that he was ready to negotiate. In the summer of 348, the Euboeans, in the course of settling their own war with Athens, passed on a message to that effect from Philip, and shortly afterwards a similar message was brought by two Athenians who had been on an embassy to Macedon concerning the unlawful seizure of one of them during the sacred truce for the Olympic festival. This second message must have reached Athens just about the time that they realized that the final expedition sent to relieve Olynthus could effect nothing. In a naïve attempt to save it by diplomacy – naïve indeed, since Philip was far too little troubled by the war with Athens to consider leaving Olynthus independent in exchange for peace – Philocrates, making his first appearance in the surviving evidence, though he was probably already eminent, proposed that Philip be allowed to send an embassy to Athens to discuss peace. He must have been well aware that Philip was anxious for peace.[1]

The decree proposed by Philocrates was passed by the People, but he was promptly indicted for making an illegal proposal, though in what sense it was illegal we can only guess. By the time this case, defended by Demosthenes, had been heard and dismissed, it was too late to dream of saving Olynthus by any means, and, after the news of the fate of that city reached Athens, no more was heard of negotiations for peace for some sixteen months. The war dragged on. Presumably Chares

stayed out on campaign; he was at hand in April 346 to report the defeat of Cersobleptes. But he did nothing and could do nothing. Indeed, shortly before the defeat of Cersobleptes, at the very moment that the Macedonian ambassadors were due in Athens, the Athenians had to send out a general to discover what Chares was doing. Philip, on the other hand, was busy. In 347 he set his privateers on to raiding the Athenian settlements on the islands of Lemnos, Imbros and Scyrus, and prepared to complete the subjection of Thrace – not that he did anything which alarmed Athens into reinforcing Chares, but Antipater was, it would seem, active in Thrace in that year, Thracian silver mines were taken over and Athenian settlers in the Chersonese began to drift back to Athens, doubtless in fear of Philip's next campaign. Athens had wasted her opportunity of getting peace without further disaster. She should have acted out of fear for the Chersonese. By ill luck, she would shortly have to fear for herself.[2]

The evidence for the Peace of Philocrates

Before discussing the melancholy end of the Sacred War, I must touch on the nature of the evidence for 346. The narrative of Diodorus furnishes a full enough account of the Sacred War, but contains not a word concerning the making of peace between Athens and Philip. The only surviving formal account of this peace, the so-called Peace of Philocrates, is the very brief notice in Justin's epitome of Trogus' *Philippica*, which is precious for the light it throws on what was in effect a congress of the leading states of the Greek world held in Macedonia after the Peace had been made and sworn to by Athens, though not yet by Philip. For the rest Justin tells us nothing of importance and we have to rely almost entirely on the charges and defences of the orators Demosthenes and Aeschines, who have been described not entirely without justification as 'a couple of liars, neither of whom can be trusted to have told the truth in any matter in which it was remotely in his interest to lie'. It is not surprising that very different views have been held not just of what the main actors of 346 intended but even of what actually happened.[3]

The negotiations for peace began with the despatch to Philip of an embassy which included Philocrates, Demosthenes and Aeschines. Shortly after their return to Athens in April,

a Macedonian embassy arrived, and the peace, substantially as proposed in a decree of Philocrates, was accepted by the Athenians at the end of a two-day debate on 18 and 19 Elaphebolion (16 and 17 April). The Athenians shortly afterwards swore to the peace and a second embassy, probably of the same persons as before, went to Macedonia to administer the oaths to Philip. It is beyond question that up to this point Demosthenes and Philocrates were in complete accord. Indeed Demosthenes, who happened to be a member of the Council, was virtually Philocrates' agent. Demosthenes, who was the youngest member of the embassy, was nominated by Philocrates; Demosthenes proposed a decree providing for an assembly to be held on 8 Elaphebolion (6 April) in case the Macedonian ambassadors arrived before the festival of the Dionysia; when they did not, he proposed in the assembly that there should be two assemblies on the 18th and 19th immediately after the festival, and also that seats in the theatre of Dionysus should be reserved for the Macedonians; Demosthenes took a leading role in entertaining them; in the crucial assembly on the 19th he foiled Aeschines' plan to seek a different sort of peace, which Demosthenes knew that Philip would not accept, by bringing the Macedonian embassy before the assembly; and if further proof were wanted that Demosthenes was Philocrates' right-hand man, one may point to the fact that from the start Demosthenes knew, as Philocrates knew, that Philip would settle only for a peace that involved alliance as well, and tempered his proposal on the 8th accordingly. The peace is called the Peace of Philocrates. It should be called the Peace of Demosthenes and Philocrates.[4]

However this concord did not last. Late in the same month, a second embassy, with the same members as previously, set out to administer the oath to Philip and his allies. They had to wait two and a half months before they accomplished this, and Demosthenes began to row with his fellow ambassadors including Philocrates and Aeschines. The trouble reached a climax in the Athenian assembly of 16 Scirophorion (12 July), when the ambassadors made their report to the People and a decree was passed on the proposal of Philocrates, strongly opposed by Demosthenes. From that moment the two were utterly irreconcilable. Philocrates wanted to maintain the peace, Demosthenes to be rid of it at the first opportunity, and since Aeschines also sought to maintain it, he and Demosthenes were embroiled in the great quarrel which came to a head with the trial of 343: Aeschines, in rendering account of this second

embassy of 346, was bitterly attacked by Demosthenes. Their speeches, each entitled *On the false embassy*, are the main source of information about 346 – and of confusion.

Although the Peace had been made with the active complicity of Demosthenes, in 343 he rounded on Aeschines and charged him with being Philocrates' partner in crime. That Athenian memories should be regarded as so short that such monstrous distortion could be attempted will amaze only those who have failed to observe equally striking gullibility in our own political life. Nor were they necessarily as short as they seem. In all the great political trials at Athens the facts of the case were of secondary importance. The issue was the policy to be pursued in future. For instance, in 367 two Athenian ambassadors, Leon and Timagoras, had been sent to what was in effect a peace congress presided over by the King of Persia, who shortly showed himself inclined to favour Thebes. Timagoras appears to have taken the view that Athens would have to bow to such a combination and come to terms with Thebes, sensibly enough as the Athenians in due course had to recognize. But on his return to Athens he was condemned to death on the charge of having taken bribes. Absurd allegations were made involving a secret note to the King, a large sum of money hardly to be concealed, luxurious oriental bedding and bed-makers and the milk of eighty cows for a sick Greek stomach, and so on. It did not matter that there could hardly be satisfactory proofs. In an Athenian court 'there was no rule requiring a pleader to limit his statement to facts which he could prove by evidence'. Timagoras' policy was unpopular and his condemnation decided that it must, for the moment, be abandoned. So too in 343. The Peace of Philocrates itself had been generally condemned as a mistake; Philocrates had had, before the trial of Aeschines, to find in exile escape from execution. But there was a serious issue in 343, which must be fully discussed later, viz. whether to abandon the Peace and return to a state of war with Philip, as Demosthenes wished, or to maintain it and develop it, as Aeschines wished, into a Common Peace for all the Greeks. Aeschines had become the champion of maintaining the Peace of Philocrates, in that sense the partner of Philocrates, and that is why, when in 346/5 he prosecuted Demosthenes' associate, Timarchus, he could declare that he had been Philocrates' partner in making the Peace, whereas the truth was that he had become his partner in keeping it. At the trial of 343, Aeschines was acquitted by a small majority; i.e. opinion was evenly divided about his policy of continuing

the Peace. That was the issue, not what had happened in 346. That is why the speeches are peculiarly difficult to handle.[5]

Athens' motive for sending the first embassy

The making of the peace was intimately linked with the death throes of the Sacred War. By 347 it was clear that for victory outside help would be necessary. The Phocians had occupied the neighbouring cities in the west of Boeotia, but the temple treasures, with which they had paid their mercenaries, were nearing exhaustion. The last of the great leaders in the struggle against Theban domination, Phalaecus, was removed from the generalship, an inquiry into the use of the treasures was begun, and three generals, who seem to have been amicably disposed towards Athens, began to attack vigorously in Boeotia. The Boeotians appealed to Philip for help, who responded by sending a small force, to honour his alliance with the Boeotians but to leave to himself the glory and the advantages of ending the war. The Boeotians won a minor success against the Phocians at Abae, the most easterly city of Phocis about five miles north of Orchomenus. The stalemate continued.[6]

Early in 346 word reached Greece that Philip was planning to march south accompanied by the Thessalians. The Phocians reacted promptly. They appealed first to the Spartans, who sent out the king, Archidamus, with 1,000 hoplites, and secondly to the Athenians, who decreed that the general, Proxenus, who appears to have been stationed in 346 at Oreus, the most northerly city of Euboea, should take over the defence of the forts controlling the road into Central Greece at Thermopylae, that fifty triremes should be manned and sent out, and that those liable to military service up to the age of forty should go to the defence of Phocis. As in 352, Philip would be excluded. Neither the Phocian generals nor the Athenians had any cause for alarm.

Then all was upset. Phalaecus was restored to the generalship in Phocis. The Phocian ambassadors who had promised that Athens would be permitted to take over the strongholds controlling Thermopylae were imprisoned. Proxenus was told to keep out. Archidamus and his force were similarly treated. Athens had to face the fact that Philip would not necessarily be unable to march into Central Greece.[7]

What moved Phalaecus to take this seemingly ruinous

decision? Too little is known of Phocian politics to permit of more than conjecture. Aeschines was later to attribute the ruin of Phocis in part to financial exhaustion, in part to 'the divided councils (*stasis*) which normally go with armies short of money', and in part to Phalaecus' failure to realize what was likely to happen. So it may not be wildly astray to suppose that he was restored to power by an army short of pay, but, realizing that he had no way of providing pay, he began to play with the idea of a peaceful settlement of the Sacred War managed by Philip of Macedon, *deus ex machina*. Philip may by diplomatic means even have induced Phalaecus to trust to diplomacy. Certainly when the second Athenian embassy went to Pella to administer the oaths to the Peace, a Phocian embassy, as well as the Theban and the Spartan, was there. Even as late as Philip's march south through Thessaly, the Phocians with him appear to have believed that a peaceful settlement was in prospect, or so Demosthenes would have us believe.[8]

The date at which Phalaecus returned to power was shortly before Athens sent off the first embassy to Philip, a decision which must have been taken about 1 Anthesterion (28 February) and the Phocian appeal to Athens therefore must have been made in the middle of the previous month, Gamelion (*c.* 14 February). Thus in the course of a fortnight or thereabouts the Athenians went through a dramatic change. Early in Gamelion they were planning to defend Thermopylae and exclude Philip from Central Greece. By the end of the month they were preparing to negotiate a peace, and, as Demosthenes clearly shows, in some considerable haste. Why? No source asserts as much, but it is a reasonable conjecture that it was the change in Phocis which induced the change of mind in Athens. The Athenian people heard a letter from Proxenus on the same day that it was deliberating about the peace; but both the letter and the peace must have been previously considered by the Council. Was it the letter that caused the Council to propose peace with Philip? Certainly something fairly startling is needed to explain Athens' sudden change.[9]

The suddenness of the change is even more apparent from another matter, which, controversial though it is, cannot be omitted in any treatment of the Peace of Philocrates. At the decisive assembly of 19 Elaphebolion (17 April) there were embassies from states all over the Greek world, either present or expected, and these embassies had been summoned to Athens by Athenian ambassadors to deliberate 'about the freedom of the Hellenes'. That is certain. What is debated is

the circumstances in which Athens issued this general invitation. If the Athenian ambassadors were sent out after it had been decided to seek peace with Philip, the summons would be not without interest in view of the belligerent terms in which it appears to have been issued. If on the other hand Athens was summoning the Greeks before she decided to seek peace, the question arises as to what moved her to such a course. Such general assemblies had only happened and could only be expected to happen when the Greeks were confronted by external threat. How does this summons relate to the events of early 346?[10]

The answer to this question becomes clear when it is recognized that these embassies summoning the Greeks are none other than those sent out under a decree of Eubulus supported by Aeschines.[11] It has been customary to assign these latter embassies to the period shortly after the fall of Olynthus but there are serious objections to doing so and strong grounds for arguing that the embassies from Greece at large of which so much is heard in connection with the debates of 18 and 19 Elaphebolion, were none other than what Demosthenes said they were, viz. those in the summoning of which Aeschines had had an important part. The matter cannot be argued here. In what follows it is simply assumed that in early 346 Eubulus and Aeschines were moved to summon a congress of the Hellenes in Athens to take counsel about the defence of Greece.[12]

The remarks of Demosthenes about these Athenian embassies show that the cause of the excitement at Athens was some news about the Arcadians appealing, or proposing to appeal, to Philip for military assistance. It is not stated but can be presumed that once again Sparta planned to attack her neighbours when Thebes, hard pressed by the Sacred War, was unable to defend them. Once the news came that Philip was planning to march south to settle the Sacred War, an appeal to him to march into the Peloponnese and remove for ever the threat of Sparta was the obvious step. But it was most alarming to Athens. So if Philip was not to be allowed to become the champion of Peloponnesian states, the Greeks would have to be assembled and an alternative method found of guaranteeing the liberty of the cities of Greece individually and the liberty of Greece as a whole. Hence the attempt of Eubulus and Aeschines to meet the crisis. The news of Philip's coming which was to lead the Phocians to appeal to Athens was received in the Peloponnese in such a way that Athens was moved to organize

a Common Peace which would reassure the Greeks and exclude Philip. The Arcadians, however, were not persuaded. Aeschines, sent to remonstrate, had to report failure. They preferred the promises of Philip to talk from the Athenians. Before long the whole Athenian initiative was rendered pointless by the return of Phalaecus to power and his exclusion of the Athenians who could have saved him from Philip.

The terms of the Peace

The first Athenian embassy to Philip in 346 hastened north and must have reached Pella in mid-Anthesterion (*c.* 15 March). There they had two audiences with Philip. At the first Aeschines, if his later report is to be trusted, argued fully the case for Athens being accorded Amphipolis, for which he was afterwards berated by Demosthenes, and rightly. The plain truth was that, no matter how strong the Athenians felt their claim to the city to be, they would have to renounce it if they wanted to get peace, and Demosthenes like Philocrates saw that Athens could not dare to fight on. At the second audience Philip replied to the points made by the Athenian ambassadors and, it is to be presumed, undertook to send a Macedonian embassy to Athens empowered to agree on the terms of peace. Philip, about to set off on a campaign aimed at the reduction of Cersobleptes and the most eastern part of Thrace, entered into an agreement with the Athenian ambassadors not to attack the Chersonese unless the peace negotiations with Athens came to nothing. The Athenians returned home. The city awaited the Macedonians.[13]

If there was to be peace, it would involve the members of the Second Athenian Confederacy, the representatives of which (*synedroi*) were constantly in Athens. But, since by this date the Confederacy was a very lame affair, all it could do to assist the cause of peace was to avoid causing delay. Accordingly at each stage resolutions (*dogmata*) of the synod were submitted to the Athenian assembly for ratification which in effect obliged the members of the Confederacy to whatever the Athenian People deemed expedient. These resolutions, of little importance in themselves, do very much illuminate the debates in the assembly, for they were drawn up in the presumption that the Greek states would in considerable numbers respond to the summons made by the decree of Eubulus. That is, the synod presumed

that there would be a Common Peace that all the Greeks could join if they chose. In the resolution put forward in the assembly before the Dionysian Festival, i.e. on 8 Elaphebolion (6 April) the synod proposed that there should be assemblies on two successive days after the Athenian ambassadors sent out under Eubulus' decree had reported; on the same day Demosthenes proposed that there should be assemblies on 18 and 19 Elaphebolion immediately after the Dionysia. It is obvious that the Synod's resolution and Demosthenes' proposal were complementary and presumed that the response of the Greeks to the appeal made under Eubulus' decree would be known before the terms of the Peace were finally fixed. On the appointed days, however, it was still not known whether the Greeks, who were not in direct alliance with Athens as members of the Confederacy, wanted to share in a peace with Philip. The synod therefore submitted a resolution to the Athenian assembly which included a clause to the effect that 'any of the Hellenes who wished could have their names added to the public record of the peace within three months and so share in the oaths and the treaty'. The reaction of Demosthenes and Philocrates to 'the delays of the Greeks' was, however, very different. Delay was dangerous, for Philip could soon be marching south. They therefore submitted to the assembly a version of a peace in which were involved only Athens and her allies, both those within the Confederacy and those without it, with the explicit exception of Phocis and Halus, a small Thessalian city at war with Philip.[14]

On the 18th Aeschines supported the version of the peace proposed by the synod of the Confederacy, and attacked that of Philocrates and Demosthenes. They however knew that Philip would never accept a peace which left it open to any Greek state including Phocis to join as and when it chose within the next three months. That is why they had explicitly excluded Phocis from their proposed decree, and on the 18th they sought to induce a more sensible state of mind in their fellow Athenians by bringing the Macedonian ambassadors before the assembly. Aeschines frustrated this, but at the start of the assembly on the 19th Demosthenes cross-questioned one of the Macedonians, Antipater. The assembly knew then that there was no saving Phocis by such means. They must choose peace on Philip's terms or resumption of war, and since Phocis might lack the will, or be in no position, to prevent Philip marching into Attica there was only one course for sensible men. Aeschines now supported the decree of Philocrates. So

did Eubulus. The only opposition recorded came from the aged orator Aristophon. He must have counted on the Phocians having the sense to see that they would only be saved from ruin if they let the Athenians defend them. If he did, he was in a sense proved right, but on 19 Elaphebolion the risks were too great. Athens had to submit. Self-respect required a minor change. The decree of Philocrates was amended to concern only Athens and her allies of the Confederacy. The hateful exclusion of Phocis would not be confessed in the terms of the Peace. For the rest the decree was passed, and on 25 Elaphebolion the Peace of Philocrates was sworn to in the presence of Macedonians by representatives of Athens and by the members of the synod of the Confederacy.[15]

The principal clause of the Peace was of course that Athens utterly renounced her claim to Amphipolis which was in future to be indisputably part of Macedon. Thus ended, or seemed to end, the long Athenian dream – a bitter blow for Athens which she only accepted for fear of worse if she did not.[16]

The Peace established not only peace between Philip and Athens but also alliance. From the first diplomatic contacts Philip made clear that that was what he wanted. Not only was the demand included in the letter which the first embassy brought with them, but even earlier at some time in the months following the fall of Olynthus the actor Aristodemus, who went to Macedonia to plead for the Athenians held captive there, was informed that Philip wished to become an ally of Athens. Why Philip wanted alliance must be discussed later. The answer affects our whole judgement of Philip's attitude to Greece and the Greeks. But what was the attitude of Demosthenes and Philocrates? Demosthenes in providing for the two assemblies on 18 and 19 Elaphebolion, made explicit in his decree that the Athenians were to deliberate about alliance as well as peace. (Aeschines constantly reverted to this as if Demosthenes was going beyond what the synod of the Confederacy wanted, but there is nothing in his charge; the resolution of the synod envisaged a Common Peace and, since almost every Common Peace of the fourth century had a sanctions clause which provided for joint action against transgressors, in speaking of peace the Synod was not excluding the idea of alliance.) Philocrates, although the leading member of the pair, is rather obscure to us, and there is no point in speculating on his attitude to alliance with Macedon. Demosthenes is not obscure. It can be said with confidence that in

accepting the demand for alliance he had no thought whatsoever that his country would ever fight side by side with the Macedonians. Philip demanded alliance. He had to have it as part of the price of peace.[17]

Alliance there was, however, and, since Philip was known to be planning an expedition into Central Greece, Athens was likely enough to be summoned to assist him. What were Demosthenes' expectations with regard to Phocis? Did he foresee the outcome which was the ruin of Phocis?

There is a serious *crux* in Demosthenic studies, which must be treated in its place. It concerns the assembly at Athens after the return of the second embassy, on 16 Scirophorion (12 July), by which date it was known that Philip was in control of Thermopylae. What course did Demosthenes urge his countrymen to follow on that occasion? The view that will be argued in this book is that Demosthenes at that impossibly late hour actually wanted an expedition sent to save Phocis.[18] If that is right, it suggests that in making the Peace of Philocrates Demosthenes had no thought of abandoning Phocis if it could possibly be saved. Athens had her long-standing alliance with Phocis; the new alliance on which Philip had insisted did nothing to cancel that; if Philip ever came against Phocis, Athens could choose, and, if Phocis would allow herself to be defended, Athens could still do what she had done in 352, viz. keep Philip out of Greece. Of course, if Phocis insisted on surrender to the man who had so firmly refused to countenance her inclusion in the Peace of Philocrates, there was nothing that Athens could do about it. But in Elaphebolion Philocrates and Demosthenes could hardly have imagined Phocis doing that. Phalaecus might himself come to terms with Philip, but, once there was peace between Philip and Athens, there was no question of Philip seeking to negotiate the right of passage for his army into Attica. Athens was safe. Phocis by one means or another could be the same.

The second embassy and the settlement of the Sacred War

The second embassy, the chief task of which was to exact from Philip and his allies the oaths to the Peace, left Athens early in the following month and proceeded to Pella at a leisurely pace. Philip was known to be settling the newly-subjected kingdom of Cersobleptes. They took twenty-three days to get

to Macedon and it was another twenty-seven before Philip arrived. Demosthenes meanwhile became very restive. He urged his fellow-ambassadors to take ship and seek out Philip wherever in Thrace he was to be found. He later alleged that his purpose was to prevent Philip capturing any more Thracian towns, but this was transparently not his real purpose. He himself had chanced to preside in the assembly on 25 Elaphebolion and had had to exclude the representative of Cersobleptes from the oath ceremony. There could be no question of saving any part of Cersobleptes' kingdom. In any case the news had already been received in Athens that Cersobleptes had in fact lost his kingdom before the second embassy's departure. So why was Demosthenes unwilling to wait in Pella for Philip and representatives of his allies to assemble for the oath-swearing?[19]

The situation in Pella was by no means what the Athenians expected. They either found there or were shortly joined by embassies from all the great states of Greece – from Thebes, Phocis, Thessaly and Sparta. These with Athens comprised all the main parties to the Sacred War. Their business was to discuss 'settlement of the war'. Whether the Athenian embassy expected to find others there is unclear; certainly Aeschines later spoke as if the embassy was entirely unbriefed for such a congress, although one would have expected the news of the Spartan embassy to have reached Athens – it may have come after the Athenian embassy had left for Macedon. They certainly did not expect to see such clear signs of military preparations for a campaign in Central Greece. The Thessalians boasted of how they would profit from it. This must have been the reason for Demosthenes' restlessness. He claimed to have tried to take ship and been prevented. He was not necessarily alone in this restlessness. All his colleagues may have felt very uneasy about what they saw, although they may have thought that it was better to stay and try to influence things.[20]

Philip's method of conducting the negotiations was to hear each side separately. First, the Thebans and the Thessalians demanded that Philip assume the leadership of Greece and punish the Phocians. As 'ruler' of Thessaly which had suffered from Phocian invasion and as ally of the Thebans, Philip could be expected now to join them in war against Phocis. Then the Phocian ambassadors assisted by the Spartans and the Athenians begged Philip not to campaign against Phocis. The substance of Demosthenes' speech Aeschines chose not to recount, but he did represent Demosthenes as listing his many services to the cause of making peace between Athens

and Philip. Perhaps what Demosthenes really said to Philip was that, if Philip had it in mind to settle the Sacred War by armed force, one of the great proponents of the Peace would be forced to seek to have it denounced. Aeschines for his part claimed to have asked Philip to settle affairs in Central Greece 'not by force but by majority decision of a tribunal', but, if as it seemed there was to be settlement by force, to punish only those Phocians personally responsible for the occupation of the temple and the use of the sacred treasures and to force the Thebans to restore the Boeotian cities which they had destroyed. For this attack the Thebans subsequently put a price on Aeschines' head. But it is very unlikely that the military preparations to which he alluded were so clearly aimed at the military destruction of Phocis. Phalaecus had acted trusting that Philip would settle the War peacefully: the Phocian ambassadors continued to believe that there was no danger of what in fact happened happening. The reason is clear. In Pella Philip sought by every means not to reveal how he intended to settle things; both sides were privately encouraged to hope that he would do as they wanted, but both were bidden not to prepare for war; a peacefully arranged concord was at hand. The necessary military preparations were alleged to be for the attack on Halus on the gulf of Pagasae, which had been under siege in the spring when the first embassy passed through it on their way north. After the conference at Pella the embassies were as much in the dark as before.[21]

Philip delayed the oath-swearing, perhaps on the ground that not all of his allies were present. The Athenians therefore had to accompany him and his army as it moved south, allegedly against Halus, and the oaths were not sworn until Philip was in Pherae. The Athenian ambassadors made their way home, at least very uneasy about how things would turn out. At Pherae Philip was uncomfortably near to Phocis.[22]

Philip was in fact far closer to Phocis than the ambassadors could possibly realize. There were two routes south from Larisa. One went south-eastwards to Pherae. The other went directly south through Pharsalus and Lamia to Thermopylae. Armies can move only as fast as their transport; commanders on horseback can comparatively quickly catch up units well in advance. If Philip was in Pherae with units bound for Halus, he could be very shortly in Lamia with units bound for Thermopylae. So it happened. The second embassy got back to Athens on 13 Scirophorion (9 July) by which date Philip was already at Thermopylae, 'in the Gates', and beginning

negotiations with the Phocians. He had so contrived that there could be no repetition of 352; whatever Athens decided, she would not be able to save Phocis.[23]

When the Athenian ambassadors returned to Athens, they found that there had been yet another change of mind in Phocis. Phocian ambassadors were present requesting Athenian military aid, and, when the Athenian ambassadors made their report to the Council, the atmosphere was tense. The council chamber was crowded with citizens listening to the debate. The issue can only have been whether or not to renounce the peace with Philip and go out to save Phocis. Demosthenes described the scene as if he was the only member of the embassy to speak, but, although he was a Councillor, it was not he who moved the Council's Recommendation to the assembly (*probouleuma*). There is no reason to think that he was alone in his view of the situation. Given that Philip had been left in Pherae, there must have seemed a reasonable likelihood of Athens occupying Thermopylae in good time to confront him as in 352; in 357 an expeditionary force had got to Euboea within five days; it would take Philip very much longer to move the troops he had with him in Pherae to Thermopylae. The Council recommended that Thermopylae be occupied and Phocis saved. The assembly was due to meet in only a day or two, on the 16th.[24]

By the 16th the news had arrived. Philip was 'within the Gates'. (When in 343 Demosthenes was pretending that Phocis could have been saved but for Aeschines' conduct in the assembly, he used the phrase 'in the Gates', which carried the suggestion that Athens too could have been there to confront him: in 330 he was more frank.) 'Within the Gates' Philip with the Macedonian and Thessalian armies could not be checked and all men of good sense had to accept it.[25]

In the assembly Demosthenes demanded that the Recommendation to the assembly which had answered the Phocian appeal for help should be read out. But it was not read out. Now it was a fixed principle at Athens that the only way in which a matter could be put on the Agenda for the assembly was for the Council to make a Recommendation. The Recommendation may have been 'open', in the sense that a matter was simply referred to the assembly for decision with no positive recommendation by the Council, but Recommendation there had to be, or any proposal would be indictable under the law governing unconstitutional action. At the end of this assembly on 16 Scirophorion Philocrates proposed a decree and, unless there

had been a Recommendation of the Council, he would have rendered himself liable to prosecution; but he never was prosecuted for unconstitutional action. (When he was prosecuted in 343, it was on other grounds.) It is, to say the least, improbable that Demosthenes would have neglected to indict him if he could have done so. The explanation must be that the debate on the 16th was in accordance with a second Recommendation, drafted, perhaps in haste, when the news of Philip being in control of Thermopylae rendered the first Recommendation irrelevant. Consistently, in 343, Demosthenes declared that 'no one read to the people *this* Recommendation'. There was another.[26]

'*This* Recommendation', the one to which Demosthenes wished to speak, was not read out because only a man out of his senses could have envisaged going to save Phocis when Philip was in control of Thermopylae and Phocis was beyond salvation. Was Demosthenes so insane that day as to envisage just that? The scene is described by the orator himself. He rose, came forward, tried to speak. Aeschines and Philocrates stood on either side of him, kept shouting and nudging him out, in the end were openly jeering at him. The Athenian people laughed and would not give him a hearing. Demosthenes in the middle of the heckling, dissociated himself from Aeschines: 'I dissociate myself.' 'Well, don't do so now,' Aeschines interrupted, 'and later pretend you didn't.' Philocrates got up and said in 'a really insulting way': 'It's no surprise, Athenians, that Demosthenes and I don't see eye to eye. He drinks water, and I drink wine.' Demosthenes concluded his description for the Athenians: 'And you laughed.' It happens that in his *Second Philippic* of the year 344 Demosthenes alluded to this remark of Philocrates and indicated that it was made when he, Demosthenes, 'was speaking out and testifying and refusing to sacrifice Thermopylae or the Phocians'. It seems plain enough that what Demosthenes wanted was to go on with the earlier Recommendation of the Council. Phocis was to be 'saved', Thermopylae too. Since the people knew that Philip already controlled Thermopylae, they laughed – even though the situation that day was no laughing matter. Demosthenes had made a fool of himself, a decisive moment in his development.[27]

The part played by Aeschines on 16 Scirophorion is more debatable. In 343 Demosthenes was to argue that Aeschines' speech induced the Athenians to vote for a decree of Philocrates which caused the Phocians to despair and surrender to

Philip. This was transparent rubbish. As Aeschines implied, it was not likely that Philip, having got so far by the arts of the general, would then make the conclusion rest on the persuasive words of an Athenian orator. As Demosthenes himself had to disclose, Philip was in no position to be stopped. But two views have been taken of what Aeschines said that day. One view is that he actually promised the Athenians that within two or three days they would hear that it was Thebes that was under attack, not Phocis: in the autumn of 346 in the speech *On the Peace*, Demosthenes spoke of promises, and so close to the event he could hardly dare to misrepresent Aeschines. But this is to belittle Demosthenes' daring in this respect and the Athenian people's capacity to forget. The other view is that Aeschines' remarks were purely consolatory, to the effect that the situation might not be as bad as it seemed. He himself claims merely to have reported what he said to Philip in attacking the Thebans, not to have 'promised' anything, though he had added various encouraging conversations, including the remarks of 'certain of Philip's Companions' to the effect that Philip would re-establish the cities of Boeotia which the Thebans had destroyed. In favour of this view it is to be noted that there would have been little point in Aeschines making promises.[28]

The conclusion of the debate on 16 Scirophorion was that the Athenians reaffirmed the Peace of Philocrates in passing another decree proposed by Philocrates. This extended the terms of the Peace to cover Philip's descendants, promised that the Athenians would join in military operations against the Phocians, if they did not vacate the temple at Delphi, and praised Philip 'because he proclaims that he will do what is just'. The decree is tell-tale. There is no suspicion of the fate that is soon to fall on Phocis. Philip is regarded as the arbiter of affairs, and his settlement is awaited. On 23 Scirophorion Phalaecus made a truce with Philip, which surrendered Phocis and allowed him and his mercenaries to go where they would. Then on the 27th the news reached Athens that Philip had handed over to the Thebans the Boeotian cities which the Phocians had captured in the war, Orchomenus, Coronea and Corsiae, and that the fate of the Phocians was to be decided not by Philip but by the Amphictyons as a whole. The second part of this message caused great alarm. Demosthenes represented it as meaning that Philip had put Phocis under the control of the Boeotians, which he had, at any rate formally speaking, not done. Its real significance was that, whereas it

might have been possible to hope for mercy for Phocis from Philip, from the Amphictyons the greatest severity was to be expected. The penalty previously appointed for temple-robbery was to be pushed over a cliff. Indeed when it came to the debate in the Amphictyonic Council, the Oetaeans actually proposed such a penalty, and Athens must have been well aware of the bitter hatred the Phocians had aroused. Nor had Athens to fear for Phocis alone. She herself had supported the temple-robbers and was tainted with guilt. What might not the assembled Amphictyons decide about her? A holy war might be declared and the combined forces of the Amphictyons descend on Attica. A decree was quickly passed that women and children should be brought into the city from the countryside, that the forts on the borders should be repaired, and the wall of the Piraeus attended to, that the festival of Heracles should be celebrated within the city. A third embassy which had been sent to Philip, its purpose not entirely clear, and which had returned from Euboea on hearing the news from Phocis, was sent off again to do what could be done in the Amphictyonic Council. There had been two letters from Philip calling on Athens to play her part in the settlement of Central Greece. Now the third embassy was sent off in deadly earnest.[29]

The settlement of Phocis effected by the Amphictyony, was represented by Demosthenes as severe beyond precedent. The cities were destroyed, and the people settled in villages of no more than fifty houses, the 'villages' to be no less than two hundred yards apart. The sacred monies that had been stolen and squandered were to be paid back at the rate of sixty talents a year, which was a very great amount for a small and poor community. Those especially responsible for the temple-robbery and those who had profited from it, i.e. principally Phalaecus and his mercenaries, were to be under a curse and liable to seizure wherever they were. The state was to be utterly defenceless. But all this was much less than might have been, as the savage proposal of the Oetaeans showed. The Phocians lived, and their land was left to them. Aeschines claimed to have pleaded for them successfully. One may guess that, although the decision was taken by the Amphictyons as a whole, Philip privately played an important part.[30]

Philip was accorded the two votes in the Amphictyony which the Phocians had formerly possessed and in some capacity he presided over the Pythian Games of autumn 346. As 'ruler' of Thessaly, he was able to influence the Thessalian votes. All in all, the decisions of the Amphictyons in 346 were

much as he wished. So the treatment of the two states that had been allied to the sacrilegious Phocians is of special interest. Neither suffered the reprisals which one may presume that the Thebans would have chosen to exact. Sparta was declared by the second-century A.D. geographer Pausanias to have been expelled from the Amphictyony; Delphian inscriptions show that this was not the case. Athens was pressingly invited to take part in all the proceedings at Delphi in 346. Her status was in no way diminished. All that happened was that in the autumn at the time of the Pythian Games, when Athens declined to take part, she was asked to give her assent to the new arrangements, which she did. Demosthenes' speech *On the Peace* concerns this request. According to him it was an order, which had to be complied with for fear of the Amphictyony declaring war against Athens. Other speeches from the debate have not survived. They may have taken a less dramatic view. If Philip had wanted to attack Athens, there had been nothing to stop him since mid-Scirophorion. By failing to answer his summons, his ally Athens had even furnished him with a formal pretext, had he wished one.[31]

After the autumn Pythian Festival, the astounding thing happened. Philip returned to Macedon. The new master of Greece retired from Greece. He kept his access; Thessalians garrisoned Nicaea, the most important of the Thermopylae towns. But he himself was gone. Why? What were Philip's aims in 346?[32]

The aims of Philip in 346

Our evidence is almost entirely Athenian, and oratory at that. Only a few sentences in Diodorus and Justin suggest historians' wider views. As usual with Philip and his son, we are left to speculate.

By the end of 346 many Greeks must have been greatly unhappy at what had happened 'on their very doorsteps, in the middle of Greece'.[33] None more than the Athenians, many of whom must have seen Philip's making the Peace of Philocrates as a mere ploy to enable him to get into Greece.

How much was planned? Without question he intended to settle the Sacred War. The expedition of Macedonians and Thessalians was known about well in advance, which should have made it more difficult for Philip to get past Thermopylae.

The attitude of Phalaecus was crucial, and one cannot help suspecting collaboration. Phalaecus 'trusted' Philip according to Aeschines, and Philip let him off remarkably lightly. Philip had shown no reluctance to fight when he deemed it necessary. In Scirophorion 346 Phalaecus and his mercenaries stood no chance against Philip's army, regardless of the Thebans at their rear. Why then did Philip not destroy them on the battlefield? One suspects that Phalaecus had made a private deal; he was at the end of his resources; Philip would let him go free if he let Philip in to Phocis. Only such a deal can explain Philip's confidence in publishing his campaign so well in advance. The Athenians seeking peace was a bonus. He could not count on it, though a threat to the Chersonese might make them begin negotiations. But, once the Peace was afoot, one suspects that Philip planned much of what happened. He delayed the oath-swearing so that the Athenian ambassadors were detained, and his method was perhaps to have representatives of his allies, like Cardia and Byzantium, arrive too late for Pella so that he would not need to swear until he was in Pherae. But the siege of Halus was crucial. It was that which enabled him to explain the army which accompanied him (or seemed to accompany, the major part having gone direct to Lamia). Now this siege was curiously prolonged. Parmenio, whose generalship Philip highly esteemed, had already begun it when the first embassy passed through it on its way northwards in Gamelion (February). He was called away to join Antipater and Eurylochus as Macedonian ambassadors to Athens, but was not indispensable in that role; at any rate Antipater spoke for them on 19 Elaphebolion. Why was Parmenio not left to finish the siege? The city was on the coast but was small, and can have offered no problem to the well-practised siege-train. Nor was it spared for the while as an ally of Athens. At all points Philip made clear that neither Phocis nor Halus could be included in the Peace. There is therefore a strong suspicion that the siege was protracted so that it could play its part in beguiling the Athenians.[34]

Did Philip also plan the settlement that was made of the Sacred War? Or did he march south in 346 uncertain as to what he would do when he got in to Central Greece? It has been maintained that Philip did indeed seriously entertain the idea of curtailing the power of Thebes, that, when some of the Athenian ambassadors were given the hint to this effect by 'certain of the king's Companions', this was by no means merely to lull suspicions and arouse false hopes, but

that such plans depended on Athens responding to Philip's appeal for military aid shortly after he penetrated Phocis; when Athens was dissuaded from sending aid, Philip had to switch his plans, to destroy Phocis and strengthen Thebes.

Such a view of Philip's actions in 346 is wholly unsatisfactory. It is clear that Philip did and said at Pella all he could to persuade all parties to leave the settlement to him and to avoid hostilities; Justin makes this plain. But there were the most powerful reasons why he should side with the Thebans against the Phocians. First, the Thessalians were of the greatest importance to him. He needed their cavalry, at this date even more than Alexander would in Asia where it was to play a vital part. He could not afford unrest in Thessaly if he was to operate far from Pella. Yet the one thing that is clear throughout is that the Thessalians hated the Phocians – for reasons ancient and modern. Philip had been called in to Thessaly as their champion against the Phocians and appointed 'ruler'. He might pay no heed to his alliance with Thebes. Would he have been so unwise as to contemplate for an instant causing trouble for himself with the Thessalians? Second, he could not side with Phocis if he meant to keep the respect of Greece for himself. The Phocians were universally condemned for their sacrilege. Those hostile to Philip conceded as much, and Philip was well aware that it was to his advantage to exploit this feeling. At the Battle of the Crocus Field in 352 his troops went into battle wearing Apollo's symbol, laurel wreaths; he was 'the avenger of sacrilege' and 'he went into battle as if under the leadership of the god'. The savage Oetaean proposal showed the intensity of Greek feeling, as did the account preserved in Diodorus of how the guilty, Athens and Sparta included, were in the fullness of time fully requited. Was Philip to alienate all those who had hailed him as saviour of the sacred shrine? It is wholly improbable that he played with the idea for an instant. (It may be added that the theory involves an absurdity, viz. that Philip with the Macedonians and Thessalians under his command needed Athenian help to defeat the Thebans. The Athenians, in sober truth, had never won a major land-battle, if it is right that the battle of Marathon was fought only when the Persians were leaving, their cavalry already aboard. Philip did not fear Thebes, Athens and ample others in 338. Are we seriously to think he needed Athenian help in 346?)[35]

Philip planned the whole affair. With great wisdom he put the formal responsibility on the Amphictyons and he took care to see that they did not deal with Phocis with full severity or

visit penalties on Athens or Sparta. Nor was his treatment of Boeotia without wisdom. He did not, *pace* Demosthenes, put the Thebans in charge of Phocis.[36] He did return to Thebes the three cities the Phocians had taken. But what else could he have done? He did not intervene in Boeotia and restore the cities Thebes had destroyed. But the Greeks had blessed the Theban hegemony in the Common Peace of 366 and 362. There was much to be said for not going back on those arrangements.

His treatment of Athens is the most striking and the most challenging. Why did he not turn against Athens once he was inside the Gates? Athens did not respond to the appeal from her new ally. Philip had a pretext if he wanted one. Perhaps it might be suggested that he feared that he would not succeed if he laid siege to the city; Perinthus and Byzantium were to check him; would he have dared to take on Athens? But he would have had all the support from Thebes that he needed, his siege-train was highly trained and practised and cities' defences against these new skills were as yet undeveloped. Siege was possible. Perhaps then he feared the loss of prestige if he turned on the state with which he had just made peace? But those who seek power cannot afford to be tender about prestige. Still, some might cavil at the claim that he treated Athens better than circumstances allowed.

It is more profitable to inquire why Philip insisted on having alliance with Athens as well as peace, as he did from the very first moment the question of negotiations was raised – which was in 347 with the actor Aristodemus.[37] His army was superior to any conceivable combination of Greeks, Athens' of little worth. There can be only one answer. Philip wanted alliance with Athens because he had already decided to attack Persia. For that the Athenian navy was indispensable.

The genesis of the plan to attack Persia is somewhat unclear. Philip did not and could not proclaim it to the Great King. By the late 340s Philip had become, in Demosthenes' phrase, 'a terror to all Greeks and barbarians' and 'neither Greece nor the barbarian world can contain the fellow's greed'; in *The Fourth Philippic* of 341 he alluded to the Persians having recently captured Hermias of Atarneus who was 'privy to and active in all Philip's preparations against the Great King', and who would tell all. So by 341 it was no longer secret. Earlier Philip had to content himself with rather vague promises of benefits to come, which left him open to the ridicule of his opponents. For instance, in early 342 Philip in a letter to the

Athenians promised 'great benefits' if they paid no heed to his opponents, whereupon Hegesippus mocked: 'The gifts won't be in the civilized world . . . but some other land, some other sphere it seems will come to light where we will be given the gifts'. With hindsight we can understand. At the time, people would inevitably misunderstand if they chose to. But not everybody chose to, and the writings of Isocrates show that the events of 346 could convert hopes into expectations. In his treatise *To Philip*, written after Athens had made the Peace of Philocrates but before Philip had sworn to it, i.e. before the settlement of the Sacred War, he sets out to persuade Philip to turn his attention to 'actions far more advantageous' than those he 'at that moment happens to have chosen', to advise him in fact to 'champion the concord of the Greeks and the campaign against the barbarians', but Isocrates is not at all sure that Philip may not do in the Peloponnese what hostile rumour said he would, viz. destroy Sparta and become ruler of all Greece. By 345 in his *First Epistle to Philip* the tone has changed. There is no longer need for encouragement and exhortation. Now it is mild exasperation. Philip has got himself wounded fighting against Illyrians. He should be getting on with the task of overthrowing the so-called Great King. The events of 346, in short, have persuaded Isocrates. Of course, Isocrates may have wanted to be persuaded, but years later just before his death, in his *Second Epistle to Philip*, he reported discussing with friends whether he had put the idea of an Asiatic campaign into Philip's head or Philip had had the idea for himself; Isocrates had answered that he rather thought that his exhortations had accorded with, rather than excited, Philip's own wishes. That is, by 338 Isocrates recognized that the plan to attack Persia had been formed in Philip's mind, before Isocrates began to address him, before the Peace of Philocrates. Hence his insistence on alliance as well as peace. Hence also his careful cosseting of Athens in 346 against Amphictyonic reprisals.[38]

If the Peace of Philocrates was to provide a necessary instrument for the war against Persia, equally necessary was concord in Greece. How did Philip in 346 imagine that, if he began to fight Persia, there would be peace in Greece? He had rejected the traditional Common Peace, for he meant to afford Phocis no means of escape from punishment; until Phocis had been punished, there was no hope of stability in Central Greece. He had therefore to rest his hopes on the Amphictyonic organization. In a vague sentence at the end of the account of

the settlement of the Sacred War, Diodorus recorded that 'the Amphictyons made arrangements for the care of the oracle and all else concerned with piety, common peace and concord amongst the Greeks.'[39] Whatever this means precisely, it would seem that Philip supposed that, since the Amphictyony embraced the main states of Greece, it would limit their hostilities; he was himself a member, and he or his deputy could always assist; so Sparta, and others with aggressive plans, had better take heed.

Late in 346 Philip 'returned to Macedon, having not merely gained for himself a reputation for piety and for excellence as a general, but also made great provision for his future advancement. For he desired to be appointed general of Greece with full powers and to conduct the war against the Persians – which indeed came about.'[40] Not, however, as easily as he imagined at the close of that dramatic year.

VIII

THE BREAKDOWN OF THE PEACE

Philip's military activities from the Peace to the resumption of war with Athens

With Greece as he thought settled, Philip in late 346 turned his attention to the security of his own kingdom. An Isocrates might imagine that all was ready for the great crusade to begin. Philip knew otherwise, and during the six years the Peace of Philocrates lasted he had much to do. His actions may be briefly reviewed before we turn to his relations with the Greeks.

His first task lay in Macedonia itself. Justin records that on returning to Macedon Philip set about transferring population, abandoning some areas and increasing cities elsewhere. No doubt the policy was in some degree resented, but Alexander could later boast of his father 'bringing the Macedonians down from the hills to the plains' and perhaps the benefits were quickly perceived. Urbanization meant security and prosperity. With the increase of trade brought by peace with Athens, the land flourished. The revenues of Thrace must have contributed much.[1]

In 345 'the Illyrian kings' engaged his attention once more. This involved him in hard fighting against a King Pleuratus whose kingdom appears to have lain in northern Albania in the lower valley of the Drin. Philip himself was wounded with a smashed shin-bone, and only saved from worse by the heroism of one of his favourites. One hundred and fifty of the Companion cavalry were wounded. Clearly Philip had been in considerable danger, and Isocrates was moved to upbraid him. But the campaign was by no means unnecessary.[2]

Philip must have been blessed with uncommon physical strength. In winter 339 he was to be wounded by a Triballian spear which passed through his thigh and killed his mount, but he was not deflected from his march into Phocis in the

autumn.[3] The wound of 345 was perhaps more disabling. Although he was no doubt anxious to conclude the securing of the kingdom, for two whole years he had to let the completion of the conquest of Thrace wait. In 344 he carried through the reorganization of Thessaly, re-establishing the ancient four-fold administration, the so-called Tetrarchies: Demosthenes fulminated about loss of liberty; the truth was less colourful, for the Thessalians appear to have at least accepted the change without demur, as Demosthenes later seemed to concede; on

Map 6. Bosporus and the Hellespontine Area

another view they positively welcomed it.[4] But such administrative matters did not need Philip's personal attention, nor for that matter did the diplomatic exchanges of those years with Athens require him to be constantly in Pella. The wound is the more likely explanation of the two years' military inactivity.

By 342 he was ready for the rigours of the Thracian campaign, but first, early in the year, he intervened in the Molossian kingdom (in Epirus), which by this date had become too important for the King of Macedon not to be able to count on. The king, Arybbas, had been submissive since 350, when Philip had taken his stepson, Alexander, brother of Olympias, to Pella. The boy, now twenty years of age, had grown into a devoted admirer of Philip (on which Greeks promptly put a

malign interpretation), and Philip must have regarded him as more likely not to exploit the opportunities to be presented by his absence in Asia. So Arybbas was replaced and went off to Athens where he was hospitably received and promised aid in the recovering of his kingdom.[5] Events were to prove the soundness of Philip's judgement. When Olympias and her son Alexander fled from the court in 336 and sought the aid of her brother, he was not to be moved: the son had to seek elsewhere; the brother was, by way of reward and insurance, given the hand in marriage of Olympias' daughter, Cleopatra. When the invasion of Asia did begin in 334, the Molossian Alexander sought an outlet for his ambition by a campaign in southern Italy (in the course of which he was killed).[6] In 342 Philip had made a very satisfactory appointment.

Having established Alexander as king of the Molossians, Philip then secured the southern confines of the kingdom by subduing the Cassiopaeans. This involved the capture of three small inland cities, which had once been colonies of Elis in the Peloponnese but by this date were hardly to be counted part of Greece. The Athenians reacted with hysteria. Demosthenes and his supporters declared that Philip was 'campaigning against Ambracia' (modern Arta) to the north of the Gulf of Ambracia. An expedition was hastily sent off to Acarnania which was the area to the south of the Gulf, wholly useless for the saving of Ambracia if indeed it could have got there in time. Nothing happened to Ambracia. Philip clearly had had no intention of attacking it. If he had so intended, nothing that Athens could have done would have stopped him.[7]

Philip returned to Macedon and by the end of June 342 the Thracian campaign had begun.[8] His forces were large and one may guess that he intended no less than the complete subjection of Thrace including the area to the north of the Great Balkan range. The aim, according to Diodorus, was to settle with Cersobleptes who had been left in 346 in possession of his kingdom but who was 'continuing to subject the Greek cities of the Hellespont and to ravage their land'. Certainly he did deal with Cersobleptes, who was dispossessed of his kingdom, but he appears to have done a great deal more. A few weeks had sufficed in 346 to capture the royal stronghold of Cersobleptes on the Sacred Mountain; the campaign begun in mid-342 continued until mid-340 when Philip began the siege of Perinthus (modern Marmaraereğlisi) on the Sea of Marmara. In the course of these two full years he fought 'several battles'. Another wife for Philip signified a war completed – since she

was daughter of a king of the Getae, he must have been fighting not just in European Turkey against Cersobleptes, but also in the valley of the Hebrus (the Bulgarian Maritza) and, most remarkably, north of the Great Balkan range. The appallingly severe Thracian winter, and perhaps illness, did not deter him from the work of pacification. Cities were founded, notably Philippopolis (Plovdiv). A tax of a tithe was imposed on the Thracians (which must have been very profitable to judge by the roughly contemporary Panagyrište treasure). The post of 'general in charge of Thrace' was probably established in this period. As Alexander was to remind the mutineers at Opis, Philip 'attached most of Thrace to Macedonia'. Those that remained outside the enlarged kingdom, 'the independent Thracians', had their own kings with the status of clients, as it were, of Philip, and who would remain independent as long as they did not act with independence. Given the terrain and the climate, the campaign was one of Philip's major achievements.[9]

Demosthenes chose to see things otherwise. In both the speeches *On the Chersonese* and *The Third Philippic* of April/May 341, Philip was declared to be advancing against Byzantium, while in the speech *On the Crown* of 330 Philip was represented as attacking his own allies, the Byzantians, when they refused to join him in attacking Athens. Since the attack did not begin until September 340 and then only after Byzantium had herself helped Perinthus against Philip, it is clear that Demosthenes has here not risen above his customary standard of truthfulness and can give no help in answering the important question of why Philip became embroiled in war with the Hellespontine Greek states at all.[10]

Philip attacked Perinthus in July 340. According to Diodorus, the reason was that 'the city was opposed to him and was inclining to the side of the Athenians', but there is not the slightest hint in Demosthenes' speech *On the Crown*, where one would expect to find it, of renewal of friendship with Athens. Perinthus had been a member of the Second Athenian Confederacy from an early date but was evidently not an ally of Athens in 340. Nor was its position of great strategic value to Philip. If he did desire to control the corn-route to Athens, Perinthus was of little use. As far as our evidence allows us to see, no corn-ships ever called at Perinthus. The explanation is likely to be that Perinthus had failed to respond to appeals from Philip for help during his attack on Cersobleptes.[11]

Whatever Philip's reason was for attacking Perinthus, the

attack opened a new phase. For all that Athenian orators had had to say to the contrary, for the first time since 346 Philip was at war with Greeks. Demosthenes saw his opportunity. Six years of fretful waiting were nearing their end. Soon he could have war.

The Athenian war-party

From the moment that the news arrived in Athens in mid-346 that Philip was within the Gates, Demosthenes was looking for an opportunity to resume the war. In late summer 346, when in his speech *On the Peace* he counselled against provoking Philip and the Amphictyons, he alluded to the possibility of 'resumption of war over Amphipolis or some such grievance which does not concern others', and he ended by pointing out the folly of 'going to war against all the Amphictyonic powers over the shadow in Delphi at this moment'. There would be war, but at the right moment.[12]

He was not alone in what his critics termed 'war-mongering'. Hegesippus, who delivered the seventh speech in the Demosthenic Corpus, and Hyperides, the celebrated orator, accuser of Philocrates in 343, played leading parts in breaking up the Peace, with Polyeuctus and the future financier Lycurgus in support. All shared with Demosthenes the honour of being demanded by name by Alexander in 335 after the suppression of the revolt of Thebes – save Hegesippus, whom perhaps death rather than repentance excepted. Demosthenes, however, was their leader thanks to his rhetorical gifts. As Aeschines was later to remark, 'those who were at war against the peace of the city were pleased to call Demosthenes to the speaker's platform, saying that only his name was untouched by bribery; Demosthenes would come forward to speak and set them on to cause war and confusion . . . He brought things to the point that if Philip did not send ambassadors he said that Philip despised the city and if he did send them he called them spies, not ambassadors.'[13] His method was simple and effective. He kept hammering away at untruths until enough Athenians came to believe them. For instance, the city of Cardia, which lay on the neck of the Gallipoli Peninsula and had been in the fifth century part of the Athenian-controlled Chersonese, had firmly refused to have anything to do with Athens in the fourth. In the 350s it had sided first with Cersobleptes, and then with

Philip in a formal alliance, and thus had participated in the Peace of Philocrates explicitly as his ally, as Demosthenes acknowledged in 346. In 341 the city was spoken of without argument as belonging to Athens and usurped by Philip, and this despite the fact that both Philip and the Cardians themselves had frequently called on the Athenians to settle their differences by arbitration.[14] Clearly truth had ceased to matter in such details, the achievement of Demosthenes and the war-party.

Caution was necessary. Early in the Attic year 346/5 Demosthenes and his political ally, Timarchus, both having been members of the Council in the previous year, joined in an attack on Aeschines who then rounded on Timarchus with a charge of immoral conduct. The case was heard very early in 345, and, despite the assistance of Demosthenes and Hegesippus, Timarchus was deprived of civil rights. The Athenian people were clearly in no humour yet to pay heed to the war-party. So throughout 345 they confined themselves to attacking Philip while he was away fighting against Pleuratus.[15]

The following year, 344, gave them a chance to widen the sphere of their criticism. With Philip seemingly preoccupied with the affairs of his own kingdom, the Spartans judged once again that the time had come to resume control of Messenia. Philip was appealed to by both the Messenians and the Argives (though we do not know how precisely they were involved) and he responded by sending a rescript to the Spartans warning them off. Presumably he wrote as Amphictyon and threatened Amphictyonic action. There was excited reaction in Athens. Demosthenes proposed an embassy to the Messenians and Argives to expostulate with them for giving Philip the chance to intervene in the Peloponnese, and was himself appointed ambassador. His embassy was by no means successful in persuading the Peloponnesians, but it was a start. Both in Athens and abroad, from 344 onwards Demosthenes and his associates were relentless in arousing hostility to Philip.[16]

The advocates of peace with Philip

The opposition Demosthenes had to overcome was various. In Athens, as had already been remarked, a curious transformation had occurred. Demosthenes, who had been Philocrates' right-hand man in making the Peace, had become the chief opponent

of maintaining it, while Aeschines, whose role had been both ancillary and ineffective, had become the chief proponent of continuing and developing it. How had this come about? One can only guess, but it is a reasonable assumption that when Philip withdrew from Greece in autumn 346 Aeschines began to hope that the Peace of Philocrates had not been made merely to outwit Athens in Central Greece but could become the basis for lasting agreement with Philip, and that this is the reason why early in 345 during his attack on Timarchus Aeschines spoke favourably of Philip. Aeschines was not alone in this view. A bare majority, but a majority, of the jurors were found to favour his case in the trial of 343, and, earlier, support had perhaps been stronger. Thus there were two opposed views: the Peace was too damnable to be maintained, and the peace, however damnable, should be maintained. The political history of Athens in these years is largely the struggle of the former against the latter.[17]

Both within Athens and elsewhere those who favoured peace with Philip received strong support from what one may term the Panhellenists. The course of Greek affairs in the fourth century was bedevilled by the widespread belief that Persia was a great menace to Greek liberty and that the solution of all Greece's problems was to be found in a great national crusade against Persia. The chief spokesman of this view was Isocrates who spent most of his life arguing that Greeks would only stop fighting each other, city against city and class against class, if they united against Persia.[18] To achieve this end, Persia had to be represented as intolerably oppressive to the Greeks of Asia.

The facts were quite otherwise. In the fourth century the Greeks of Asia led remarkably untroubled lives, by comparison with Greeks outside the Persian Empire. They had to pay tribute and to serve when called on in Persian armies. But the tribute was, in itself, not great and, compared to the costs of constant warfare in Greece itself probably very small indeed; the largest contingent of Greeks in Persian service in the fourth century ever recorded was 6,000,[19] an extremely low figure considering the large number of cities from which it was drawn; and moreover service was not regular, being confined, as far as the evidence goes, to the four years' actual fighting involved in the various attempts to recover Egypt; compared to the constant warfare in Greece itself this was practically nothing. Cities were left free in large measure to conduct their own foreign policy. The garrisons of which Isocrates complained appear to have been withdrawn once Athens and Sparta had accepted

that they had to keep out of Asia. In general, within the *Pax Persica* the lot of the Greeks was quite a happy one. After fulminating in his *Panegyric Oration* of 380, Isocrates deemed it prudent not to persist in his abuse of Persia, but the belief persisted. Demosthenes had to pay lip-service. In 354/3 a rumour reached Greece that the Great King had ordered the preparation of a large fleet (which was probably the fleet used in the abortive invasion of Egypt of 351/0), and there was an excited proposal at Athens that there should be a union of Greeks to confront it: in arguing against this, Demosthenes saw fit to declare 'I think that the Great King is the common enemy of all the Greeks' (and the 'I' is emphatic and bears the sense 'I am no exception to those who think . . .'). In 351/0 when he proposed help for the exiled democrats of Rhodes, he had to wrestle with the argument that there was a danger of provoking the Great King, and in *The Fourth Philippic* of 341 when he recommended an appeal to Persia, he begged his countrymen 'to lay aside the silliness, which has often disadvantaged you, of speaking of "the barbarian, and the common enemy of all" and all such talk; for whenever I see anyone who is afraid of the man in Susa and Ecbatana and says he is ill-disposed to the city . . . but takes a different line about the bandit on our doorstep increasing his power nearby in the heart of Greece, I marvel at him and fear him, whoever he is, since he does not fear Philip.'[20]

The fear of the Great King was indeed strong and blinded judgement. It is true that he had intervened in Greek affairs, and his support, with money and the threat of force, for his chosen ally in Greece, first Sparta and then Thebes, had fed these fears; the Social War of Athens against the leading members of the Second Athenian Confederacy had been brought abruptly to an end in 355 by a Royal ultimatum, and as recently as the late 350s Thebes had received a subvention of money to help her in the Sacred War. But there was no real danger of Persia seeking to resume the expansive ambitions of the fifth century. Her real anxieties were in the eastern end of her empire and the Great King had no ambition to come westwards of Asia again. Diplomacy served his purposes better. But many Greeks were not to be persuaded of this. Isocrates declared that help for the Great King in recovering Egypt in 343/2 enabled him to 'plot against the Greeks', and Aristotle in the *Rhetoric* gave as an example of a 'general belief' the argument that 'it was necessary to prepare against the Great King and not allow him to control Egypt' since just as Darius

and Xerxes did not come over to Greece before each had retaken Egypt so too 'if he takes it now, he will come over'.[21]

Such folly was Philip's great ally. The Panhellenists looked to him to lead the crusade; Greece must fight with, not against, him.[22] The only Athenian whom we can confidently name as Panhellenist is Isocrates himself, but he clearly had his following. Elsewhere, though less surprisingly, names are lacking, but the creed must have been widespread to judge by the attitude of Greeks to Alexander and his conquests. An Ephesian, Delius, disciple of Plato, was sent by 'the Greeks living in Asia' to Alexander shortly after his accession to urge him to be on with 'the war against the barbarians'; in about 330 the Thespians of Boeotia made a dedication in honour of its men 'sent under arms against barbarian Asia to avenge their ancestors'; Theopompus in the 320s spoke in a letter to Alexander of those who had died at the battle of Issus in 332 'on behalf of your kingship and the liberty of the Greeks'. Alexander himself after the victory of Gaugamela in 331 wrote to the Greeks in terms suitable to the Panhellenist mission accomplished, 'being eager to win the favour of the Greeks'.[23] Hollow it may all have been, but there were plenty of Greeks so minded. In their expectations the cause of peace with Philip found strong support.

More practical considerations too moved men to wish to keep the peace established by Philip in 346. As Polybius pointed out in a famous passage, the statesmen of the Peloponnese named as traitors by Demosthenes in his Black List in the speech *On the Crown* by no means deserved the title; the support and friendship of Philip had secured their countries against the threat of Sparta. As a native of Megalopolis, Polybius spoke with feeling and understanding. If Philip were to be involved in war with Greece, who would protect the Messenians, or the Arcadians?[24]

To Demosthenes Philip's influence in Greece was due to the corruption and bribery of all who differed from the Athenian war-party. The theme is constant in his speeches after 346, and he persuaded posterity that bribery was the root of all Philip's successes. Cicero for instance remarked to his friend Atticus that 'Philip used to say that all strongholds could be stormed provided an ass laden with gold could get up to them.' Demosthenes himself, and his circle, was the source of all this, and there was little reason for it – not at any rate in the judgement of Polybius in the area of Greece he knew well, nor, as our evidence shows, in the case of Athens. Time and again Aeschines

was pronounced a traitor who took bribes. If there had been anything in the accusation, he would have been brought to trial and condemned. He never was. As Aeschines in 343 wryly commented, 'Demosthenes in his speech appears to be the only man who cares for his city; all the rest are traitors.' In an Athenian court accusations of corruption were easily made. The law required that to secure the condemnation of a politician for giving the people bad advice the charge had to include statements of bribery, but this was a matter of mere form. It was not bad conscience that led Philocrates to leave Athens before his trial in 343; his sensibly conceived policy had turned out ill and, such being the nature of justice in Athenian political trials, prudence bade him anticipate the verdict. Philip certainly offered gifts to ambassadors quite openly, but this was probably conventional, although the Thebans ostentatiously refused them. No serious evidence for wild allegations about Aeschines was ever advanced and his policy is wholly explicable without recourse to the hypothesis of bribery.[25]

For politicians elsewhere we have hardly more than the sweeping assertions of Demosthenes, as he bewailed 'the dread disease' which had come on the Greeks.[26] The truth was more solemn. Not just political leaders but whole cities saw Philip as a saviour – a view more difficult to refute. How else could they be saved?

The proposal to strengthen the Peace of Philocrates

An alternative presented itself in 344. The bitter attacks on Philip made by Demosthenes on his embassy to Messenia and Argos in the first half of the year prompted joint protest early in the Attic year 344/3 by Philip and all his allies in the Peace of Philocrates as well as by the Messenians and Argives. Philip was represented by the celebrated Byzantian orator, Python, one of Isocrates' most illustrious pupils. A notable scene ensued.[27]

It happened that at the same moment an embassy arrived from the Great King requesting Athenian help in the army he was preparing for the final attempt to reconquer Egypt, which was to be made in winter 343/2. The Athenians declined in a contemptuous manner: 'the Athenian friendship for the Great King continues, provided the Great King does not attack the

cities of the Greeks,' but, they added, 'if he starts any trouble, they would summon both Philip and the rest of the Greeks against him.'[28] This was surprising indeed. At the very moment that Philip's ambassadors were in Athens to complain about Athens' attitude towards him, the Athenians gave an answer to the Great King which clearly implied an attitude of friendship to Philip and the only explanation one can offer is that the Council had considered the business of both embassies together, that their hostile Recommendation (*probouleuma*) to the assembly about Persia was conditioned by a friendly Recommendation about Macedon, and that the assembly gave its answer to Persia accordingly. So far so good for Philip.

Then came the turn of Python. He made a speech strongly attacking the war-party, and complaining to the Athenians that (in the version given by Hegesippus in 342) 'although Philip had set out to treat the Athenians well and had chosen them especially amongst the Greeks as his friends, they heeded the speeches of those who accused and slandered him; that such speeches caused him, when he heard that the Athenians gave a favourable hearing to abuse of him, to change his opinion, since those whom he had chosen to treat well appeared to distrust him.' He went on to require Philip's critics to stop finding fault with the Peace and, if there was anything unsatisfactory in the clause, to propose amendment.

In offering the possibility of amendment, Philip can have had only one thing in mind. Athens had complained that he had promised to protect the Messenians and the Argives against Sparta. There was only one alternative to that sort of protection, namely the establishment of a Common Peace for the Greeks with a sanctions clause which provided for joint action against aggressors. Such an amendment was what the Athenians in part proposed and was under consideration for the next twenty months. Such an amendment too seemed implicit in the response to Persia. It seems likely therefore that in proposing that the Peace could be amended Philip had this sort of amendment in mind. Certainly, as far as one can judge from Hegesippus' version, Python had no expectation of any other sort of amendment. If he had known that the status of Amphipolis as Philip's possession was to be raised, he would have had much to say.[29]

Debate followed. Demosthenes, and if we may believe a claim made late in life Demosthenes alone, spoke against Python, his charges and his proposal. So one may guess that a Recommendation from the Council had proposed amendment of the

Peace in the way acceptable to Python and consistent with the reply to Persia. Demosthenes saw his chance. *The Second Philippic* was the result, perhaps one of the most effective speeches ever made: if the Athenians had to consider how the present situation should be 'amended', they must realize that all that Philip was doing was aimed at destroying Athens: as he had warned the Argives and Messenians on his embassy, apparently to no effect, the only proper attitude to tyrants like Philip was distrust. Unfortunately the reply which Demosthenes proposed should be made to the embassies has not been preserved in our text, but he finished with an attack on Aeschines and a prophecy of disaster to come. A successful speech indeed to judge by the sequel. For Hegesippus rose and proposed a decree which he claimed to have drafted in the course of the assembly, and which proposed that the Peace should be amended so that Philip should restore Amphipolis to Athens. The decree was carried, and formally read to the ambassadors. They made no reply. Hegesippus later pretended that they can have had no fault to find. The truth must have been utterly otherwise, that they were thunder-struck; if there was one thing certain, it was that Philip would never cede Amphipolis; it was the lynch-pin of Macedonian power to the east. The war-party had struck a savage blow at the prospects for peace – a lively demonstration of pure democracy in action and the power of oratory.[30]

The decree had provided for an embassy to be sent to Philip. Hegesippus was elected to it, seemingly the leading spirit. They must have reached Pella late in 344, where Philip accorded them a very cool reception. An Athenian poet living in Macedon who was so imprudent as to entertain them was ordered to leave the country. The result was predictable, but the Athenian war-party had thereby advanced their plans for destroying the peace. In the first half of 343 Hyperides prosecuted Philocrates as the author of the accursed Peace and got him condemned to death. Shortly afterwards, in the second half of the year, Aeschines was brought to trial in hopes of a similar result, but Demosthenes' plans suffered a check. Aeschines was narrowly acquitted. There was still a considerable body of opinion in favour of saving the Peace. Negotiation of an amendment to the Peace was still possible, and early in 342 a letter arrived from Philip proposing again the establishment of a Common Peace: it listed various differences and suggested that they be settled by arbitration.[31] The reply of Hegesippus is preserved for us as the seventh speech in the Demosthenic Corpus,

sarcastic, scathing, malign. It was the end of the affair. Philip had to accept that Athens could neither trust him under the Peace she had nor seriously set about making a better one. At that moment he must have realized that before attacking Persia he would have to deal with Athens.

Demosthenes' reasons for seeking to destroy the Peace

Were Demosthenes and the war-party right to reject the proffered chance to negotiate a more satisfactory peace? Was Philip wholly untrustworthy?

The theme is constant in Demosthenes' speeches that Philip was constantly breaking the Peace. Much of what he says is demonstrably untruthful – concerning Cardia and the Thracian forts once held by Cersobleptes. But there were incidents in Greek cities, for which he claimed Philip was really responsible, and one must inquire whether in the very period that Philip was protesting blamelessness he was infringing the spirit, if not the letter, of the Peace. One such incident was at Elis where in the course of 344/3 there was a bloody revolution at the end of which those who supported the cause of peace with Philip were established in control of the city; Elis remained neutral in 339/8 in the campaign of Chaeronea, and the 'Philippizers' were later named by Demosthenes in his Black List in the speech *On the Crown*. In Megara, on Athens' very doorstep, in 343 a leading citizen was alleged to have brought mercenary soldiers from Philip and just failed in an attempt to force his way into the city – a detailed story. So was Philip, blatantly or secretly, doing all he could to see that his friends came to power in the cities of Greece?[32]

The history of most of the city-states of Greece in the fourth century is a melancholy procession of violent expulsions and expropriations. Both before and after the bloodshed of 344/3 Elis was no exception. Megara too continued to be troubled; shortly after, perhaps in 341/0, the illustrious Athenian general Phocion intervened by force of arms to prevent the Boeotians gaining influence in the city; the alleged 'Philippizer', Perillus, named in the Black List, was nonetheless later 'thrown overboard' by Philip or Alexander; in the 320s violence continued. Despite the men on the Black List, Megara fought against Philip at Chaeronea. In such confusion Demosthenes could without difficulty make 'the facts' suit his case. In fourth-

century Athens one had to rely on rumours and some of Demosthenes' confident assertions were proved incorrect. In 344 he declared 'Philip is sending mercenaries' to help the Argives and Messenians, but no more was heard of them. In 343 Philip was said to be 'continuing to plot against Geraestus', the cape at the south of Euboea which was of vital importance for the safety of the corn-supply of Athens from the Black Sea: no more is heard of that charge either, and no corn-ships were molested before the outbreak of war in 340. Any stick was good enough or bad enough with which to beat Philip's reputation. The Megara story is suspect if for no other reason than that, if it had indeed been the case that mercenaries from Philip were used in 343, the acquittal of Aeschines is, in the terms of Athenian political trials, inexplicable.[33]

So even if one had only Demosthenes' speeches, one should hesitate to assert that Philip was infringing the Peace between 344 and 342. But there is also a powerful indication that he was not. When Hegesippus in early 342 delivered the final answer to Philip's proposal to negotiate the Peace, he claimed as proof of Philip's insincerity that he had installed in Pherae in Thessaly a Macedonian garrison, had incorporated in the Molossian kingdom three inland cities of north-western Greece, and was campaigning against Ambracia. If Philip had done the dastardly deeds of which Demosthenes had accused him, why should Hegesippus have been scraping the bucket for these remote and debatable matters? Why is there nothing said about Megara or, even more serious for Athens, Euboea, a bridge into Greece? Demosthenes vaguely asserted in 343 'there are soldiers in Euboea', by implication Philip's, but not a word on this subject passed Hegesippus' lips. It would be confidently alleged in due course that Macedonian soldiers were in Euboea, but in 343 there were almost certainly none. Otherwise Hegesippus would have said so. He did not refrain from the empty Demosthenic claptrap about the Thracian forts. Why should he have renounced his real 'proofs'?[34]

The truth is that between 344 and 342 Philip did not intervene in Greece or infringe the Peace. Demosthenes lied. Perhaps in a good cause, but he lied. So should not the Athenians have taken Philip's offer seriously?

But, it might be asked in Demosthenes' defence, had not Philip in 346 refused to entertain the notion of a Common Peace? Why should the Athenians have taken the offer seriously in 344? The Synod of the Second Athenian Confederacy in 346 had proposed a peace that all Greeks could join, a Common

Peace, and Aeschines had vainly sought to advance it, but their purpose was to make it possible for Phocis to join and so secure safety. Philip would not have peace with Phocis, as Demosthenes knew, and the idea of a Common Peace was dropped in hopes of saving Phocis by other means. But in the two following years Philip had perhaps learned that he had been too optimistic. If he was himself to offer security against aggression by Sparta or any other states, he would be accused of seeking to dominate Greece. Some other system must be tried, and a Common Peace with a sanctions clause may have seemed to him worth attempting.

No Athenian, of course, in the crucial assembly of 343 could be sure of what exactly Philip would accept. It was to be presumed that Philip would require some share in the joint arrangements. By the League of Corinth of 337 Macedonian power was, as we shall see, enthroned within Greece itself. After the disaster of Chaeronea nothing else was possible. But in 344 something was to be expected more akin to the Common Peaces established under the influence of the Great King. Outrageous as they had been to Panhellenist sentiment, they had served Greece well enough. At any rate the *hegemon*, the Great King, had never sent military forces into Greece, and even Isocrates had come to see some virtue in the peaces dictated by Persia; in 355 he even advocated that the system of the King's Peace be restored.[35] Under that system the Greeks had been left to keep order amongst themselves under the patronage (*prostasia*) of either one or two leading states, and the *hegemon* need never intervene. Would Philip have tolerated such a state of affairs? No one could tell until negotiations began. Yet there was the possibility, even the hope. Aeschines cherished it. Demosthenes and the war-party destroyed it – an act of great political folly.

For Demosthenes had no alternative other than a war, which Athens could not win. The war for Amphipolis had proved that she could not succeed in containing Philip in Macedon even before the great increase in Macedonian strength which the eastward extension of the kingdom had brought, let alone succeed in destroying him. Demosthenes however had learned nothing – Athens, he supposed, could return to plundering and ravaging much of Philip's land, and 'a multitude else'. It had all been tried before and found ineffective. Worse still, since 346 Philip had kept a garrison in Nicaea, the town that dominated Thermopylae, and had open access to Greece. How was he to be kept out of Attica itself?[36]

It is the axiom of apologists for Demosthenes that he had in mind that, come Armageddon for Athens, she would not fight alone, that he could count on the support of the leading military power of Greece, the Thebans. Demosthenes was the so-called *proxenos* of Thebes at Athens (i.e. the Greek equivalent of a consular representative), who not only provided hospitality for Theban ambassadors to Athens but also could be counted on to speak on their behalf whenever the interests of Athens did not plainly forbid him. In his speech *On the Crown* Demosthenes began his defence of his conduct in making the Theban alliance in 339/8 by declaring that despite the influence of 'Philippizers' in Thebes and Athens he had continually sought to prevent the two cities becoming embroiled with each other; in early 352 in the speech *For the Megalopolitans* he had envisaged in extreme circumstances alliance with Thebes; and at Pella in 346 he had tried to prevent Aeschines attacking the Thebans in his speech to Philip. So was Demosthenes so blind strategically? Or did he in 344 foresee the alliance of Chaeronea, confident that Athens would not fight alone?[37]

It might be comforting to be able to think more highly of Demosthenes' strategic sense, but study of the speeches does not permit it. If we did not know that Demosthenes was Theban *proxenos*, we could never guess it from the speech *On the Megalopolitans*; alliance with Thebes is envisaged only as a wild paradox; elsewhere he argues that Athens' advantage lay in the weakening of Thebes. In the case of *The Second Philippic*, far from suspecting that Demosthenes was Theban *proxenos*, one would suppose that he was a bitter opponent of Thebes; Thebes was on Philip's side which was only to be expected from the state that had betrayed Greece to Persia in 480; there was nothing to be said for the restoration in 346 of the captured Boeotian cities; any suspicions of trouble between Thebes and Philip were to be discredited; the Thebans were being nurtured out of hostility to Athens. All this would have been very curious if in the act of preferring the path to war Demosthenes was hoping for Theban alliance. In 343 in his attack on Aeschines he played on the theme of Theban *hubris*, a mixture of insolence and violence. In the speeches of 341 the slanderous references to Thebes are not to be found, but there is no break in the ice. The Thebans are thought of as on Philip's side, which they increasingly were not, and when Demosthenes calls for embassies to be sent all over the Greek world, he lists a number of places, ending with the paradox of appealing to the Great King, but there is not a word of Thebes. It may be countered that

Thebes was so hated at Athens that he dared not reveal his ultimate plans. There is indeed a time and a place for revealing plans, but, if Demosthenes had been nurturing hopes of the Theban alliance, he missed the vital moment. Early in 339 the Thebans seized control of Thermopylae, a very serious blow against Philip, but events of the following months were to show that there was a strong party in Thebes not prepared to fight Philip, and the making of the alliance was a close-run thing later in the year. The moment to act was when Thermopylae was seized, but Demosthenes uttered not a word of his alleged great hope until the news came that Philip had marched into Phocis. In that perplexed moment, when no one rose to speak, when there seemed nothing to say or to be done, Demosthenes came forward and proposed the Theban alliance. A curious hope indeed to have nurtured, if it could not be advanced by a single word until the moment of despair had come. The truth is that either he did not nurture it but conceived it at the very last moment, or it was so utterly impracticable that it could not be unveiled.[38]

If one studies Demosthenes' answer to Philip's declaration of war in late summer 340, a solemn truth emerges. Demosthenes was not putting his trust in a Theban alliance. Thebes is declared to have become lukewarm towards Philip; there is no suggestion that she should be stimulated to seize Thermopylae or in any way become hot for the liberty of Greece. Demosthenes' real hope lay in his city's good Fortune. 'For Fortune is of great weight, nay, is all important in all the affairs of men' – a theme echoing what he has often enough declared before. In 341 he let out an illuminating comment about choosing 'a policy in which Fortune prevails more than reasoned judgements'. His hope was in the name of Fortune, and 'Fortune' echoes through his great apology, *On the Crown*. The word occurs there no less than twenty-six times. 'Fortune' was to blame for what had happened. He had thought all and done all that could be thought and done, but Fortune had failed them. He had bet on Fortune and had lost.[39]

Demosthenes was, in a sense, the hero of a tragedy of his own making. The end of his policy was, as Polybius pointed out, the disaster of Chaeronea.[40] But a defence might be made in these terms. It is better to die in liberty than live without it. There was a greater danger to Greece than any danger ever mentioned in the speeches of Demosthenes. It was the danger that Greece would be passed by and the assault on Persia succeed. Every step that a Macedonian king took on the road

to the heart of the Persian Empire was that much more territory and power for Macedon. If Phoenicia, the seat of Persian naval power, were to be taken, Athens and her fleet would be irrelevant and dispensable. So perhaps it was better to have sudden death in Greece than to suffer the long strangulation of any sort of Macedonian peace? That is a hard question indeed. But, if Philip attacked Persia, there was hope that Greece might yet be free – not so much that Persia alone would destroy the Macedonian power, but that preoccupation with war against Persia would afford the opportunity for Greece to revolt. United in and by a Common Peace, they might have succeeded. As it was, the revolt of Thebes in 335 and of Sparta in 331 were unsupported. The great land-powers were destroyed one after the other. The final revolt of the Lamian War on the death of Alexander put an end to Athenian naval supremacy for ever. All might have been different if Demosthenes and the war-party had tempered their plans in 344 and explored Philip's offer to consider amending the Peace. The Greek cause was not hopeless. Demosthenes' policy was.

Did Philip intervene in Euboea in 341?

All thought of remoulding the Peace of Philocrates was ended with the rebuff to Philip of early 342. By the end of June he was away on his Thracian campaign, but probably before that began – certainly before the beginning of the Attic year 342/1 – Athens had sent out to her settlement (cleruchy) in the Thracian Chersonese (the Gallipoli Peninsula) a new lot of settlers to replace those who had drifted home. In charge of them went the general, Diopithes, an associate of Hegesippus, and he proceeded to gather a force of mercenaries and to claim as Athenian and then to ravage the territory of Cardia, Philip's ally. This was not what he had been formally instructed to do, but for stirring up a war a nod from Hegesippus was as good as a decree of the People. The Cardians appealed to Philip, who wrote an admonishing letter to the Athenians, which was answered by Demosthenes in April 341 with the speech *On the Chersonese*; the theme of the speech was that, since Philip was virtually at war with Athens, Diopithes should be allowed to do what he liked. Demosthenes had his way. A few weeks later in *The Third Philippic* the danger of Diopithes being recalled was past. Philip responded by sending a force to protect the

Cardians. Diopithes enslaved the inhabitants of two Thracian forts, ravaged the nearby part of Thrace, and arrested and held for a ransom of nine talents (an enormous sum) a Macedonian ambassador. The Athenians nodded approval. Through it all Demosthenes hammered away; Philip is breaking the Peace.[41]

Philip was not breaking the Peace. He did not need to. His interests were being advanced by those in the cities of Greece who could profit from his alliance. In the course of 342/1, if we are to trust Demosthenes in *The Third Philippic* of (roughly) May 341, he sent three bodies of mercenaries to support his friends in Eretria in Euboea, first 1,000 under an otherwise unknown Hipponicus, then two other forces of unspecified number under Eurylochus, an illustrious Macedonian name, and Parmenio, presumably Philip's right-hand man and 'only general'; Hipponicus is said to have destroyed the walls of Porthmus, the port twenty-two kilometres to the east of Eretria, used by the Athenians in 348 to land troops in Eretrian territory, and in 342/1 presumably the refuge of the opponents of the 'Philippizers'. In the same period at Oreus, on the northern end of the island, the 'Philippizer' Philistides was established in power, although no mention is made of military help from Macedon. Perhaps Demosthenes was stating the truth about all this. But one cannot avoid doubt. In the speech *On the Chersonese* delivered a few weeks earlier, all this detail is lacking, when it would have provided a most compelling argument in favour of not recalling Diopithes. It is possible therefore that the mercenaries of Hipponicus were not Macedonian at all, and that the role of Eurylochus and Parmenio was, as it had been in 346, merely diplomatic but represented by Demosthenes as military. It is notable that a late third-century B.C. historian spoke of Parmenio being in Oreus, with which Demosthenes did not connect him.[42]

These doubts about what really happened in Euboea in 342/1 are upsetting. They greatly complicate the task of disentangling the divisions in Euboean politics with which Demosthenes and Athens were so much concerned, but they also affect judgement of Philip. If he installed his friends in power by force, it was a great error to leave them unsupported by force. In the summer of 341 both Philistides of Oreus and Clitarchus of Eretria were ejected by Athenian arms and their cities 'liberated', but no Macedonians appear to have been involved. Perhaps Philip did err. Perhaps he did not bother to maintain what he had grabbed. But, shocking as it will seem

to those who readily believe Demosthenes, the view is here taken that the mercenaries who secured the Philippizers in power at Oreus and Eretria were not supplied by Philip, and that they were only conceived as such by Demosthenes in the few weeks between the speech *On the Chersonese* and *The Third Philippic*. The truth was that the 'dread disease' had smitten Euboea. With ample popular support the politicians opposed to Athens did not fear Philip – which posed a serious problem for the Athenian war-party. How was the united military effort needed for the coming year to be achieved?

Demosthenes' attempts to form a Hellenic League against Philip

The formation of the Hellenic League against Macedon is most unsatisfactorily attested, depending largely on Demosthenes' defence in 330 against the charges of Aeschines' *Against Ctesiphon*. Any reconstruction is inevitably conjectural. At the battle of Chaeronea beside the Athenians and Thebans were found the Achaians, the Corinthians, the Megarians. Some Acarnanians, friendly to Athens, took part. Phocis as a whole, being occupied by Philip, cannot have sent a contingent, but some Phocians appear to have fought. The Locrians of Amphissa fought a separate engagement. The Euboeans may have shared in the battle, although the official Euboean contribution to the war may have been merely naval. Perhaps Epidaurus and Troezen helped. When and in what circumstances each of these states was won over to the Greek cause is most obscure. Some who joined in alliance with Athens at one stage or another abstained, and progress was at best fitful. As Demosthenes complained in *The Fourth Philippic*, his plans were bedevilled by arguments about which state should lead the organization, and where the Synod should meet, and by disinclination to act in concert. So a tidy account is impossible.[43]

The method of Demosthenes and his associates was to make the most of every excursion and alarm. The campaign of Philip in early 342 in the Molossian kingdom gave them a chance. Philip was represented as intending to attack Ambracia and then to invade the Peloponnese. As already noted, a largely futile Athenian force was dispatched to Acarnania, and at the same time five members of the war-party were sent on embassies around the Peloponnese. Demosthenes himself went, probably to Ambracia and Acarnania. At the same time Callias of Chalcis

went independently to add the arguments of someone who was not an Athenian.[44]

Callias' motives are obscure. His prime aim seems to have been to unite the Euboeans in a Euboean League with Chalcis as the leading state. He sought help for this in the friendship first of Philip, in which he failed, and then of Athens. His opponents in Euboea, principally Clitarchus of Eretria and Philistides of Oreus, therefore sought the favour of Philip, and Callias was drawn into the Athenian plans for a union of the Greeks.[45]

The success of these embassies was not great. Demosthenes claimed that they had turned Philip back from operations which in fact he probably never intended, but no abiding arrangements were made. When Demosthenes reported to the Athenian assembly on his embassy, Callias was produced and he claimed to have secured promises from various states of large contributions of money towards the cost of the coming war. Demosthenes made similar claims and asserted that the states would accept Athenian leadership and that they would shortly, on 16 Anthesterion (*c.* 1 March 342) assemble in a synod at Athens. Nothing came of this. Aeschines in 330 taunted Demosthenes at some length with these empty promises: it was one of the topics on which Demosthenes thought it discreet to make no reply whatsoever. The embassies did, however, produce a temporary success. In the last month of 343/2 (*c.* June 342) an alliance was formed between Athens and the Messenians with some other state or states, probably the Achaeans, the eastern Arcadians, the Megalopolitans and the Argives. But, except for the Achaeans, none of these states shared in the defence of Greece in 338 and the alliance, whatever its shape and purposes, may have fallen apart quickly. Certainly there is no hint of it in Demosthenes' speeches of 341. Perhaps the sort of wrangling Demosthenes alluded to in *The Fourth Philippic* aborted it. All in all, 342 was not a good year for the cause.[46]

Yet the influence of Callias in Euboea gave grounds for hope, and Demosthenes seems to have tried to assist him in the unification of the island. When Callias made his promises of money, he offered a large sum from the cities of Euboea, and Demosthenes proposed that embassies be sent to Eretria and to Oreus to induce them to share; Eretria was to be dispensed from any formal or actual obligations to Athens and asked to share directly in the Euboean League; Oreus, more remote geographically and more disinclined formally to join with Chalcis, was to be asked to ally with Athens but to contribute money

to the Euboean League.[47] From these complicated negotiations nothing tangible emerged. In the course of 342/1 Eretria and Oreus inclined the more markedly to favouring Philip. Military action was necessary. In June 341 Athens made formal alliance with Chalcis. There was a two-pronged attack on Oreus. Cephisophon, at this moment probably the general on Sciathus, the island off the northern tip of Euboea, attacked from the sea, and the Chalcidians by land from the south, assisted by the Megarians who must have been brought into alliance during 342/1. Philistides was killed, and Oreus was saved for the Greek cause. In the following month the Athenians, commanded by Phocion, crossed to Euboea and expelled Clitarchus from Eretria.[48] Euboea was safe. The subsequent history of the Euboean League is dark. But it is to be presumed that Callias of Chalcis had his way. At any rate 'the Euboeans' joined in the Hellenic League and suffered for it in 338. Callias in 341/0, according to Philip's letter declaring war on Athens in October 340, 'seized all the cities on the gulf of Pagasae' and sold as slaves those he caught sailing to Macedon; he had the use of Athenian ships.[49] In all this he proved himself an able partner to Demosthenes, and since by 341 war with Philip was inevitable, probably enough a heroic patriot. So in contrast to 342, 341 was a good year.

In *The Third Philippic* of May 341 Demosthenes had counselled diplomatic overtures to Persia, a hopeful source of money for the war. In *The Fourth Philippic* he argued against Athenian distrust of the Great King, and again called for an embassy. In 340 it was sent, to Philip's fury – another success for Demosthenes, or so in 340 it must have seemed. (The Great King's reply, when it came, was abrupt. 'I won't give you money-Don't ask me. You won't get it.')[50]

So much then for Demosthenes' attempts to unite the Greeks. The explusion of the Philippizers in Euboea was a considerable success, and, with the Megarian alliance, no doubt made Athenians more comfortable. But Thebes remained a danger, and by mid-340 very little had been done to fashion the large army that war with Philip would require. He kept control over Thermopylae. There were few really comforting considerations.

Philip declares war

When Philip attacked Perinthus in July 340, he faced no light task. The city had had enough confidence in its natural position

to attempt to defy the Persians, and in 340 it was ready again. Although Philip used ships in the approach, presumably for siege equipment, he did not have command of the sea and the city was able to supply itself. Situated on the sides of a hill fifty-six metres high, it posed a difficult problem for Philip's engineers. All the techniques were employed – towers allegedly eighty cubits high, from which missiles of all kinds cleared the defenders from their walls, as well as battering rams to weaken and mines to destroy the walls. The Perinthians had engines of their own but nothing to match the Macedonians', and within a remarkably short space of time part of the wall of the city had collapsed. But at this point the difficulty of the site asserted itself. The rows of houses rising up the hill, like the rows of seats in a theatre, presented the Perinthians with a series of impromptu walls, which they proceeded to use. Help came by sea. The Great King, alerted to the danger of Macedonian invasion, instructed the satraps of the satrapies on the sea-coast of Asia Minor to foster opposition to Philip, and they sent in to the beleaguered city money, food, weapons of all sorts, and mercenaries. At this point the Byzantians, who had already assisted with materials of war, sent the best of their generals and their soldiers. The siege continued, and there was no reason for Philip to despair. But two months was a long time for a small city to delay him. Splitting his army in two, he turned to besiege the major prize, Byzantium itself.[51]

Perinthus did not really matter to Athens. Byzantium did. The corn-ships on their way to Athens down the Bosporus could be convoyed past the city, but even so there was a danger of serious interruption. Given a moderate fleet, whoever controlled Byzantium could cause the greatest alarm in Athens. When Philip began to besiege the city, Athens had real cause to fear.[52]

Again, without control of the sea the task was not easy for Philip, and Demosthenes determined to do all that could be done. The notorious general, Chares, had been sent out with a fleet of forty ships in 341, perhaps on convoy duty, and was readily available. Demosthenes went on an embassy. Byzantium was brought into the Athenian alliance and access by sea was secured. At the same time Byzantium's allies in the revolt against Athens of 357, Chios, Rhodes and Cos, sent help to the city.[53]

The Macedonian engineers set about the task. Part of the wall was demolished and a brisk assault by night was made. But the defence held and Philip realized that he was faced with

a major military problem. So he decided that the time had come for outright war with Athens; Athens might render the siege difficult and lengthy, but she would not do it with impunity. In late September 340 he sent to Athens a letter declaring war, a version of which is preserved as the twelfth speech of the Demosthenic Corpus. Demosthenes replied with a speech whose precise text is lost, but the version which was given by the historian Anaximenes and incorporated as Demosthenes' eleventh speech no doubt followed the original closely enough. The mood is one of relief: Philip at last admits he is at war, and there is no reason for Athens to defer the most strenuous action. In triumph Demosthenes proposed a decree declaring war, which was carried. The stone recording the Peace of Philocrates was destroyed. A fleet was manned, and Phocion put in command.[54]

IX

THE FINAL WAR

The siege of Byzantium

The war began with a fortunate raid by Philip. In mid-September the weather in the Aegean is bad for a few days and the corn-ships from the Pontus (the Black Sea) would gather in the Bosporus and sail south after the storm. When the haven of the Golden Horn was denied them, they gathered at a small port on the Asiatic side near the mouth of the Bosporus, whence if necessary they could be convoyed south. In autumn 340 no less than 230 corn-ships were assembled there for Chares to escort past Byzantium and the small fleet that Philip appears to have had there. Chares went off to a meeting with the Persian commanders to concert plans for attacking Philip, who seized his chance. Putting a force of soldiers across the Bosporus, he captured the whole lot. From the ships bound for Athens he took supplies for his army and then used their timbers for building siege-engines. Philip collected in all 700 talents, well over a year's revenue for the Athenians.[1]

The incident was not of great importance. The 230 ships were only a part of the Pontic trade and in the fourth century Athens did not, as she did in the fifth, rely on that source alone for her food. The naval war was renewed to Philip's disadvantage, and shortly Phocion arrived with his large fleet to take over from Chares. Ten years later Demosthenes was to pretend that the seizure of the corn-ships began the war: it did not, to judge by the absence of any reference to it in the speech put into Demosthenes' mouth by Anaximenes when describing the outbreak of the war. It was no more than a short, sharp shock. But it is of considerable interest to the historian for the comment it provides on the siege of Byzantium.[2]

If two months were spent on the siege of Perinthus, which did not begin until late July 340 at the earliest and which must

have taken at least two months, the siege of Byzantium cannot have begun before September 340, and this is supported by the fact that Philip used the captured ship timbers for building siege-engines.[3] So if the attack began in earnest in October, he cannot have spent very long at Byzantium. In the course of 339 he was to be fighting on the Danube and then taking his army into Greece and time must be allowed for him to recover from a serious wound in the leg; so it is very likely that he spent no

Map 7. Central Greece

more than three months on the siege of Byzantium. Was it a serious reverse? Was the task beyond him?

The Greek city of Byzantium was very much smaller than the city built by Constantine, the walls of which are still to be seen. It occupied in fact only the high ground at the most eastern part of the headland which juts out into the Bosporus south of the Golden Horn, roughly the area where Topkapi and Santa Sophia are to be found. Its defences were to be compared with those of Rhodes which would at the end of that century defy Demetrius the Besieger, and were only eclipsed by the fourth-century walls of Messene which Sparta never even attempted to assault. The massive walls, which were probably still the same when they excited the wonder of the historian Dio in the third century A.D., had been designed to

frustrate the attacks of the Thracian peoples, and the city had remained secure despite the constant pillaging of its territory.[4] It was a formidable task for the Macedonian engines. They however were equal to it. A section of the wall was undermined and demolished, and a surprise assault by night was only frustrated by chance. But the wall was quickly repaired and Philip appears not to have tried again.[5] With all the help the city was receiving from Persia and Athens as well as from Chios, Rhodes and Cos, it must have been bristling with defenders, but that would hardly deter Philip. If the Macedonians penetrated the city, there would be the greater slaughter, and no number of defenders at this date could prevent the work of the Macedonian engineers.

To the Greeks Philip's withdrawal was a glorious victory. There is another explanation possible. Once war had been declared between Philip and Athens, the capture of Byzantium was of minor importance. If it fell quickly, so much the better; Athens could be made to feel Philip's interruptions of Pontic trade. But since Athens still had to be fought even if he took Byzantium, whereas Byzantium would be likely not to continue the struggle once Athens had been dealt with, he may have decided to abandon the minor for the major objective. Why then, when he withdrew, did he go against the Scyths before going to Greece? One can only guess, but it is possible that the Scythian campaign was needed to complete his preparations for attacking Persia. This time there would be no delay between the peace in Greece and the crusade. Once he was in Asia, he would be beyond suspicion and malice, or so he may have hoped.[7]

The march into Greece

A winter campaign against the nomadic Scyths living south of the Danube in the Dobruja was no light matter, but Philip defeated them in a set battle, captured huge numbers of women and children and set up at the mouth of the Danube a statue of Heracles, a symbol of Macedonian authority (to be compared with the altar to Augustus set up on the banks of the Elbe). He then proceeded to march home to Macedon through the territory of the Triballi, whose location is unsure but was probably beside the Danube, as a further assertion of authority. In an engagement he was severely wounded, a spear passing

right through his leg and killing his horse. But, while he recovered, preparations were made for the march into Greece and in autumn 339 he set out.[8]

He had a new problem of access. Early in the year the Thebans had seized the town of Nicaea which dominated the route through Thermopylae, and the same problem which confronted the Persians in 480 now confronted him.[9]

In his speech *On the Crown* Demosthenes made Aeschines responsible for Philip coming into Greece, and it is certainly true that after a lot of petty bickering in which Aeschines played a part the Delphic Amphictyons declared war on Amphissa, which lies on the Crisaean plain just below Delphi, and that for this so-called Fourth Sacred War, on the proposal of a Thessalian who was there no doubt because he was friendly to Macedon, Philip was finally appointed 'leader'. But Thebes did not participate in the declaration of war against Amphissa and may well have taken no part in the appointment of Philip. In any case there is no reason to suppose that the Thebans were at any point minded to abandon the control of Thermopylae. It is simply not true that Philip came into Greece on the excuse that he was asked to lead the Amphictyons against Amphissa or that the invitation in any way facilitated his coming into Greece. He came to finish the war with Athens, and he entered Greece without the aid of Aeschines or anyone else engaged in the political fisticuffs of the Fourth Sacred War.[10]

When Xerxes came south through Thessaly in 480, he was confronted by the Spartans at Thermopylae. His first plan for outflanking them was, we may guess, to defeat the Greeks at sea and so to land troops in the Spartan rear. He did in fact win the naval engagement of Artemisium, at the end of which the Greeks 'planned to run away', but in view of the damage sustained in a storm by his fleet he had not been able to count on naval victory. Hence the famous outflanking march by the path Anopaea which brought a Persian force through and down the mountains to the Spartan rear. Herodotus would have us believe that the Spartan commander, King Leonidas, had foreseen the possibility of being so outflanked and had posted the Phocians in the mountains to guard the pass; when the Phocians in the night heard the noise of the Persians coming, they rushed to a strong position on high ground thinking they were about to be destroyed; the Persians in fact turned aside and went on, and down to Thermopylae. One is thus left with the impression that the Phocians had failed in their appointed

task. This is probably quite wrong. Leonidas did not learn of the existence of the path before he arrived at Thermopylae and the Phocians were almost certainly sent direct from Phocis into the mountains solely to protect the route into Phocis. That is, in the view of the Greeks Phocis could be reached by a difficult mountain route which could be easily defended.[11]

The defence provided in 480 was not needed. In 339, when it was essential, it was not provided and Philip's army slipped over the mountains into Phocis and seized the city of Elatea – a complete military surprise. How did it happen?

First of all, one must convict Demosthenes, the Athenians, the Thebans and the Greeks generally of ignorance to a high degree of their own history. The Thessalians had actually used the mountain route to attack Phocis in the sixth century.[12] The Phocians and the Spartans had expected it to be used in 480. Four generations later educated Athenians were surprised when Philip used it. Even if one were to acquit them of ignorance, they would be guilty on the more serious charge of complacency, the complacency of thinking that the route would not be of much use for transporting Philip's army.

Philip had provided. In 346 the Amphictyons had treated Phocis, as has already been remarked, with less severity than might have been expected, and no doubt Philip's hand was behind this. As early as 344 there were rumours that Philip was about to rebuild and refortify Elatea, and, although the garrison of mercenaries left by him was still there in 343, no more is heard of it afterwards and it was presumably withdrawn when in autumn 343 the first payment was made by the Phocians of the fine imposed in 346. By 339 Elatea was indeed restored, and by 338 the old political organization of the Phocians had been re-established. All this was the fruit of a policy on Philip's part of friendship for Phocis, which in turn looked with grateful eye on Philip. Thus he was able to get into Greece while his enemies slept.[13]

Of course, there was a serious problem of supply. It was evidently about November 339 when he came into Greece. A friendly Phocis would provide the winter's food. But the equipment needed by an army and normally carried on waggons would take time to arrive, and this partly explains why the decisive battle was not fought until the end of August of the following year.[14] But only partly. Philip did not need nine months to prepare. Why did he delay?

The alliance of Athens and Thebes

The news of the seizure of Elatea occasioned in Athens the utmost alarm; Philip was only three days' march away from Attica, a situation totally unforeseen. The scene was described by Demosthenes in his speech *On the Crown* in one of the most famous passages in Greek literature.[15]

> It was evening when a man came to the presidents of the Council (*Prytaneis*) with a message that Elatea had been taken. Thereupon some of them immediately got up in the middle of dinner and began to move people out of the booths set up in the Market and set fire to the wicker-work barricades, while some sent for the Generals and summoned the War-trumpeter. The city was filled with confusion. The next day, at dawn, the presiding committee summoned the Council to the Chamber, you Athenians went to the assembly and before the Council had considered the business and drafted a Recommendation, the whole People were in their seats. When the Council came and the presidents, having reported the news, produced the man who brought the message, and he himself repeated it, the Herald called 'Who wishes to address the assembly?' No one came forward. He called a number of times. Still no one got up, although all the Generals were there and all the customary speakers and our country was calling for the man who would speak for its salvation. . . . That was the occasion, that was the day that called for a man . . . who had followed things from the outset and had rightly calculated Philip's motives and wishes in these actions. . . . Well, that man was found on that day, myself. I came forward and spoke.

The passage is too long to quote more fully, perhaps also too familiar. It is Demosthenes at his noblest, on his proudest moment. He went on to counsel against despair: Philip was at any rate beyond Boeotia, not on the borders of Attica with the Thebans at his side; Thebes could be won over to alliance, if only Athens was ready to support those Thebans prepared to fight with Athens for the liberty of Greece. He proposed that the Athenians should go out under arms towards Boeotia, and an embassy be sent to offer aid. The decree was carried and Demosthenes was appointed an ambassador. He went, and he persuaded the Thebans. Within a few days the Athenian army was received in Thebes on its way to join the Theban army already on guard in the north of Boeotia.

Demosthenes indeed persuaded the Thebans, who, unlike the Athenians, had a real choice open to them. Despite their seizure of control over Thermopylae, they had not openly broken with Philip and they remained his allies. For years there

had been a division between those opposed to him and those who had made the alliance, and there was reason for Philip to hope that with the help of the latter the state could be persuaded not to break with him. So, although Demosthenes' embassy arrived in Thebes within a very few days of the occupation of Elatea, they found that an embassy from Philip was already there, asking the Thebans to allow Philip's army to pass through into Attica even if they would not join him. The Thebans rejected his request, but the matter did not end with that, for it would seem that at a later date the Thebans were given the opportunity to prefer peace to war. Similarly Philip appealed to the Peloponnesians.[16]

Demosthenes would have it believed that Philip was afraid to confront in battle the coalition he had organized. Nothing, however, in the record of the Macedonian army can give countenance to such an explanation. If Philip did not proceed to battle as soon as his full force was with him, it must have been because he hoped that diplomacy could resolve the situation. Battle was the easy solution. For his planned crusade it was not the best. Of course, he may have been hoping merely to isolate Athens the better to destroy her. It is equally possible that he believed that all would be well with Athens, if Demosthenes and his followers were expelled – the solution first proposed by Alexander after the revolt of Thebes in 335.[17]

Diplomacy failed. The Thebans exiled the opponents of war, and it had to be war. One may remark that they made their decision with Philip's army a day's march from their city and they could have avoided the conflict. Their reputation in Greece had been one of bestial backwardness. An Athenian comic poet in the fifth century could raise a laugh by repeating the ancient slur of swinishness. 'These are Boeotian swine, a clog-wearing sort of men.' In the fourth century the great historian, Ephorus, judged that they failed for lack of education and culture. In truth they were the real heroes of the last days of Greek liberty. When Philip died, they alone had the courage to revolt.[18]

The battle of Chaeronea

Formally, Philip had been summoned by the Amphictyons to deal with Amphissa. He did so, after deceiving the Athenian commanders of a force of 10,000 mercenaries stationed to guard the route from Phocis to Amphissa into abandoning their post.

But this was a minor operation while he tried to settle Greece by diplomacy. The real war had to be fought on the highroad south from Phocis into Boeotia. Theban precautions had no doubt seen to it that he could not, as the Spartans had done before the battle of Leuctra in 371, slip into Boeotia by a back door. There certainly were some preliminary operations. Demosthenes referred to a battle 'on the river' and 'the winter battle' and claimed that the Athenians performed creditably.



Map 8. Chaeronea

But there is no other evidence.[19] The main Greek defensive position was at Chaeronea and in late August 338 Philip moved against it to fight one of the most decisive battles of history.

Philip's army numbered over 30,000 foot and 2,000 cavalry, which seems to have been roughly the size of the Macedonian Grand Army in this period, though perhaps only two-thirds of the normal cavalry force was present. The Greeks were probably about equal in numbers, but their position was strong.[20] They had to prevent Philip marching down the highway into Boeotia, and Chaeronea was the best place to do it. Not only did it deny

Philip access to any Boeotian cities, whether by the highway or by the side road over the pass to Lebadea (modern Levadhia) or, presuming that the easily blockable route from Amphissa via Delphi had indeed been cut off, in by the back door used by the Spartans in 371 when they marched from Phocis to Leuctra, but also the terrain was admirably suited to defence; little more than two and a half kilometres separated Mount Akontion on the north from the part of Mount Thurion to the south up which the side road to Lebadea passed. Philip would have to force his way through by frontal assault.

The precise position of the Greeks has been much discussed but, since the discovery at the turn of this century of a mound roughly in the middle of the plain, it has been generally agreed that in all likelihood the fiercest fighting occurred there. In this mound, amid a lot of ash and charcoal, were pieces of pottery of fourth-century styles, bones, teeth, remains of weapons including abnormally large spear heads fifteen inches long, presumably *sarissae*, and a bronze coin certainly of the classical period and probably Macedonian.[21] It must be the funeral pyre of the Macedonians in 338, and it is a reasonable conjecture that it was placed where most of the Macedonian casualties occurred. So we know where one part of the Greek line was, and, since there was a prime strategic necessity to deny Philip the side-road to Lebadea, we cannot be far wrong in slanting the line across the plain through the mound and to the foot of the hill. There is one major uncertainty. All modern accounts of the battle have rested the right flank of the Greeks on the river Cephisus, which is likely enough, for Alexander who commanded the left flank of the Macedonian army is said to have had his tent beside the river.[22] But, as ever with the battlefields of ancient Greece, we are bedevilled by uncertainties about the exact course of the river in the fourth century B.C. At the present time there is quite a stretch of flat firm ground between the river and Mount Akontion. That cannot have been the case in 338. The Cephisus in August is not a large river, and, if it had been possible to get behind the right of the Greek line by crossing the river, the Greeks would never have chosen so to expose themselves. So either the river's course was different and lay close to the steep part of Mount Akontion, or swamp denied passage on the left bank. The flank must have been secure.

The position was indeed strong, both by nature and for tactical considerations. Slanting across the plain, the Greek line rendered it difficult for Philip to repeat the sort of advance

adopted by Epaminondas at Leuctra in 371, when the left flank of the Theban army was thrust forward to concentrate force on the Spartan right flank. To fight at Chaeronea, it must have seemed to the Greek generals that Philip would have to adopt an oblique formation if he was to reach the right flank of the Greeks at all, and an attack against the Greek left flank backed by high ground would be unprofitable. So they could await the Macedonian advance with some confidence, the Athenians on the left, the Thebans on the right, the other allies in the centre.

The only formal account we have of the battle from a historian is that of Diodorus and it allows little to be said with assurance – the battle was fierce and long and the Greek front was not broken until Alexander attacked on the left flank, whereupon Philip drove back those on the right and rout ensued; at the end of the affair over 1,000 Athenians lay dead, and no less than 2,000 had been taken prisoner; the Boeotians fared similarly.[23] That is all we know for sure. There is, however, a teasing piece in the *Stratagems* of Polyaenus, a Macedonian rhetorician of the second century A.D. who collected from sources good and bad a curious rag-bag of bits about generals' tricks and devices. Some are plain rubbish; some because we have their source are known to be respectable; but there is no simple criterion for most of them. So one can have no confidence in using Polyaenus to fill out the picture of the battle of Chaeronea. But neither can he be confidently discarded. The passage in question[24] reads as follows:

> When Philip was in position at Chaeronea, he yielded to pressure by the Athenians and began to give ground. The Athenian general Stratocles cried out 'We've got to keep on attacking until we shut the enemy into Macedonia', and did not give up pursuit. Philip, remarking 'the Athenians don't know how to win', kept retiring as he contracted the phalanx and stayed on guard. Shortly, on attaining higher ground, he encouraged the ranks, stopped retiring and stoutly attacked the Athenians. After a glorious contest, he gained the victory.

The reported remarks may be discarded, but what of the rest? Did Philip give way before the Athenians? If so, did he do so under pressure or as a preconceived plan? Where was the 'higher ground'?

It has already been remarked that the Greek position was hard to assail, and denied Philip any chance of attack with one flank thrust forward. How then did he break the Greek line? If this passage of Polyaenus is at all to be trusted, we may guess

that Philip, by a controlled withdrawal, induced the Greek line to stretch and break itself. We must imagine that, as the Macedonian left went forward, the right retired. But there can have been no break in the Macedonian line, for, if there had, both the account and the outcome of the battle would have been different. So Philip must have had his army execute a wheeling manoeuvre, pivoting on the centre, and as the right of the Macedonian phalanx performed its well-drilled withdrawal, the Athenians followed, and the Greek line stretched and broke before the assault of the Macedonian cavalry under Alexander on the left. It is no objection that 'higher ground' in a suitable area is not to be found. The plain today is certainly much raised above what it was in 338.

Modern accounts of the battle have divided sharply over acceptance or rejection of this 'stratagem'.[25] But, whatever happened on the day, the result was decisive, and in Greek experience decisive without precedent. The Athenian army in Sicily in 413 B.C. had been totally destroyed or captured, but the state was not unable to continue the Peloponnesian War. Sparta had sustained heavy losses at the battle of Leuctra in 371, but they were 'heavy' only because of the archaic exclusiveness of full Spartan citizenship, and she continued to fight in following years. At Chaeronea the war came to a sudden end. About 6,000 Athenians had taken part. Half were dead or prisoners. The Sacred Band of Thebes was cut to pieces and the Boeotians were in no more of a condition to continue than the Athenians. Of the allies, we happen to know that the Achaeans were still recovering from their losses fifteen years later. Probably the pathetic scenes and panic proposals of which we hear at Athens were repeated in all the cities that had sent men to fight for liberty.[26]

Today the Lion of Chaeronea, which was smashed to pieces in the Greek War of Independence and reassembled in the late nineteenth century, looks out over the battlefield. It is one of the most memorable of monuments and one of the most puzzling. No inscription records who erected it or when. Plutarch, who belonged to Chaeronea, makes no allusion to it. Under the Lion were found two hundred and fifty-four corpses laid out in seven rows. They cannot have been Macedonian, for the Macedonians cremated their dead as the mound reminds us; in any case why should they have buried two hundred and fifty-four separately? In Roman times it was believed that the Lion marked the mass grave of the Thebans, and since it is improbable that literally every one of the three hundred

members of the Theban Sacred Band was killed it has been widely assumed that the Lion marked the spot where the dead of the Sacred Band were buried.[27] However, many other Thebans were killed and one would expect them all to be buried together. No sure answer can be given.

Philip the soldier had played his part. It was time once again for Philip the statesman.

X

THE PLACE OF PHILIP IN THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE ART OF WAR

Greek warfare before Philip

Supreme in politics, Philip was also supreme in war, and no account of him is complete without an assessment of his skill as general. He inherited a disorganized and defeated army, and he bequeathed to Alexander a superb instrument of war. But he can only be understood in this matter in relation to Greeks. The barbarian peoples of the north contributed much, but principally he derived from and developed the art of war as he saw it practised in Greece, especially by the Thebans under Epaminondas, the greatest general of the classical age.

The fifth century is essentially the age of the heavy-armed citizen soldier, the hoplite. Well-protected by a helmet, breastplate, greaves and a solid round shield a metre in diameter, the hoplite armed with spear and sword did the real fighting. Light-armed and mounted troops played only a minor part, either in preliminary skirmishes or in the pursuit. The full hoplite force was committed at the start of the battle and the commander shared in the fighting since, the order to advance having been given, he had nothing else to do.

So much is generally agreed, but there is such widespread misunderstanding of what happened in the course of hoplite battles that further discussion is necessary. The prevailing notion of a hoplite battle is to a large extent erroneous and, to understand the Macedonian phalanx, it is necessary to expose the error.

An account of the battle of the Anapus outside Syracuse in 415/4 will serve to illustrate.[1] The Athenians and allied hoplites on that occasion were drawn up in line eight deep; the Syracusans and allies confronted them sixteen deep with their cavalry on the right flank. The battle opened with skirmishing between the light-armed troops of each side in front of the

hoplites and they 'put each other to flight as you would expect with lightarmed', as Thucydides somewhat contemptuously commented. Then the war-trumpeters sounded the advance and the real battle commenced. The hoplites engaged in hand-to-hand fighting and resisted each other 'for a long time'. Then and only then the Athenian side locked shields and shoved. Part of the Syracusan line was broken and the rest fled. The Athenians pursued until they were checked by the Syracusan cavalry. (Two untypical features must be noted, both due to the fact that the Athenians had been put on shore not far from the gates of Syracuse: first, they themselves lacked cavalry, and second, part of the army had to be left to guard the supply-train with orders to help only if the battle went awry. But neither feature affects the question of what actually happened during this hoplite fighting.[2])

The role of the cavalry was purely ancillary, just as it was in another fully described engagement, the battle of Delium in 424; on that occasion cavalry was posted to cut off retreat and to pursue.[3] This is consistent with the fact that on early vases hoplites are frequently depicted on horses; they are riding to battle, but they will fight dismounted; in the Spartan army of the fifth century the so-called 'horsemen' are picked hoplites who fight as hoplites guarding the person of the king. True cavalry was slow to develop – and for two good reasons. First, the stirrup was unknown to the Greeks (as indeed to the Romans and the Parthians) and, hit or miss, the rider was in danger of being unseated. Second, 'in the fifth century B.C. the Greek horse as represented by painters and sculptors and described in literature was a small animal, perhaps never exceeding and seldom reaching fifteen hands.'[4]

The real battle was with the hoplites, and it was often said to have continued 'long'. Precise indications are rare. The battle of Delium began 'late in the day' and went on till nightfall, presumably an hour or two at least. The battle of Himera in Sicily in 480 lasted from 'dawn to late afternoon', probably unusually long and so to be remarked. But one cannot be wildly astray in supposing that the fighting normally lasted two or three hours.[5] What exactly were the hoplites doing all that time? The common notion is that the hoplite battle was essentially a huge scrummage in which those in the front rank fought while those behind (seven in number in the normal eight-deep formation), pushed. But this is wildest folly, both on general grounds (for the front ranks would have been better able to use their teeth than their weapons when a broad shield

was jammed against the back with the weight of seven men) and because it does not respect the evidence. The shoving, the so-called *othismos*, appears to come in a second phase. For instance, at Platea in 479 the battle was 'hard and went on for a long time until they came to shoving'. At Delium the shoving did not come until the Thebans 'were mastering the Athenians'. So too in the battle of the Anapus the fighting was 'hand-to-hand for a long time'; only later did the shoving of the Argives effect a breach of the line.[6] What then was happening before the shoving began? In the poems of Tyrtaeus, the seventh-century Spartan, the picture is clear; there were a lot of individual combats out in front (*en promachois*). One of the fragments[7] concludes with a most tell-tale detail. He exhorted each man to engage with spear or sword one of the foe, 'foot to foot, shield to shield, crest to crest, helmet to helmet', and went on

> And you, ye light-armed, crouching behind the shield, one on one side, one on the other, hurl great rocks, and standing near those in panoply throw smooth-shafted javelins at the foe.

Thus behind the hoplite of Tyrtaeus there was no row of shoving extras. Each warrior engaged in personal combat, supported each by the light-armed. This picture is dismissed as Homeric echo, not a true reflection of what actually happened once war became the business of hoplites and not merely heroes. But Tyrtaeus is not the only evidence. The two versions given of the Athenian who most distinguished himself in the battle of Platea are suggestive: the one version was that he had an anchor emblazoned on his shield; according to the other 'he wore an iron anchor, fastened to the belt . . . and this, when he came near the enemy, he threw out, with the intent that when the enemy left their ranks they would not be able to shift him.' A quaint story, but that it was told at all does not suggest that hoplite warfare was merely a scrummage and that the personal combat and prowess had no part in battle. Indeed, that the world of Tyrtaeus was not wholly passed away is suggested also by the casualties reported for Platea: besides ninety-one full Spartan citizens who died, i.e. hoplites, there were a number of helots (public serfs) fighting as light-armed, who were killed; perhaps they had met their death 'crouching behind the shield'. Finally, there is an inscription of the mid-fifth century which praises a man who had distinguished himself 'out in front' (*en promachois*).[8] Thus before the shoving began, the hand-to-hand fighting was a large number of personal

combats. The hoplites advanced in line; they then broke up somewhat to fight hand-to-hand (and in a long battle even the fittest would have to rest); finally they joined shields for the shove. To these three phases there were appropriate formations – for the advance solid line (*pyknosis*), for the hand-to-hand open order, for the shove overlapping shields (*synaspismos*).[9]

Thus the hoplite was not a specialist who fought a special part of the battle. Essentially, his battle was the whole battle and within it he did all that fighting then comprised – with spear and sword and shield. But in the course of the Peloponnesian War important developments began which were to transform the art of war and to flower in the army and the generalship of Philip.

First, specialist arms began to be important, chiefly the specialist light-armed, the so-called peltasts. Lightly clad and with a light shield, they were highly mobile spearmen, available long before they are first mentioned in literature but disregarded until the general Demosthenes, perhaps Athens' best soldier in the fifth century, saw his hoplites in 426 roughly used by Aetolian light-armed troops. From then on the possibilities of the use of light-armed against hoplites were ever increasingly realized. The climax of this particular development was reached under the Athenian general Iphicrates, whose peltasts in 390 annihilated one whole hoplite division of the Spartan army. The day of hoplite supremacy was beginning to pass. Peltasts began to be found regularly in armies and on occasion out-numbered hoplites. Iphicrates was said to have likened the composition of armies to the human body. 'He called the Phalanx (i.e. the hoplite array) the trunk, the light-armed the hands, the cavalry the feet, the general the head.' Iphicrates was concerned to assert the importance of generalship but the implication is notable; the parts that delivered the blows were the light-armed. Specialization in warfare had come.[10]

Second, the late fifth century brought a great increase of professionalism. Earlier the Spartans had been predominant in war because they had been wholly devoted to training for war. Before battle they needed no rousing harangues of the sort customary in other armies; they knew that long practice in arms was what counted.[11] It is uncertain how much other states trained. At Athens, although one could take private lessons, both in weapon drill and in tactics, there was perhaps no public training. Elsewhere things may have been rather different, but in Sparta they trained all the time. Their set

pieces seemed to the other Greeks complicated, although they were not. Their obvious enough practice in transmission of orders was deemed worthy of explanation by Thucydides. They were drilled in loading the waggons for campaign. In the field, when not actually fighting, they practised for fighting. Their shields were kept dazzling bright, and in their purple uniforms and with their long locks, the boast of the champion race, they did indeed affright. Nowhere was Spartan professionalism more plain than at the battle of Mantinea in 418. Their opponents advanced 'vehemently and in wrath', the Spartans slowly to the sound of flutes, keeping line and distance. To counter the overlap which threatened on the right flank, during the advance the king actually ordered part of the line to move out and join the right flank and the rest to close the gap created – a supremely difficult tactic only conceivable if long practised. When this miscarried, they won the day by valour; some of their opponents did not even dare to face them in hand-to-hand fighting. They were unbeatable in the hoplite fray and men knew it, amateurs before professionals.[12] But even in the fifth century others began to imitate; Argos kept at public expense 1,000 picked hoplites to train continually, and in the fourth century the Spartan monopoly was gone. Thebes and Pherae had armies comparably professional. Plato's ideal policy in the *Laws* set aside a day a month for training – not very much but an indication of the way things were going. Indeed, that typical figure of the fourth century, the mercenary, who sought employment in war, found it because his professional services were needed by city-states, large and small. Warfare was no longer a matter for summer hoplite excursions. The mercenary was the soldier for all seasons. Professional generals appear. Politics are left to politicians. The great Athenian generals of the fourth century, Iphicrates, Timotheus, Chabrias, Chares, unlike Pericles in the fifth, stick to war, and theorists of war profess to teach the art. Military literature begins. Xenophon's *On Cavalry* and *The Cavalry Commander* and the general treatise of Aeneas the Tactician are surviving examples of the new genre.[13]

In the generals of the new age professionalism and specialization combine. Now, in Iphicrates' simile, the head controlled the body and directed the battle, and it became normal not to commit all the available forces in the first shock. Reserves are found occasionally in the later fifth century,[14] and when at the battle of Delium the Thebans made their part of the Boeotian line of battle twenty-five deep, although Thucydides did not

explain the point of this unprecedented formation, one must presume that the purpose was not merely to gain extra weight for the shoving, if indeed it had anything whatever to do with that; the rearmost hoplites must have been intended for use in a second phase of the battle. Experience of novel military situations in the barbarian world encouraged this development, as is to be seen during the March of the Ten Thousand,[15] and the military operations described by Xenophon in his *History of Greece* are startlingly unlike those of the fifth century – and sometimes puzzling. For instance, at the battle of Nemea in 394, although it had been agreed before the battle to draw up the line sixteen deep, the Thebans made their section 'really deep' when it was their turn to command, and began the battle by moving to the right.[16] Commanders were now concerned with the second phase as they had not been in the past, and generalship was becoming a complex art.

The supreme master of the art before Philip was Epaminondas of Thebes, his masterpiece being the battle of Leuctra in 371.[17] Although it was a hoplite battle in the sense that the knockout blow was delivered by hoplites, and although it was not entirely without precedent in that the great depth of the Theban line at Delium and at Nemea pointed the way to the much greater depth at Leuctra, it was a battle of revolutionary novelty. The infantry attack was coordinated with what the Spartans supposed to be a merely preliminary cavalry skirmish, so that the other Boeotians on the right never engaged their opponents, but on the left the Thebans, fifty deep, were thrown against the Spartans by some sort of oblique advance; if there were 4,000 Thebans, their frontage can have been only eighty yards, whereas the Spartan section of the line opposed to them will have been something like 300 metres of front. Hoplite warfare, in the sense of the clashing of two lines of hoplites with the strongest on the right, was thus utterly outmoded. The future lay with the concentration of force, and its employment as the battle developed. At Leuctra the 300-strong Sacred Band was used to prevent the Spartans outflanking the Thebans, but the great depth of the Thebans must in turn have been used to outflank the Spartans. Warfare was now to be conceived of in terms of ships ramming.[18] Metaphors of boxing, punches and left-hooks, had also been appropriate.

The battle of Second Mantinea in 362 would no doubt be of equal repute in the annals of war if Epaminondas had survived long enough to have exploited the destruction of his opponents' right flank which he had begun. The evidence for this battle is

even poorer than that for Leuctra.[19] It is clear, however, that once again he concentrated force on the left flank but this time not just infantry; the cavalry too were formed into a ram to batter the opposing line of cavalry and were supported by a sort of infantry, the so-called *hamippoi*, who had been heard of in connection with the Theban army in the fifth century but were now used in a novel fashion, to judge by Xenophon's comment on it in his *History of Greece* and his way elsewhere of urging the Athenians to follow suit.[20] One thinks inevitably of the use of tanks and infantry together in modern warfare: things were, as will appear, to be similarly ordered in the army of Philip. Epaminondas was indeed master of the art of war, and not just tactically considered. The whole campaign of 362 showed his lively strategic sense. First, he sought to ambush the Athenians on their way to help Sparta (an attempt frustrated by a false report that the Athenians were going by sea). Then, at the moment when the Spartan king was leading out the army by one route, he made a quick night march and very nearly succeeded in taking Sparta undefended. Again frustrated by bad luck, he refused to risk his men in the hazards, as great then as now, of street-fighting, but dashed back to the Arcadian plain, leaving the Spartan king unwilling to risk moving out of the city again. He then sought to surprise Mantinea, being again frustrated by the chance arrival of the Athenian cavalry. One may echo Xenophon. 'I could not say that he was favoured by fortune in this period of command. Yet in my opinion the man left nothing undone which required forethought and daring.' Elsewhere Xenophon commented with admiration on the high pitch of training in Epaminondas' army. It was high indeed. The dash to Sparta involved fifty-five kilometres march, most of it in the course of a summer's night; then without pause back another seventy to Mantinea. Only armies used to such movement in training can bring it off in war and be ready to fight. 'As you train, so shall you fight.' Like all great commanders, Epaminondas trained his army to move and to fight, and that was a large part of his success.

In short, Epaminondas was a creative military genius, the flower of the city-state in the field of war. As he lay dying, one of his friends in tears exclaimed (so the story goes), 'You die without a son.' Epaminondas replied 'I do, by Heaven, but I leave two daughters, my Victory of Leuctra and my Victory of Mantinea.' They were indeed his real legacy. It is one of the curious chances of history that in the period of Epaminondas' greatness a Macedonian boy, Philip, was observing and

listening in Thebes. He was the real heir. He too was no mean general.

Philip and war

If one exempts siege-warfare, which must be treated separately, it must be confessed that in assessing Philip as general there is not a great deal to go on. The battle of Chaeronea was certainly a masterly performance, considering the strength of his opponents' position, but, since not all have been able to accept the 'stratagem' attributed to him, the battle is not a great help. Of the great Battle of the Crocus Field in 352 at the end of which 6,000 Phocian mercenaries lay dead, another 3,000 were prisoners, and Phocian influence in Thessaly was finished, we know practically nothing. Another 'stratagem' is reported whereby the previous year Philip suffered a reverse when he was perhaps outnumbered by the Phocians and which might be used to convict him of failure adequately to reconnoitre, but it is too slight to make much of. His surprise of Elatea in 339 was achieved by means of an uncommonly difficult march, but no details are known. So too with his constant campaigns against Illyria and in Thrace. Narrowly considered, the military career of Philip may be admired but not discussed.[21]

However, the army of Alexander was created by Philip, and since, in the months immediately following Philip's death, Alexander can hardly have had opportunity to develop what he had inherited, one may take Alexander's campaign of 335 into consideration.[22] In the course of seven months the Macedonian Grand Army, setting out from Amphipolis, crossed the Great Balkan Range, fought both south of and across the Danube, returned probably by Sofia into southern Yugoslavia, marched by way of Heraclea Lyncestis (Monastir–Bitola) into eastern Albania, fought south of Lake Prespa, and marched through Thessaly against Thebes in revolt, arriving in Boeotia more quickly than the rumour of its approach. At the least the campaign reveals that Philip's army had been trained to move enormous distances and his commissariat not to fail – no mean achievement for over 2,000 kilometres, the last 500 in thirteen days. The reputation Philip acquired for training his army was not vain.[23] Fifty-kilometre route marches in full kit and the carrying of thirty days' rations on the person had their effect. Indeed Alexander could never have accomplished his celebrated

lightning advances in Asia if the army had not been so disciplined by Philip over many years. This is true, moreover, for all branches of warfare. The dazzling display of quickly changing formations in Eastern Albania in 335 is a proof of this, as indeed is the 'stratagem' of Chaeronea: if it actually happened, it must have been long practised in training.

It would be unjust to attribute to Philip's precept and example all that happened in 335. Alexander's greatest moment, militarily speaking, was at the battle of the Hydaspes in 326 when he accomplished that most difficult of operations, an opposed river crossing, and the crossing of the Danube in 335 may have been made by unprecedented measures. Likewise his extricating his army from a difficult situation when he was surrounded and without supplies at Pelium (north of Korçe – Koritsa in Albania) was brilliant and exhibited the tactical skill which was his supreme merit. The covering of a river crossing by the use of artillery and archers[24] may have been his own invention. But the campaign showed that under Philip the special function of each arm had been realized. When a sudden attack by a mobile force was required, the hypaspists, the Agrianian javelineers and a detachment of cavalry were regularly sent to the task. Cavalry were supported by ground troops whenever they had to fight as well as charge, the method developed by Epaminondas at Second Mantinea. The phalanx varied its formation readily to match the ground and the situation.[25] In general, the Macedonian army showed itself as a varied set of instruments available for the commander. Philip had realized to its full potential the specialization in the art of war begun in the later fifth century.

The phalanx, which he created at his accession, showed this. Its strength was in its united force, but the individual phalangite was in no condition to defend himself. The long *sarissa* which employed both his hands, the small shield on the left forearm which afforded little cover, the absence of breastplate which increased mobility and decreased protection, all made him vulnerable in the way the hoplite was not. But Philip saw that protection for the phalanx could and should be provided by other parts of the army: the days of individual combat were for the phalanx utterly past. Formation could vary for advance, attack or defence,[26] but the phalanx would fight as a whole.

The most powerful instrument for attack was the cavalry, as was shown at Chaeronea in 338 no less than on the plain of Gaugamela in 331. (It is true that no source specifically attests

that at Chaeronea Alexander, who 'was first to break the unbroken front of the enemy', did so with a cavalry attack. But it may be presumed.) Why then was the Macedonian cavalry such a successful striking force when before Philip it had been so ineffective? The battle of Second Mantinea had shown that Epaminondas conceived of the cavalry in a new way, but it is to be noted that he appears to have used the cavalry there against cavalry, not hoplites. The Macedonian method succeeded for two reasons. First, the cavalry were trained to strike at precisely the right moment, keeping formation and assailing the infantry when the initial array was either stretched or broken. Philip adopted the formation from the Thracians, preferring their wedge shape to the square Greek mass or the rhomboid formation usual with the Thessalians since the 370s, but it is doubtful whether there was much gained in this. It was the timing that counted and the maintenance of whatever formation was adopted. Second, the horses used by the Macedonians were probably different from the (militarily) inferior breed maintained in the main city-states.[27]

The Arabian charger was not known to the classical Greeks. The most highly esteemed horses, raised in huge numbers on the Nesaean plain in Media,[28] came with the Persian army into Europe, and, since the Persians had control of Thrace for thirty years, the quality of horses in Macedonia was no doubt affected.[29] An even more important source of superior stock was the steppe country to the north of the Danube. Philip is recorded to have exacted a large number of mares from the Scyths in 339; presumably their quality was well-known to him (as to the Greeks very much earlier), and in the Macedonian world, where horses were prized and bought for large sums of money, Scythian stock had probably been imported for a long time and used for breeding.[30] In the 380s a prince of the Elymian canton scored a notable success against Olynthian cavalry, probably not just a matter of superior horsemanship.[31] It is anyhow sure enough that the Macedonian horses were superior. The horse familiar to us from the coinage of Philip is much larger and stronger than the sort of horse to be seen on Attic vases and sculptures. It is therefore no surprise that the Macedonian cavalry was able to play so effective a part in Asia.

All in all, although we are regrettably ill-provided with evidence for Philip's wars, he can safely be regarded as one of the great soldiers of antiquity. If Epaminondas had lived, Philip might in the 350s have met his match, but no other

general of the city-states emerged to build on what Epaminondas had begun. Philip did.

Siege-craft

The warfare of the fifth century was determined by the fact that the art of capturing cities had made very little progress. The Spartans sought as far as possible to prevent the construction of walls; they were notoriously inept at assaulting them. The Athenians had something of a reputation in this regard, though it is not clear why. Perhaps their success in reducing members of the Delian League in revolt impressed other Greeks, but it is clear that their only really effective method was to circumvallate. They took over two years in the 460s to reduce Thasos, admittedly not an easy place to assault, and at Samos in 440, although Pericles had some success in demolishing walls with the new inventions of battering-ram and protective 'tortoise-shell' of shields, the city was not captured, but came to terms at the end of a nine-month blockade on sea and on land. The Spartans tried in 429 to capture the city of Plataea by assault; a ramp was built and they sought to gain entry by demolishing part of the walls. Although the city was small and defended by less than five hundred men, the attempt failed, and the Spartans settled down to siege by circumvallation. The Athenian operations before Syracuse in 414 and 413 are typical of the age. The whole effort was concentrated on completing the walling-off of the city. No direct assault was ever contemplated and in general it is clear that there had been very little progress in siege-craft by the last decade of the fifth century.[32]

The first real advance in the Greek world was due to Dionysius I, virtually tyrant of Syracuse from 406 onwards. The Carthaginians, attacking the Greek cities of Sicily, provided him with examples of the effective use of rams, mounds, wheeled towers and mines, all of which Dionysius in turn used with success against them. To these means was added, most portentously, the catapult, which was believed by at least one Greek historian to have been invented in Syracuse in this period. It was not a torsion machine; that is, it derived its power not from the twisting of hair or sinew, but merely from the bending of wood and metal. It fired arrows, not missiles, and so destroyed only defenders, not defences. But it was

revolutionary and greatly helped to inaugurate the new age of warfare. From now on cities would be taken, not merely starved into submission after a long and expensive siege. The end of the independent city-state was in sight.[33]

By the accession of Philip the methods of Dionysius had become common in Greece itself. The Athenians used catapults in besieging Samos in 365, and from the late 370s onwards kept, it would appear, a stock of them on the Acropolis. Sparta as usual was behind the times, and continued to rely on circumvallation and starvation, and since Sparta dominated the first three decades of the fourth century and it is Spartan sieges which are described in detail, one might be tempted to suppose that Athens was exceptional. That would be quite wrong. The surviving part of the military treatise of Aeneas the Tactician concerns the defence of cities. It was written very shortly after 360 and is thus an index of the way sieges were being conducted when Philip acceded. Circumvallation is simply not envisaged. The greatest menace to cities is from trickery and treachery, but cities can expect outright assault from forces using rams, mines, 'tortoises', and wheeled towers 'on which many troops are brought forward and from which missiles of different sorts including catapults and slings are fired . . .' Some of the devices recommended for plaguing and frustrating the besiegers have the charm of the comic invention; for example, wasps and bees are to be introduced to the besiegers' mines, and when the wall is about to be destroyed by ramming, it is to be demolished from the inside until only a thin outer covering remains, whereupon the rammers outside are to be counter-rammed from inside with a very much bigger ram. But most of the book is sober sense, and shows that by 359 no city was really secure against a large, well-organized army.[34]

For Demosthenes, and so for posterity, Philip took cities by bribing men into treachery. In fact he is recorded as having besieged eleven cities, quite apart from the forts and cities he seems to have seized so quickly that the word 'siege' was inappropriate. Why was he so successful?

Philip created a corps of 'engineers'. This was hardly an innovation. We hear of 'engineers' at Athens, and there must have been some sort of specialist unit concerned with the catapults, although it may have amounted to no more than a number of technical advisers. Elsewhere in Greek armies there will have been similar units expert in the sort of siege techniques alluded to by Aeneas. But anything that other armies could do Philip's could be trained to do as well or better. The stronghold

of Amphipolis which had defied Athenian efforts for decades was taken by assault in 357. Presumably he instituted and trained the corps as part of the military reforms of his first few months. Every siege increased its experience and skills, and it was chiefly through its efficiency that Philip succeeded, not through technical advances, although technical advances there were. The most notable was the torsion catapult, invented by a Thessalian in Philip's service, probably late in the reign.[35] This was a more efficient means of firing arrows, but no more; the heavy stone-throwing machines do not appear until Alexander's sieges of Halicarnassus and Tyre; and the Macedonian lead bullets of thirty grammes, which were found in ample number at Olynthus, and which are one and a half times as heavy as the Olynthian, were almost certainly discharged by slings.[36] To the torsion catapult one might add some sort of advance in military engineering in the movable towers. At Perinthus they were said to be eighty cubits high (about thirty-nine metres). The figure is credible enough, since at Halicarnassus Alexander built towers one hundred cubits high, but is none the less astonishing. It is true that no figures are available for the heights of movable towers earlier, but, although they were higher than the walls of the city under attack, evidently they were not enormously higher, perhaps no more than fifteen metres from the ground. So Philip's towers were a technical triumph.[37] But both enormous towers and torsion catapult were late to appear and for the most part Philip succeeded because his engineers were so efficient at doing what was being and had been done elsewhere.

The proof of this is the comparative speed of his sieges. The Athenians took ten months to besiege Samos in 366/5. Philip did not begin his attack on Perinthus until after the start of the Attic year 340/39, and had moved to Byzantium while the corn-ships were still coming through the Bosporus – a matter of perhaps three months at the outside, in the course of which the huge towers just mentioned had been constructed, the wall of the city in part demolished, and sundry emergency walls constructed out of the rows of houses rising up the hill 'like seats in a theatre' cleared away.[38] In the case of Olynthus, the city was probably not under siege in mid-348 when the third appeal for help was sent to Athens, for there would have been little point in Athens sending 2,000 hoplites and 300 cavalry to help a city already beleaguered. By September the siege was already over. The Greek world had never known anything like it. In glittering succession the cities fell and the Athenians, with

more prudence than Demosthenes, declined to subject their forces to likely capture, when they had nothing with which to counter the Macedonian engineers. Behind it all lay careful training and attention to supplies. The siege-engines were quickly assembled because the component parts were carried ready to use.[39] Philip had to improvize before Byzantium but only because his regular engines were in action at Perinthus. Normally there was no delay. In 332 the Macedonians were to capture Tyre, situated on an island in the harbour and very strongly defended, within seven months. It is no surprise that Philip's sieges did not detain him.

The capture of Tyre was a masterpiece of siege-craft. Why, given the resourcefulness and efficiency of Philip's engineers, did he not capture Perinthus and Byzantium? At Tyre stone-throwing machines were used for the first time, and most effectively, in breaching walls,[40] but at both Perinthus and Byzantium Philip breached the walls. The real difficulty was that both cities were supplied and reinforced by sea and the cost in casualties of exploiting the breached walls was too great. Both perhaps could have been taken if he had persisted, but in refusing to let Perinthus keep him from Byzantium, or Byzantium from the war in Greece itself, Philip showed sound strategic sense. After settling Greece Byzantium would, he rightly judged, submit. To persist with the siege of Byzantium would have offered Athens and the Persian satraps the chance to detain him for a very long time.

Comparison with Alexander

No assessment of Philip as soldier would be complete without a comparison with his son. Philip provided the instrument. Did Alexander make better use of it? Unfortunately we are so ill-provided with detailed information about Philip's campaigns that it is not possible to compare the two as tacticians. Certainly Alexander displayed remarkable resource in a great many greatly varied situations and was not defeated. There is no evidence to suggest that Philip was not equally resourceful, equally successful in the varied but almost always difficult terrain of the Balkans. Probably what had become drill in Alexander's army had been learned by Philip in hard fighting. If comparison were really possible, Philip would have the merit and the disadvantage of coming first.

Strategically speaking, we are not so limited. Philip had patience and knew his limitations. He did not attempt to develop sea-power to confront Athens, although he was better placed to do so than Thebes under Epaminondas which did try. Instead he used his land-power when Athens was prevented persist with what might prove costly in lives or distracting by weather from using her navy, and when Athens was in a left Athens to pay for what she could not afford. Nor did he perisist with what might prove costly in lives or distracting from his main purposes. He recoiled from Thermopylae in 352 and from the Hellespontine area in 339, only to pounce more effectively. Warfare was one of the instruments of policy rationally conceived and rationally pursued.

As much cannot be said of Alexander. One may exempt from consideration his disastrous march across the Gedrosian Desert for the sake, it would seem, of outdoing illustrious antecedents:[41] by 325 he was perhaps parting company with moderation and good sense. It is in the campaigns prior to 330 that he showed questionable strategic ability. The conquest of Egypt was of no importance for the defeat of the King of Persia, from whom for long periods it had been in revolt without seriously impairing the Empire. After the reduction of Tyre the prime objective was to attack the king at the heart of the Empire before the effects of the battle of Issus had worn off and a new army been gathered and trained. Alexander preferred to go to Egypt, perhaps in part to satisfy his desire to emulate Perseus and Heracles and to consult the oracle of Ammon on the question of his divine origins. Mystical imaginings rather than military calculations it would seem, and if it is said in his defence that he was so good a soldier that he could afford to waste as much time as he fancied, one may recall that on the battlefield of Gaugamela there was a moment when the Indian and Persian cavalry broke through the Macedonian centre while the left under Parmenio was in need of help. It was, in short, a close-run thing.[42] Likewise with the battle of Issus. By luck or good management the Persians came down in Alexander's rear. Alexander could not believe his ears and had to go and see for himself. He had neglected to block the Amanus Gates, which could have cost him dear. Earlier still, his decision to disband his fleet was exposed as a strategic error when the Persians exploited the defencelessness of the Aegean.[43]

Alexander's brilliance as a tactician has blinded posterity to his less lustrous strategic powers. His motive force was again and again a restless, irrational desire (*pothos*). The soldier's art

demands rational calculation. Nothing suggests that Philip lacked it. The military sense of how to fight he possessed no less than his son. The political sense of whether to fight at all is another matter. Philip seems to have possessed it in the highest degree. The case of his son requires to be considered.

XI

THE SETTLEMENT OF GREECE

Preliminary arrangements

In the cities of Greece which had chosen to fight, the news of the disaster must have caused extreme alarm. Certainly at Athens the walls were feverishly repaired; help was summoned from Troezen and Epidaurus across the Saronic Gulf and from elsewhere; it was forbidden to leave the city; all hands and all means would be needed in the imminent siege. Similar preparations at Corinth are recorded. No doubt the alarm was general, while in Thebes despair must have reigned. The city was within a long day's march for the Macedonians and beyond salvation; many of the men who might have delayed the attack on the city were either dead or prisoners of war.[1]

No sieges followed. Philip intended, as events showed, to master, not to destroy, the independent cities of Greece. Destruction he was reserving for the empire of the Persians, or at any rate the western satrapies, and for that he needed the help of the Greeks. So he set about creating a Hellenic League which would secure peace within Greece and the military aid he required.

The League of Corinth was the outcome, but it required careful preparation and did not mature until the second half of 337, a date secured for us by a fragment, found at Oxyrhynchus, of the work of a chronographer; that is why as late as mid-337 Athens was still pressing ahead with work on the walls.[2] But the length of the interval between the battle and the first meeting of the League need occasion no surprise. There was much to do by diplomacy and the threat of war, and it was best done by moving around Greece with the Macedonian army. We hear of Philip encamping near Corinth and it was perhaps here that much of the work was done, but, before all was ready, he had had to invade and ravage in Laconia, pre-

sumably in the spring or early summer of 337, and elsewhere probably enough the sight of Macedonian arms furnished a powerful argument for seeing things as Philip saw them.[3]

First of all, he had to deal with those who had fought and lost, which he seems to have done before moving south from Boeotia. Athens he treated with astounding leniency. Although the Second Athenian Confederacy was dissolved (and by this date it was the merest shadow of what it had once been) not only were the 2,000 captives restored without ransom, but the city was allowed to keep the Samian cleruchy, a generous concession indeed: Athens prized the island greatly and when the Exiles Decree issued by Alexander in 324 meant that she would lose it, the city planned revolt, but in 338 she was in no position to defy.[4] What moved Philip? One of the Athenian prisoners of war had been the orator Demades who was said to have won his city this favourable treatment; he certainly was sent by Philip to summon the Athenians to negotiate a peace; he returned as one of the ambassadors sent to recover the fallen and to beg for the return of the prisoners; when the young Alexander came, on his only visit to Athens, to negotiate the peace, accompanied by Antipater who had represented the king in the negotiations of 346, Demades played the leading part and the peace was rightly said to have been of his making. But Philip was not the man to be deflected from his purposes by rhetoric. His 'generosity', as Demades himself termed it, needs to be explained otherwise.[5] It could hardly be argued that Philip feared that he could not succeed in an all-out assault on Athens. No one would come to Athens' aid; Philip could have taken as much time as he wished; besides, he surrendered a major bargaining counter, the prisoners of war, before the negotiation of the Peace of Demades properly began.[6] His 'generosity' can only be explained by supposing that still as in 346, Athenian alliance and Athenian naval power were vital to his plans. As in 346, peace was accompanied by alliance. The league he had in mind could give valuable help; without Athens, he could not begin to plan.

By contrast Thebes was treated with great severity. Money had to be paid for the captives and even for the right to bury the dead. The city surrendered, and a Macedonian garrison was installed. The political leaders were either exiled or executed, in either case their property was confiscated. Exiled Thebans, presumably the politicians who had favoured concord with Philip, were recalled and three hundred of their number sat in judgement on their fellow citizens. The cities of Boeotia which

Thebes had destroyed were restored, their citizens reassembled, although the Boeotian Confederacy, at the head of which Thebes under Epaminondas had attained her greatest power, was not dissolved.[7] Why such severity? It is possible that Philip had nurtured a private hatred for Thebes ever since his days as a hostage there. It is also possible that Philip saw that the Thebans were the real danger to a *Pax Macedonica* in Greece, as indeed the events of 335 were to show when Thebes alone had the courage to stand for Greek liberty. But the punishment of politicians suggests that what had angered Philip was Theban policy and perhaps the right explanation of Philip's severity is that Thebes had not, like Athens, in 344 repudiated the Persian appeal for help in the reconquest of Egypt. It was not just that the Theban general had contributed much to the Persian success and so made it easier for the Persians to face the coming Macedonian invasion. The very readiness to help Persia must have seemed a recrudescence of that shameful Medizing which had distracted an earlier Panhellenist champion, Agesilaus, from his assault on Asia. Isocrates pointed to the disgrace of the Theban policy in Panhellenist eyes. Philip acted, and with severity. Nor is this explanation weakened by the fact that Argos, which was equally guilty of helping Persia, was not similarly treated. Argos had not fought at Chaeronea.[8]

For the other states that had fought there is less information. Philip made peace treaties with them all, but most of the details are lost. Corinth and Chalcis, which controlled the bridge to Euboea across the Euripus, both received Macedonian garrisons. The Achaean League of the north-western Peloponnese was deprived of its possession on the north side of the Gulf of Corinth, Naupactus, which Philip, as he had promised, handed over to the Aetolians; for the rest it appears to have been left to mourn its many dead. As to his treaties with Troezen, Epidaurus and Megara, we are wholly uniformed; perhaps Philip was content to see those who had urged their cities to fight ousted from power.[9]

Having dealt with the combatants, Philip turned to the settlement of the Spartan problem. In one sense the problem no longer existed; if Sparta attacked her neighbours as she had in 352 and as she constantly threatened both before that year and after, the league which Philip had in mind would protect them. But there were border disputes involving the Argives, the Tegeans, the Megalopolitans and the Messenians, which, if not settled, were certain to cause trouble. What exactly

Philip did is not clear. He seems to have summoned the Spartans to discussions, received a blunt refusal and ravaged the territory of Sparta, and the decisions are in Polybius ascribed to him personally by a speaker hostile to the Macedonians. The settlements, however, were made by what another speaker described as 'a general Hellenic court', which would suggest that they were the work of the League of Corinth. Whatever the process of decision, justice may have been done. At any rate, three and a half centuries later the Roman Senate confirmed one part of Philip's arrangements, and the rest seems to have long stood unchallenged. The gratitude of the Peloponnesians is plain to us, not so much by the buildings and statues erected in Philip's honour – for stones can flatter and lie – as by the praise of the most famous citizen of Megalopolis, the historian Polybius himself.[10]

It is notable that Philip did not seize on Sparta's intransigence as an excuse for destroying the state, though it is inconceivable that he could not have done so had he wished. He may have thought that, if the states of the Peloponnese were utterly freed of the bogey of Sparta, they would have less taste for a Macedonian guaranteed peace. He may also have shrunk from destroying a state whose history and institutions had inspired so many Greeks, the nearest approach to Plato's ideal city. Even if Philip had no respect for it, he may have judged that Greek feelings would be no less affronted by the destruction of Sparta than they had ever been by her severities: so at any rate it was to prove with the destruction of Thebes in 335. Sparta was left therefore in obdurate isolation. Ultimately Philip sought not the domination but the compliance of Greece, and if Sparta would not comply the rest of Greece would. The self-proclaimed heroes of the Persian War could be left to take no part in the great crusade. The inscription set up in Athens with the spoils of the first great victory over the Persians on Asiatic soil could proclaim the Spartans' absence.[11]

The League of Corinth

By mid-337 all these preliminaries were over, and the League of Corinth could be established. A congress was proclaimed. All states were invited to send representatives to Corinth, empowered moreover to make decisions: such is the implication of a story in Plutarch's *Life of Phocion* about Phocion trying to

prevent the Athenians voting to 'share with the Hellenes in the Common Peace and the Council' before they knew what that would entail. The congress met, the rights and obligations of membership were agreed, and the completed constitution was sworn to by the member-states, presumably, in the approved Greek manner, in each city by holders of office deemed representative. The only state which refused to join was Sparta. The new League thus formally constituted, the General Synod met and was urged by Philip to declare war on Persia. It duly did so. Philip returned to Macedon to prepare for the expedition, and in spring 336 a Macedonian force landed at Ephesus. Philip and the Greeks were to follow later in the year.[12]

As Philip's final solution of the problem of securing Greek co-operation in the war against Persia, the League deserves careful scrutiny. The formal accounts in Justin's epitome and Diodorus are very brief and, if there had not chanced to be preserved in the corpus of Demosthenes' speeches a speech (XVII), delivered in 331/0, urging Athens to join the revolt of the Spartans under King Agis III, we would be very much in the dark. It is entitled *On the treaty with Alexander* and is concerned to argue that the Macedonians have seriously infringed various clauses of the constitution of the League. The effect of the speech is quite contrary. It suggests that no serious infringements have occurred. But it is possible to extract sufficient information about the constitution for its outline to be fairly clear. In addition, large fragments of an inscription found at Epidaurus, which recorded the re-foundation of a Hellenic League in 302 by Antigonus the One-eyed and his son Demetrius the Besieger, provide useful hints, especially with regard to the Synod. There is no proof that the two leagues had the same constitution, but Plutarch, in making the position of the two kings analogous to that of Philip, seems to suggest as much, and, in view of the fact that Polyperchon in 319 sought the favour of the Greeks by promising to restore the Peace established by Philip, it seems likely that the two kings in 302 with the same aim restored, at least in broad outline, the League of Corinth. So the inscription can be used, with discretion, to supplement and suggest.[13] Last but not least, there are two teasing fragments of the inscription set up in Athens in 337 recording the constitution of the League of Corinth itself: the first contains parts of the oath, the second a puzzling list of names of states followed by numerals.[14] All in all the evidence is ample enough for agreement and disputes.

'The League of Corinth' is a modern name. It was properly styled 'the Hellenes', the somewhat ambiguous title used for earlier leagues from the Persian Wars onwards, suggesting a large measure of continuity. First, the states 'sharing in the Common Peace' were guaranteed freedom from outside attack even by their own exiles, freedom of navigation, and freedom from intervention in their internal affairs, which was defined, as in the Second Athenian Confederacy of 378, as freedom from garrisons and from payment of tribute. In addition there was what seems at first sight a very remarkable development. States were to be protected against revolutionary changes of constitution, and the League authorities were to take action in any state against executions and exile which were not in accordance with the constitution of that state, and against confiscation of property, redistribution of land, cancellation of debts, and liberation of slaves for revolutionary purposes. Second, a General Synod of delegates from member-states was set up to administer the common affairs of the Greeks. To guess from the Epidaurus inscription, a committee of 'presiding officers' (*Proedroi*) chosen in time of peace by lot, in time of war by the *Hegemon* (i.e. the king or his appointee), prepared the business, summoned meetings and presided over them. The Synod not only passed decrees binding on member-states but also acted as a court, which could pronounce on both individuals and cities, and which perhaps arbitrated in disputes between states; at least, some such procedure seems to be implied in the case of the wrangles between Sparta and her neighbours. In time of war the Synod was to meet when the *Hegemon* and the 'presiding officers' bade, in peace at the national festivals. There is enough known about earlier Hellenic leagues to show that there was little, if anything, novel in this new General Synod. Third, a sanctions clause provided for action against those who transgressed the Peace. Such a clause had become a regular part of the Common Peaces.[15]

So much would be generally conceded, but various problems arise. First, there seems the plainest inconsistency between the guarantee of freedom from garrisons and the incontestable fact that there were garrisons installed not only in three of the states which had fought at Chaeronea, viz. Corinth, Chalcis, and Thebes, but also in Ambracia which for all we know had not, and it is notable that the orator of *On the treaty with Alexander* makes no allusion to the matter. Was there then an inconsistency that was, strangely, tolerated? With such an orator toleration of genuine wrongs is inconceivable; no doubt he would have

been delighted to have something real to flog. So one might wonder whether the constitution really did guarantee freedom from garrisons. But, even if the explicit evidence is not strong, it is very unlikely that by 337 'freedom and autonomy' did not exclude the possibility of garrisons. So there is a problem. The solution is to be found in the existence of officials referred to by our orator as 'those in charge of the general security'. If by this term is meant the four Macedonian commandants and their forces, the problem vanishes. They had to be stationed somewhere and the four cities named were the chosen places, but their role was essentially that of a peace-keeping force. One of the commandants, Corragus, was later found intervening in Pellene in Achaea, and the defeat of his force in 331 marked the beginning of the Spartan-led revolt. One can understand too why a garrison was placed in Ambracia with which in particular Philip had, as far as we know, no quarrel. Ambracia was simply a convenient site for a force to keep the peace in north-western Greece.[16]

Secondly, much has been made of the list of names and numerals, which was evidently part of the published constitution of 337. In what sense were associated, for instance, 'Oetaeans and Malians and ... ? ...', or 'Agraeans and Dolopians: 5', when 'Phocians' not necessarily on their own was followed by a 3, as were Cephallenia and somewhere else (only one letter of the name being preserved)? The mysterious list has to be seen as a whole and no explanation will be found wholly satisfactory. It is widely accepted that the list is evidence that in the League of Corinth there was proportional representation, and if this were so Philip must have been a remarkably far-sighted man. There was proportional representation in the Aetolian and the Achaean Leagues certainly at a later date and presumably in the fourth century, but these were compact and homogeneous polities. The more broadly Hellenic leagues and all the Synods of the Common Peaces as far as we know were organized on the principle enunciated, for instance, at the foundation of the Second Athenian Confederacy, viz. one city one vote regardless of the size of the city. So the explanation advanced would make of Philip one of the great constitutional innovators. It is, however, most improbable. It is true that, although Philip in settling with those who fought him in 338 found it expedient to dissolve the Second Athenian Confederacy, the Boeotian League and the Achaean League which had fought survived,[17] and no doubt Philip saw no advantage in breaking up existing unities; but the creation of

new and very artificial units to form constituencies from peoples, as far as we know, never before associated in political action in a world where the notion of constituencies was not generally followed, is a wholly different matter. The Boeotian League, created in the middle of the fifth century, is posed as an analogy. But there is a very great gap between on the one hand a grouping of cities, conscious of being Boeotian, living at no great distance from each other, when indeed their territories were not actually contiguous, with the ready communications offered by the Copaic lake around which ancient Boeotia was spread, for the purpose of sharing equitably amongst each of the eleven groups the provision of a large number of soldiers and sixty members of the League Council, and on the other hand the creation of constituencies from hitherto unassociated and often unsociable peoples for the purpose of producing differing numbers of representatives. After all, the normal aim in creating constituencies is to achieve some sort of equality of either numbers or social interest. By what process did the island of Cephallenia and some other place, probably enough the nearby island of Zacynthus, appoint and brief and hear reports from three delegates to the Synod at Corinth? Within the bounds of Greek history it is hard to imagine. Was such a grouping really worth the trouble, when no great evil would have resulted from each island having one vote? The hypothesis of proportional representation in the General Synod is most improbable. It might be urged in its support that in the revived league of 302 there was more than one delegate from each member state; but it is not clear that a delegation cast more than one vote and it is clear that the 'cities' and 'tribes' (*ethnē*) were the units that were responsible for sending delegates; there is absolutely no mention of groups of cities or tribes; if there was proportional representation in 337, it must have been regarded in 302 as unworkably complicated.[18] But the whole hypothesis is ill-grounded and unworthy of the credit it has received.

What then are these names and numbers? The only other explanation is that they are somehow connected with the military organization of the League, the numbers of which the highest is ten being for units of some sort of soldier. Both the formal accounts of the foundation, viz. Justin and Diodorus, speak of an apportionment of military obligations. So it is no surprise to find that the epigraphic record of the foundation contained a list with numbers. According to Justin, the League forces totalled 200,000 infantry and 15,000 cavalry, figures enormously

in excess of any actual Hellenic army and therefore mere paper strengths. If the unit was declared to be a certain number of soldiers, states could be grouped together to provide a certain number of units more equitably than if they were to be called on separately. The concerting of policy between disparate peoples would have been difficult, the contribution of a fair share to the numbers required of them of, for instance, javelineers much less contentious. If what we are dealing with is a list of groups of states with the number of units to which they were obliged, the theoretical total being 200,000 infantry and 15,000 cavalry, when there was a call-up of a 'League array totalling 10,000', by a quick calculation each group would know exactly how many it had to contribute. This may sound complicated in explanation, but it would be much less complicated in practice than the postulated system of proportional representation. Nor does it conflict with our knowledge of how Greek leagues shared out military duties – for we know on that subject practically nothing, save that in the Achaean League of the third century there was grouping of states for military purposes of the sort proposed here.[19]

Much may be made of the clause, which sought to prevent revolutionary social and constitutional change. Was Greek society to be frozen from 337 onwards? And in whose interests? Were Macedon's quislings to be in power for ever? So much may be said, and it cannot be proved that Philip did not so intend. But there is also much that can be urged in mitigation of this severe judgement. Greek leagues had regularly tended to base themselves on constitutional uniformity. Sparta had exercised hegemony in the Peloponnese, as Thucydides remarked, on the basis of oligarchy, while the Athenians in the fourth century as in the fifth tended both to ally with democracies and to exchange guarantees of help in case of revolutionary change.[20] So in this clause of the League of Corinth Philip was formulating as a general rule what had been long practised in associations of Greek states. The clause did however go very much further than any previous formulations; even if a legally constituted government should wish to cancel debts, confiscate property and redistribute land, it was not to be permitted to do so, and Philip might be regarded as the champion of the rich from whom he expected grateful loyalty. It would not be surprising if this were at least part of the truth. Philip had no reason to place much trust in democracies, and in fourth-century Greece democracy was generally government by the poorer citizens. But there may have been a better side

to it. In the fourth century Greece was becoming poorer. In the fifth the ancient cities had lived by exporting their manufactured wares to the periphery of the Greek world in return for cereals. In the fourth, as the ever-increasing prevalence of local pottery shows, the market was drying up, and poverty increased. Constant warfare also played its part. Whatever the cause, undeniably the strife of rich and poor was destroying the heart of Greece. For Plato such strife was the common lot of oligarchies which really became two cities, the city of the rich and the city of the poor; for Aristotle, the division occurred in all states save where there was equality of wealth. The result was constant bloodshed and exile of opponents. In 366 Isocrates declared that after the eclipse of Sparta 'there are more in exile from a single city than formerly from the whole of the Peloponnese.' By 324 Alexander resolved to have the exiles of Greece received back into their own cities and no less than twenty thousand assembled at the Olympic Festival to hear his Rescript read. Only Athens and Aetolia, both for special reasons, objected to this order; indeed, since the General Synod of the League of Corinth must have been meeting at the Festival, the order may have been formally approved. The problem of the exiles was generally acknowledged in 324 to be a great evil. But it was not new. Many of the exiles assembled at Olympia were banished long before 337, the case of Theopompus the historian being not untypical; he had been exiled with his father for the latter's pro-Spartan sympathies, which can only have been in the 360s or earlier, and was still in exile after 337. In seeking to call a halt to this sort of thing which was the inevitable result of the trouble caused by cancellation of debts and usurpation of property, Philip may not have been consulting merely his own interests. But what of the impoverished? Was there to be no way out? Philip had his answer in the colonies he proposed to found in Asia.[21]

It is in the role of the Hegemon that the real secret of the League of Corinth is to be found. Tantalizingly broken though the fragment of the oath found at Athens is, it is clear enough that in the sanctions clause of the constitution which provided for joint action against those who transgressed the peace, the Hegemon, that is the King of Macedon or his deputy, was directly involved in the action.[22] The contrast with the condition of Greece under the various peaces made with the King of Persia earlier in the century is striking. There the Hegemon was, as it were, *deus ex machina*, who could be called in only as a last resort; until that point was reached, a leading Greek

state was 'champion' of the peace (*prostatēs*) and on its own initiative punished transgressions. By the League of Corinth the King of Macedon was installed with authority and power to enforce it within Greece itself; let trouble arise and 'those in charge of the general security' would swiftly act. The chance for the Greeks to deal with trouble themselves the Athenians had squandered in the negotiations of 344 to 342. After the military disaster the King of Macedon would be the very present help in trouble. Greece had lost her liberty. Under the remote King of Persia she had had partial peace and partial liberty; under the King of Macedon, once at her doorstep, now within the doors, she had total peace and no liberty.

Liberty gone, Greece depended on the favour of the King of Macedon. But within that framework what did Philip intend? Was Greece from now on to be a gaol or a museum? Within a year Philip was dead and there is no way of knowing how he intended to treat the Greeks; it is beyond the scope of this book to consider how they fared under Alexander. Suffice it to say that the common notion of groaning servitude is singularly ill-supported by evidence:[23] the corruption of powerlessness is perhaps the more apt description. But one thing stands out clearly. The settlement of Philip in 337 remained popular. When Polyperchon in 319 sought to woo the favour of the Greeks, he held before them the restoration of what Philip had established.[24] So too in 302 with Antigonus and Demetrius. The Greeks did not feel that they had been placed within a gaol. Under Roman domination things were different.[25]

By late 337 Philip was finished in Greece, and in a sense with Greece. He had been appointed by the Greeks 'general of Greece with full independent powers' (*stratēgos autokratōr*) for the war against Persia. The Greeks would get their orders in due course.[26] It was time for the final arrangements in Macedon. Philip and the army returned home.

XII

THE END

336 was to be the start of the campaign against Persia. In the spring the advance force was sent to Asia under the command of Parmenio and Attalus, with instructions to liberate the Greek cities. Ephesus threw off the Persian suzerainty, commissioned a statue of Philip to be placed in the temple of Artemis, and received the Macedonians, who advanced to Magnesia, where they were confronted by Memnon and suffered some sort of reverse.[1] Unfortunately we are not informed which Magnesia. There was one on the Maeander just over twenty kilometres south-east of Ephesus, and, if this was as far as the advance guard got, they made very little progress. But the other Magnesia (modern Manisa), situated in the valley of the Hermus and so on the road from the sea to Sardis the seat of the Satrap of Lydia, is much more likely. If Persian power was to be destroyed in Asia Minor, the satrapal strongholds had to be captured (and it is notable that after defeating the satraps at the Granicus in 334 Alexander proceeded directly to seize both Dascylium in the north and Sardis). So in 336 the Macedonian advance guard proceeded on the very route taken by Agesilaus of Sparta in 395 when he began his abortive march 'up-country' (*anabasis*), and in doing so probably freed a number of the Greek cities.[2] All in all, it was a sound start to the campaign. How Philip planned to continue it is only to be conjectured. Perhaps he intended to transport the bulk of his army across the Hellespont, just as Alexander was to do, and to engage the Satrap of the Dascylian satrapy, and presumably he intended to cross in the late summer of that year after the Etesian winds had ceased and the fleet, mainly Athenian, could reach the Hellespont but in time to prevent the satraps joining forces against Parmenio, whose army numbered only 10,000. Orders must have been issued to the League of Corinth, though we do not hear of them. There were more engaging things in 336 for historians to record.

Philip had consulted the Delphic oracle about the Persian campaign and received a very satisfactory response: 'Garlanded is the bull. Fulfilment is here. One there is who will strike the victim.' Philip prepared a festal occasion to send him off to do the deed, a great concourse of Greeks at Aegae for a great display of Greek culture, drama and athletic contests as well as a wedding of great political importance, the marriage of his daughter Cleopatra, full sister of Alexander the Great, to that other Alexander installed by Philip as King of the Molossians. The Greeks assembled, both private friends of Philip and representatives of the leading states. The Athenians brought and caused to be proclaimed an honorific decree suitable for the leader of the Panhellenic crusade. There was one absentee, the mother of the bride and sister of the groom, Olympias.[3]

Philip had seven wives. The sixth was the daughter of a Thracian king and the marriage set the seal on the Thracian campaign of the late 340s. Her arrival at the court in no way incommoded Olympias, who understood the needs of imperial policy. The seventh was different. She was the niece of a Macedonian noble, Attalus, eminent enough to be appointed joint commander with Parmenio of the advance party soon to be sent to Asia. The marriage was an affair of the heart and instantly menaced the position of Olympias at court, and not only Olympias. Philip was only in his middle forties and, if he lived, a son might be old enough to displace Alexander in the succession. Although in 340 when Philip was attacking Byzantium, Alexander at the age of sixteen had been entrusted with the care of the realm and two years later had commanded the left wing at Chaeronea and after the battle been sent to Athens as ambassador, he feared he might be displaced. The wedding was in autumn 337 and there was an ugly scene, when at a drinking bout Attalus, drunk as Macedonian lords so often were, taunted Alexander with the prospect of a 'genuine' successor to the throne being born of his niece's marriage. 'Do you think I'm a bastard?' Alexander shouted back and flung his cup at him. Philip, equally drunk, jumped up, drew his sword, and fell over. Alexander taunted 'Gentlemen, this fellow was getting ready to cross from Europe to Asia, when he can't get from one side of the table to the other without upending himself.' It was a scene typical enough of Macedonian life and of no greater significance than the similar scene of seven years later when Alexander had the misfortune not to be drunk enough to avoid killing Clitus and in his remorse nearly killed himself. On this occasion Alexander took his mother and

fled west. She went to her brother's court in Molossia, he to Illyria.[4]

How serious was the rift? A number of Alexander's friends including Ptolemy, the future ruler of Egypt, were later banished because they were loyal, and had to be recalled by Alexander on his accession. So clearly it was widely felt that Alexander's position as heir presumptive was in danger. But Alexander was persuaded by Philip to return. Perhaps the one was unwilling to miss the Persian expedition and the other both wanted him with the cavalry and feared to leave him with Olympias. The new wife was already with child but until she had produced a son and the son had proved himself worthy Alexander could let the question of the succession wait.[5]

Olympias, however, was finished with Philip and Philip with her. If she was to regain her power and influence, it could be only when Philip had been replaced by her son; in the meantime she looked to her brother, Alexander, King of the Molossians, to help her. But Philip knew this other Alexander well enough. He offered him the hand of his daughter Cleopatra. Alexander accepted and came to Aegae for the marriage, leaving Olympias to fume by herself.

On the day of the wedding the great company of guests assembled in the theatre. An elaborate procession entered which included the statues of the Twelve Gods and then a thirteenth, that of Philip himself. There were perhaps already cities in the Greek world where Philip was regarded as in some sense divine, and at a later date a proposal could be made at Athens to add Alexander to the Twelve Gods; so many may have taken the statue to mean that Philip was claiming to be more than mortal man.[6] There was no time on the day for theological speculation. Shortly Philip in person was at the entrance to the theatre, the close attendance of his bodyguard dispensed with. As he advanced in a white robe, one of the bodyguard, Pausanias, rushed at him and stabbed him to death.

Pausanias was a man with a grievance. The uncle of the new royal bride, Attalus, had got him drunk and homosexually assaulted by his grooms, allegedly in revenge for Pausanias having years before taunted a friend of Attalus with effeminacy until he virtually committed suicide on the field of battle. Pausanias had complained to Philip who far from investigating the matter appointed Attalus to command in Asia, and so, unable to strike the person of the wrong-doer, Pausanias struck at his power by murdering the man from whom it derived. This version was accepted by Aristotle, who was in Macedonia at

the time and was well aware of what was credible there. But there may have been more to it. There were two direct beneficiaries of the deed. Alexander gained the throne and Olympias regained her influence. So some believed that one or the other incited Pausanias. Olympias was said to have returned promptly enough and publicly honoured the murderer's corpse, though if she did she may have done so out of gratitude for her return. Alexander was said to have answered Pausanias' complaints about Attalus and Philip with a line from Euripides which prompted thoughts of murdering Philip, but, since Pausanias is hardly likely to have told anyone about it even if Alexander had said it, the story is worthless. Nothing more substantial was ever asserted after his death. All that can be said is that both had reason to be content with what had happened.[7]

The long history of the Macedonian court was full of plots and rumours of plots and Alexander presumed, or affected to presume, that others were involved. Of three members of the leading family of Lyncus, two were promptly executed as accomplices, the third exempted because he had immediately recognized Alexander as King; perhaps the real fault of the other two was that they had not done the same; if they had been accomplices in the murder, either they wanted Philip replaced by Alexander, in which case they should have displayed the same allegiance as their brother, or they wanted someone else to succeed, in which case their difference from their brother needs explanation.[8] In itself their execution does not prove guilt. As one of the first acts of his reign, Alexander had Attalus murdered, just as his mother spilled her spite in the blood of the seventh wife's baby. Later, perhaps tongue in cheek, he even accused the King of Persia of prompting Pausanias, and in 331 he was alleged to have consulted the oracle of Ammon as to whether any of those party to his father's murder were unpunished, which argues nothing.[9] The truth is denied us. Perhaps Aristotle was right.

The rivalries at the court revealed after Philip's return to Macedon in 337 might suggest that the state was basically as unstable as ever. When Demosthenes heard of the murder, he put aside mourning for the death of his daughter to rejoice in the death of his foe: he felt no need to fear that Philip's successor would take note – a response similar to Cicero's at the murder of Caesar. Phocion, by contrast, took the view that the power of Macedon was undiminished, and Phocion was right. In the first year of Alexander's reign it was far from clear that he would be as great a king as his father had been,

but the state did not dissolve. There was trouble with the Illyrians as there always had been, but the cantons of upper Macedonia were unshaken. The chief servants of Philip, Parmenio and Antipater, did not waver. Attalus in Asia was alleged to have contemplated revolt and to have entered into treasonable negotiations with Demosthenes, which he then, in a mood of repentance, reported to Alexander; but all this may be invention to justify the murder which got rid of Attalus. All in all, the work of Philip proved itself in 336. The kingdom did not fall apart.[10]

How much did the early death of Philip matter? It might be argued that his work was done, the Macedonian *Reich* secure against the danger of disintegrating (as the succession of Alexander showed), Greece under control and organized to support the extension of Macedonian power in Asia, that Philip had played his part, it was time for his son to begin his.

The truth is perhaps quite different. It is by no means sure that the Macedonian army would have been less effective under Philip's command against the Persian armies, and it is possible that Alexander took a decision which Philip would never have taken and which sealed the fate of the Hellenic world. When Alexander had captured Tyre, he received a message from the King of Persia proposing that Alexander should have all the lands between the Euphrates and the sea and that there should be friendship and alliance between them. Parmenio, Philip's chief marshal and now Alexander's, counselled acceptance. Alexander brusquely repudiated the offer and the war of conquest of the whole empire followed.[11] In 331 Alexander crossed the Euphrates and on his celebrated charger rode east to glory and into Romance. But was the decision to conquer rather than to be in concord with the Persian Empire the better course?

If Alexander had accepted the offer, the Macedonian empire would have circled the Aegean from Greece to Egypt. Naval power could have helped to hold together what were to become the eastern provinces of the Roman Empire. To the east would have lain the Iranian power, first Persian later Parthian, both alike perhaps content to coexist with the Mediterranean power. East was East, and West was West, and just as Rome and Parthia came to see that finally only coexistence worked, so too Macedon and Persia could have reached the same conclusion if ever either party was minded to transgress the peace and the Euphrates. The Iranian power had to concentrate on its

eastern defences. It was there that the founder of the Persian dynasty, Cyrus, had died, that Alexander had some of his hardest fighting, that the Yueh-Chih came in late in the second century B.C. It was the road to India and China and offered no natural check to nomadic pressures. After the grandiose plans of Darius I and Xerxes for expansion in the west had miscarried, Persia settled down to keeping under control what she had and she could never relax her vigilance in the north-east. Concord with the Mediterranean power was the only sensible policy. Similarly in reverse. Rome found that the natural frontier of the desert was best. To advance into Iranian lands was to come up against a civilization she could neither comprehend nor absorb. It proved best to leave them to their own vices. The lands of Asia Minor where Hellenized shaded into Iranian provided the only problem, but with good sense a deal could be struck, just as at an earlier date and on a more westerly line it had been struck between Athens and Persia in the Peace of Callias by that master of policy, Pericles.

Rome at length saw sense and gained peace.* Pericles saw sense and gave Athens the chance of sea-empire in Greece. Would it not have been sense for the Macedonian King too? It is true that Alexander, dying young, had no chance properly to attempt to bind together the immense empire he had created. Under his tutelage the cities he had founded might have made more impression on the Iranian lump and the cities he did not found, that is those he planned on the southern coast of Iran,[12] might have produced an explosion of Hellenism in the Indian Ocean and down the African coast which would have utterly changed the history of the world. But no matter how successful he had been, the hard fact would have remained. The empire was too large for enduring unity. Finally the stability of empires depends largely on the system of communications, and between India and the Adriatic nature presented the rebellious with too many defences. Sooner or later Alexander's empire must have fallen apart, and the resilient Iranian civilization come again into its own. But in the falling apart, in the wars of whatever successors, there was the greatest danger, or rather certain death, from Rome. The divisions of the Hellenistic world that were created on Alexander's death made it possible for Rome to gobble up the Hellenistic world morsel by morsel until with the

* Trajan ignored the lesson and involved Rome in the Iranian world, disastrously in the third century when the Sassanids set about throwing the Romans out of northern Mesopotamia.

end of Ptolemaic Egypt after the battle of Actium nothing remained.

There are two profound divisions running through the history of the ancient world. One is that already discussed, the division between Iranian and Mediterranean. The other is that between Latin West and Hellenic East. One of the main purposes of Rome was to bind the East to Rome but it was an uphill struggle. The division that in 48 B.C. brought the Latin West under Julius Caesar to fight at Pharsalus against Pompey and the Hellenic East emerged seventeen years later at Actium in the support of Octavian and that of Antony, asserted itself in the division of the empire under Diocletian and stands perhaps for ever in the separation of the Roman Catholic and Orthodox Churches. Conflict between East and West in the period of rising Roman power was therefore inevitable. When Alexander crossed the Euphrates, he ensured the victory of the Latin West.

Would Philip have acted differently? Parmenio was a cautious man. It is neither proven nor justifiable to suppose that in his attitude to the Persian offer he necessarily reflected the attitude of his former king. We can only guess what Philip would have done. He could not have foreseen that out of barbarian Italy would come a rival to Macedonian power. But he was a hard-headed man who might well have predicted the problems that would arise if he advanced into the Iranian world and defeated the ruling power, and he might well have preferred to consolidate what he had gained around what he could regard as *mare nostrum*. If he had so preferred, Macedonia might have become the homeland of a mighty power. For it was fit to be so.

One cannot travel through the world of Philip II without remarking its comparative wealth, in cereals, timber, minerals. The foothills of the Pierian Mountains, base of the Macedonian rise to power, are as beautiful in their cultivation as any Italian countryside. Virgil could sing the praises of Italy in *The Second Georgic*. Some other poet of the Macedonian empire could have sung the praises of Macedon. 'Hail, fertile mother of crops, fertile mother of men.' The men did marvels to the Indus and beyond. Had Philip lived, their achievements might have been different, less romantic but more effective.

A NOTE ON CHRONOLOGY

For the period before the negotiation of the Peace of Philocrates in 347/6 there are few chronological questions that seriously affect understanding of Philip. The first years of the Sacred War are a famous crux, but since Philip had no part in it before he had fought and won the Battle of the Crocus Field it is a crux which can here happily be avoided. The date of the battle is surely enough to be fixed in the early summer of 352. The *Atthis* of Philochorus, who was a man of scholarly standards and method and whose assignment of events to Attic *archōn* years has in no instance ever been successfully impugned, shows that the march to Thermopylae which followed the battle was in 353/2 (F.153), the year under which Diodorus (16.34.3), drawing on his generally reliable chronographic source, set the war in the Peloponnese. That war straddled the Battle of the Crocus Field, since Sparta could only have begun it when Thebes was too much in fear of Phocis to send help to Peloponnesian allies, and Thebes could only have sent help after the Battle of the Crocus Field had relieved her and incidentally sent the Phocian mercenaries in search of employment (D.S.16.39.2f.). It is not proven but probable that the battle belongs in the first half of 352 rather than the second half of 353, since the siege of Methone was in 354/3 according to Diodorus' chronographic source (16.31.6) and so 353 is required for Philip's first intervention in Thessaly (D.S.16.35).

D.3.4 surely enough makes November 352 the date of Philip's march to Heraeum Teichos for it is barely conceivable that November 351 would have been spoken of in the second half of 349 as 'three or four years ago'. Philoch FF.49–51 provide the basis for a certain chronology of the Olynthian War and for the Euboean, which began after Demosthenes had delivered his Olynthiacs and ended before Olynthus fell (**A.**2. 12ff.). The only uncertainty is the date of the debate during which *The First Philippic* was delivered, but to my mind it must precede the despatch of Charidemus in late 351 (D.3.5); the speech makes no allusion to his return if he had returned and left the Chersonese unguarded, or to his being in the Chersonese, as is more probable (cf. Philoch. F.49), and so relevant at many

points in the speech. It may be quixotic to cling to 352/1 (the date for the speech given by Dionysius of Halicarnassus), but it still seems plainest good sense to connect the speech with the debate or debates that culminated in the despatch of Charidemus.

To continue to date the embassies of the decree of Eubulus and Aeschines (D.19.9ff. and 303ff., A.2.79) to early 346 will seem to some another of my unlovable foibles. I mean to defend my dating on the more appropriate battle-ground of a learned journal. The central argument is still that, when Aeschines defended himself against Demosthenes' charge that he had entirely changed his attitude to making peace with Philip and had spoken on 19 Elaphebolion 'in the presence and in the hearing of the ambassadors whom you Athenians sent for from the Hellenes because of the suasions of this man' (i.e. Aeschines), Aeschines did not expose Demosthenes as a liar as citation of the dated documents could so easily have done, but replied that the Athenian ambassadors were not yet back. Not only so, but in referring to his part in these events, Aeschines defended himself in words which the events of 346 make, and, for all we know, alone make, intelligible. All this I will expound elsewhere, but here I must insist that, however one dates the part of Eubulus and Aeschines, the important thing is that there were embassies due in Athens in Elaphebolion 346 and they must be explained. If Athens summoned the Hellenes before she began to seek peace with Macedon, the explanation I offer of Eubulus' and Aeschines' embassies fits those of Elaphebolion. If the summoning was decided on after Athens voted to send the first embassy, what was the purpose, and what became of it all? The names of the authors matter very little compared to the part the Hellenes were expected to play.

After 346, Philochorus (F.54) provides a firm date for Philip's attack on Perinthus, viz. 340/39, and indeed early in that year; some have tried to evade the consequences of the observation that citations from Philochorus that begin 'in this year' are of Philochorus' first entry for the year, but even without appealing to this one can be sure that the attack on Perinthus began in July 340 or very shortly after, because after Philip moved to attack Byzantium the bulk of the Athenian corn ships was still moving southwards (Phil. F.162) and Demosthenes 50 shows that that was less likely to be the case every day after the end of September. Philochorus also furnishes a precise date for the Athenian interventions in Euboea, cf. FF.159 (with Schol. A.3.85) and 160, the latter being an 'in this year' entry. So the end of the period is well fixed. Earlier one must have recourse to the datings by Dionysius of Halicarnassus of Demosthenes' speeches, which have stood up to all criticism – not surprisingly since they were made with the help of 'general histories' like those of Theopompus, Ephorus and Anaximenes, not to mention the Atthides. The appeal to Athens by the King of Persia for help in reconquering Egypt was made early in 344/3 (Phil. F.157, an 'in this year' entry, with D.S.16.44 and D.12.6), to which year Dionysius

assigned *The Second Philippic*. I adhere in the text to the view that the most economical explanation of the silence of that speech on the subject of Persia is that it was delivered as an answer to the Macedonian embassy led by Python which happened to arrive in Athens at the very same moment as the Persian (cf. Didymus' comment at Phil. F.157). Egypt was conquered by 342 (cf. Isoc. 12.159 and Speusippus' *Letter to Philip* § 14), and very probably during 343/2, for that curious document from Egypt (in curious Greek) *The Dream of Nectanebo* (Wilcken, *Urkunden der Ptolemäerzeit* I no. 81) was written in the belief that the last native king of Egypt was still on the throne on the night of 5–6 July 343, during which in answer to a prayer to be shown 'what was at hand' he dreamed of the goddess Isis on a throne on a boat . . . , and there unhappily the fragment ends; sceptics will continue to question the value of this piece of Oriental evidence, but it is all we have and, since our choice for the date of the conquest is confined to 343/2 and 344/3, we may assign the campaign to winter 343/2; for the Persians had to go in as the Nile fell and complete the task by the time it reached its lowest in May.

For Philip's Thracian campaign of 342 onwards, the key is provided by Demosthenes' *On the Chersonese* which was delivered before Athens had intervened in Euboea in June 341 (cf. § 36 and Phil. F.159) but only shortly before the Etesians began to blow (§§ 14 and 18); a date of April–May 341 must be about right. Since at the moment the speech was delivered Philip was already in the eleventh month of his Thracian campaign (§§ 2 and 35), he must have begun in mid-342. So Philip's intervention in the Molossian kingdom (J.8.6, D.7.32), of which nothing is heard in D. 19, must belong in the first half of 342; mid-winter is possible, since Philip did not shrink from winter campaigns (D.9.50, 8.35, etc.).

As to the attempt to unite the Greeks, in which Callias of Chalcis played a leading part, and on which Demosthenes in his speech *On the Crown* preferred almost total silence to answering Aeschines' lengthy charge (A.3.85ff.), I adhere to the view that 342 was the year of this almost wholly abortive affair, but must defer my defence to a place more appropriate to such a tangled and entangling debate.

ABBREVIATIONS USED IN THE NOTES

Ancient authors

Ael. *V.H.*	Aelian *Varia Historiarum*
A.	Aeschines (for full collection of scholia see the 1865 Teubner edition of F. Schultz)
Ar. *Ath. Pol.*	Aristotle *Athenaiōn Politeia*
Ar. *Pol.*	Aristotle *Politics*
Ar. *Hist. Anim.*	Aristotle *Historia Animalium*
Ar. *Rhet.*	Aristotle *Rhetoric*
[Ar.] *Econ.*	Pseudo-Aristotle *Economica*
A.A.	Arrian *Anabasis*
Ath.	Athenaeus
C.R.	Curtius Rufus
D.	Demosthenes
D.S.	Diodorus Siculus
Hdt.	Herodotus
Hyper. *Euxen.*	Hyperides *For Euxenippus*
Isoc.	Isocrates
J.	Justin *Philippica*
P.	Pausanias
Philoch.	Philochorus (=*Fragmente der griechischen Historiker* no. 328)
Plut. *Aem.*	Plutarch *Aemilius*
Al.	*Alexander*
Artox.	*Artoxerxes*
Cim.	*Cimon*
Eum.	*Eumenes*
Mor.	*Moralia*
Pel.	*Pelopidas*
Phoc.	*Phocion*
Poly.	Polyaenus
Polyb.	Polybius
Steph. Byz.	Stephanus Byzantinus
Str.	Strabo
T.	Thucydides

Theoph.	Theophrastus
Theop.	Theopompus (=*Fragmente der griechischen Historiker* no. 115)
Xen. *Anab.*	Xenophon *Anabasis*
Cav. Comm.	*Cavalry Commander*
Cyn.	*Cynegeticus*
Hell.	*Hellenica*
Mem.	*Memorabilia*
R.L.	*Respublica Lacedaemoniorum*

Modern Publications

A.T.L.	*Athenian Tribute Lists* Vol. III (Meritt, Wade-Gery, and McGregor)
B.S.A.	*Annual of the British School at Athens*
B.C.H.	*Bulletin de Correspondance hellénique*
Diels *VS*	Diels *Vorsokratiker*
F.G.H.	*Fragmente der griechischen Historiker* ed. F. Jacoby
G.H.I.	*Greek Historical Inscriptions*
I.G.	*Inscriptiones Graecae*
Kock *C.A.F.*	*Comicorum Atticorum Fragmenta* ed. Kock
S.I.G.	*Sylloge Inscriptionum Graecarum* ed. Dittenberger

NOTES

Notes to Chapter I (pages 17–19)

1. A.A.7.9.2ff.
2. D.S.16.1.6; Theop. FF.27 and 256.
3. D.S.16.54; Horace *Odes* 3.16.14; Polyb. 18.14; Plut. *Mor.* 177C; Cicero *de officiis* 2.26.90; Valerius Maximus 7.2.10.

Notes to Chapter II (pages 20–8)

1. T.2.98ff.; 4.79, 83.1, 124f; for Archelaus in Thessaly, [Herodes] *Peri Politeias*; Bengtson *Staatsverträge* II no. 186, especially lines 59 and 61.
2. Plato *Gorgias* 471a-d; for the declined invitation, *Diogenes Laertius* 2.25 (cf. Ael. *V.H.* 14.17); T.2.100.2.
3. For Macedonians as ambassadors, cf. A.3.72; for dialect, C.R. 6.9.34ff. and Plut. *Al.* 51; for Alexander the Philhellene at Olympia, Hdt. 5.22; for Thrasymachus, Diels *VS* 85 B 2; Isoc. 5.108, T.2.81.
4. For Pella, Xen. *Hell.* 5.2.13, Ael. *V.H.* 14.17; for poets and artists, Ath. 345d, Plut. *Mor.* 177 AB, Ael. *V.H.* 2.21 and 13.4, Suidas s.v. *Euripides* etc.; for the dramatic festivals at Dium, A.A.1.11.1, D.S.17.16.3.
5. Ar. *Pol.* 1311 b 12.
6. Plut. *Cim.* 14.3; D.12.21; *G.H.I.*[2] 49; D.7.12 and cf. *A.T.L.* Register (s.v. Methone); Hermippus F63(K); [Herodes] *Peri Politeias* 19.
7. T.2.95.3.
8. For polygamy at Sparta, Hdt. 5.40, and at Syracuse, D.S.14.44; for Macedonians in Asia, A.A.7.4.7 and 12.2, J.12.4.2; for Philip's marriages, Ath. 557; for divorce of Olympias, J.9.5.9; for fifth-century political marriages, Ar. *Pol.* 1311 b 8ff., Hdt. 5.21.
9. D.S.14.92.2ff. (cf. 15.19.2); Isoc. 6.46; Xen. *Hell.* 5.2.12f. and D.S.15.19; Bengtson *Staatsverträge* II no. 264; D.S.15.70.
10. An inscription (*B.S.A.* XVII 1910–11 pp. 193ff.) refers to the

settlement by Amyntas of a boundary dispute involving Perrhaebians; D.S.15.61 and 67.3f., Plut. *Pel.* 26; for Philip hostage at Thebes, J.7.5.1ff.; for death of Alexander II, D.S.15.71.1 and *F.G.H.* 135–6 F.11.

11. D.S.15.71.1; Plut. *Pel.* 27; A.2.27ff.; D.S.15.77.5; Dinarchus 1.14; D.S.16.2.4f.

12. Str. 326C (cf. T.4.125).

13. For date of Philip's birth, P.8.7.6 and J.9.8.1; for date of Philip's going to Thebes, A.2.28 causes trouble but may be mere embroidery; for Philip's domain under Perdiccas, Ath. 506f.

14. A.A.4.11.4 and 6, Polyb. 15.25.11, C.R.10.7.9, J.24.5.14.

15. D.S.17.117; J.7.5.9f.

Notes to Chapter III (pages 29–49)

1. D.S.16.2 and 3, J.7.6.

2. *F.G.H.* 72 F.4.

3. D.2.17; T.2.100.2.

4. D.S.16.3.1f.

5. The fifty Companions taken to Thebes in 368 (Plut. *Pel.* 27.4) I take to have been Companions in the narrow sense of the King's Councillors.

6. For Companions (in the narrow sense) under Archelaus, Ael. *V.H.* 13.4, and in Asia under Alexander the Great, A.A.2.16.8 and 25.2, 7.4.6, and D.S.17.16.4; for the territorial organization of the Companion cavalry, e.g. A.A.2.9.3 and 1.2.5, and for their armament, A.A.1.15.5–8; for the Royal squadron, e.g. A.A.2.5.9 and 3.1.4.

7. For territorial organization of the Foot Companions, D.S.17.57.2; for *sarissa*, Theophrastus *Historia Plantarum* 3.12.2 (cf. Asclepiodotus *Tactica* 5.1; also for size of shield) and M. Andronikos *B.C.H.* 94 1970 pp. 91ff. 'Sarissa'; for the Macedonian shield, Plut. *Aem.* 19.1; for absence of breast-plate, Poly. 4.2.10 and inscription cited and discussed by G. T. Griffith *Proc. Camb. Philol. Soc.* 4 1956–7 p. 4.

8. For 'sections of ten', A.A.7.23.2, Frontinus *Strat.* 4.1.6 and *F.G.H.* 72 F 4; for 'eights' in Alexander's army, Polyb. 12.19.6 and 18.30; for formations, Asclepiodotus *Tactica* 4.3 (cf. Arrian *Tactica* 11.3f.); for overhead protection from the rear, Polyb. 18.30.

9. Polyb. 18.29 and 30; Plut. *Aem.* 19 and 20.

10. For the term 'hypaspist', cf. e.g. Xen. *Anab.* 4.2.20; for armament, A.A.2.4.3, etc.; for mobility, cf. A.A.1.1.11 and 5.10.

11. For *Asthetairoi*, A.A.2.23.2, 4.23.1, 5.22.6, etc.; for persistent separateness of Upper Macedonia, Str. 326 C (fin.).

12. A.A.1.14.1 and 6, 3.12.3, etc.; 2.8.9.

13. For Paeonians, e.g. A.A. 1.14.6; for Agrianians, Appian *Illyrica* 14 and, e.g., A.A.1.14.1 and 3.13.5; for Thracian cavalry and infantry, A.A.3.12.4, etc.

14. For mercenaries, D.S.16.8.7 (cf. D.9.49).
15. D.S.16.4.4, 7; Ath. 557c.
16. D.S.16.8; for Alexander's campaign, Plut. *Al.* 9; for the king of the Agrianians, A.A.1.5.2.
17. D.S.16.8.3, D.1.5 and 20.63, Plut. *Mor.* 851A; for Pydna in the fifth century, T.1.137.1 and D.S.13.49.1f.
18. For Methone in the fifth century, *G.H.I.*² 65 and T.6.7.3; for capture by Athenians in 364, Dinarchus 1.14; for date of capture by Philip, D.S.16.31.6 from Diodorus' chronographic source (and not 16.34.4f., the narrative of the siege) sets it in 354–3 and, since 353 is otherwise engaged, 354 is the year; for duration of siege, D.4.35 argues for a short siege (and therefore l.13 of *I.G.*II² 130 of late 355 is to be related not to the siege but to the Athenian-supported attempt of Argaeus, based on Methone, in 359); for the wound, Didymus col. 12 1.43, etc.
19. D.S.16.34.5, D.9.26, *S.I.G.*³ 332.
20 A.A.1.2.5, 12.7, 14.1 and 6, and 15.1, 2.9.3, 3.11.8; D.S.17.17.5; Theop. F.225b.
21. A.A.7.8ff.
22. A.A.4.13ff., C.R.5.1.42, D.S.17.65.1.
23. A.A.7.9.2; for Celetrum, Livy 31.40.1–3; for Bylazora, Polyb. 5.97; for Heraclea Sintica, Steph. Byz. s.v.; for Philippopolis, see p. 44; D.4.48; J.8.5.7f. (cf. Poly. 4.2.12); Alexandria in Egypt and Charax at the mouth of the Tigris are the exceptions in Alexander's foundations, which were generally *propugnacula imperii*.
24. A.A.7.9.2.
25. For Bardylis, D.S.16.4.4f. (cf. Theop. F.286 and *F.G.H.* 124 F.27); for Grabus, D.S.16.22.3, Bengtson *Staatsverträge* II no. 307, *G.H.I.* 157, Plut. *Al.* 3 (cf. J.12.16.6); for Parmenio Philip's 'only general', Plut. *Mor.* 177C.
26. For Illyrians in Alexander's army, D.S.17.17.4, A.A.2.7.5, etc.; Isoc. 5.21; for the site of Antipatria, cf. N.G.L. Hammond *Epirus* p. 567.
27. For the defeat of Pleuratus, D.S.16.69.7 (which must be the campaign alluded to in 16.93.6, for which there is no time later); for the wound, Didymus col. 12 l.62ff.; for the location of the Ardiaei, Str. 315C, and for their power at this period, Theop. F.40; the campaign of J.8.6.3 against the Dardanians (on the head-waters of the Vardar) is otherwise unattested; Isoc. *Letter* 2.
28. For tribute, D.S.16.2.2, J.7.5.1; A.A.1.5.1 and 6.11.
29. For power and wealth of Thrace in the fifth century, T.2.97, and in the fourth, D.23.110, Isoc. 8.24.
30. For Cotys, Theop. F.31 and D.23, which is largely concerned with Thrace in the 350s.
31. D.S.16.3.7 and 8.3; *G.H.I.* 157; for Philippi, D.S.16.8.6, Appian *Bellum Civile* 4.106.
32. For 353, D.23.183 and Poly. 4.2.22; for 352, D.3.4f.; for the treatment of the Thracian kings, D.1.13, Theop. F.101, schol. A.2.81; for 346, A.2.90; for 342, D.S.16.71.1; for 'the general in

charge of Thrace', A.A.1.25.2, and for the extent of his authority under Philip, A.A.1.1.6; for foundation of cities, cf. D.8.44; for Philippopolis, Theop. F.110, Pliny *N.H.* 4.18; for Cabyle, D.8.44 and Str. 320C.

33. D.12.8.

34. For fifth-century roads, Hdt. 7.115.3 and 131, T.2.98.1, 100.2 and 128.4, Livy 44.43.1, and cf. N. G. L. Hammond *Macedonia* I p. 164 n.3; for Alexander's route in 335, A.A.1.5.1 and 5, and in 334, A.A.1.11.3; for waggons, Frontinus *Strat.* 4.1.6 and A.A.1.24.3.

35. For Persian pontoon bridging, cf. Xen. *Anab.* 1.2.5 and 2.4.24; for the bridge at Amphipolis, T.4.103.4; Professor Andronikos remarked to me on the absence of any internal supports for the roof of the large chambers in the palace at Palatitsa, which suggests the use of beams to span 13 metres; for evidence of bridges, cf. N.G.L. Hammond *Macedonia* I pp. 160f. and *Epirus* pp. 235f. and 140; for removable cross-planks, Polyb. 2.5.5.

36. For Theophrastus in Macedon, see p. 52; for drainage around Philippi, Theophrastus *Caus. Plant.* 5.14.5; for afforestation, Hdt. 7.115.3 and 131, T.2.100.2, Livy 44.43.1; for change of dress, A.A.7.9.2.

37. For revenues from trade, D.19.89 (cf. [Ar.] Ec. 2.22); for mines in the fifth century, Hdt. 5.17; for location of Damastion, Str. 326C; for mines near Amphipolis, T.4.108.1, and near Philippi, D.S.16.8.6; for shortage of money in 334, Plut. *Al.* 15.

38. For mercenaries, D.S.16.8.7, Ath. 532e, Poly. 4.2.18, D.9.16 and 32; for Demosthenes' presumption of mercenaries, D.6.15, 9.58, etc.; for manpower, D.S.17.17.4, Poly. 5.44.4 (10,000 is a round figure, but credible; cf. Xen. *Hell.* 3.4.2 for Agesilaus' army in 396, showing what was necessary to fight the satraps of Asia Minor); for Thessalian military potential, D.S.16.30.4.

39. For size of Athenian armies, D.S.15.37.3 and 63.2, etc., and of Theban, D.S.15.52.2 and 16.30.4.

40. T.5.74.1; Hdt. 9.29.

Notes to Chapter IV (pages 50–7)

1. For samples of wit, Ath. 289e, Plut. *Mor.* 177; for the impression made on ambassadors, A.2.41–3, 47, D.19.308.

2. Ath. 18a; for lions, etc., Hdt. 7.125f., Ar. *Hist. Anim.* 579 b 7, 606 b 15, Xen. *Cyn.* 11.1; for summary execution, A.A.3.26; for the debauch, D.S.16.93.7; for Macedonian drinking, *F.G.H.* 126F.1; for Theopompus on Philip's drunken habits, Theop. FF.27, 162, 236, 282 (cf. D.2.18); Plut. *Al.* 9.

3. Diogenes Laertius 5.1; Plato *Ep.* 5, especially 322a2 (cf. D.S. 16.94.1); Ath. 508e.

4. For Eurydice learning the alphabet, Plut. *Mor.* 14b; for the

immigrant Greeks, Theop. FF.224, 225 and D.2.18; for Nearchus, *F.G.H.* 133, Arrian *Indica* 18.10.4, Plut. *Al.* 10; for Eumenes, Plut. *Eum.* 1 and Nepos *Eum.* 1; for Python, A.2.125 with schol., etc.; Isoc. 5.19.

5. Theop. F.236, D.2.19, Suidas s.v. *Anaxandrides*; A.2.15; D.19.331.

6. Diogenes Laertius 5.1 and 4.1; Speusippus' letter to Philip is most conveniently to be found in E. Bickerman and J. Sykutris 'Speusipps Brief an König Philipp', *Berichte über die Verhandlungen der Sächsischen Akademie* (Philol./Hist. Klasse) 80 1928; Theop. T.7; for Theophrastus, Ael. *V.H.* 4.19 (cf., e.g., Theophrastus *Hist. Plant.* 39.2 and 6).

7. Diogenes Laertius 5.3f. and 9, Theop. F.250 (cf. D.S.15.37.3 for the name), Str. 610C, D.10.32 and Didymus col. 4 l.59–6 l.62 are the main passages; for Hermias' influence to the south, *G.H.I.* 165; for relations with Erastus and Coriscus of Scepsis in the Troad, Plat. *Ep.* 6; for dates of Aristotle, cf. Dionysius Halicarnassensis *To Ammaeus* 5.

8. D.10.32f.

9. For the school run by 'the sophist Hermocrates', D.S.16.94.1 (cf. Plato *Ep.* 5 322a *diatribē*); for Antipater, Suidas s.v. *Antipatros*, Diogenes Laertius 5.11 and 27, P.6.4.8, Plut. *Al.* 74; for familiarity with Euripides, Plut. *Al.* 10 and 51.

10. For education of the Pages, A.A.4.13.2; for Mieza, Plut. *Al.* 7.4f., Pliny *N.H.* 31.30, and Ph. Petsas *Praktika Arch. Het.* 1965 pp. 36–46 and 1968 pp. 65–71 (both in modern Greek), cf. *B.C.H.* 90 1966 p. 867f.; for Aristotle, 'stuck in the mud', Didymus col. 6 l.49 (cf. Diogenes Laertius 5.11); for Aristotle's library, Str. 608 C (fin.) (probably of the Lyceum, but he presumably began collecting much earlier); for Aristotle's other pupils, C.R. 3.12.16 (Hephaestion), Steph. Byz. s.v. *Mieza* (Nicanor, Berve *Das Alexanderreich.* no. 557), Plut. *Al.* 74 (Cassander), but there is no real evidence for Ptolemy; for Alexander's literary tastes, Plut. *Al.* 8 and 26, etc., and for his scientific interests, Str. 69C.

11. D.12.19; Plut. *Mor.* 178A.

12. Plut. *Al.* 34.2; A.A.1.9.10 and Plut. *Al.* 11.10ff.

13. Cf. G. M. A. Richter *The Portraits of the Greeks* III p.253.

Notes to Chapter V (pages 58–68)

1. For role of Thessalian cavalry, Plut. *Al.* 24.2, D.8.4 (cf. A.2.132 and D.S.16.59.2); for horses and horsemanship, Hdt. 7.196, Plut. *Al.* 6.1, Xen. *Hell.* 7.5.16 and 4.3.9, Plato *Meno* 70a, Arrian *Tactica* 16.3; for alleged strength, Xen. *Hell.* 6.1.8 and Isoc. 8.118; for Thessalian grandeur, Xen. *Hell.* 6.1.3, and for prosperity in the fifth century, Isoc. 15.155 (cf. 8.117f.).

2. [Herodes] *Peri Politeias* §§ 6 and 33 (cf. Diels *VS.* 85 B 2); D.S.14.92.3, Isoc. 5.20.
3. For exports through Pagasae, Xen. *Hell.* 5.4.56 and 6.1.11, Plut. *Mor.* 193E, Hermippus F.63(K); for the attempt of Jason's father, Lycophron, Xen. *Hell.* 2.3.4, and D.S.14.82.5; for Jason's rise to power, Xen. *Hell.* 6.1.5ff. and 19, D.S.15.57.2 and 60.2, and for his grandiose utterances, Isoc. 5.119; for his designs on Macedon, Xen. *Hell.* 6.1.11; for his death, Xen. *Hell.* 6.4.31.
4. Xen. *Hell.* 6.4.33–7; *G.H.I.* 147 (cf. Xen. *Hell.* 6.4.37 fin.).
5. D.S.16.4.1–2 (following the MS reading), J.7.6.7f. (accepting the statement about Thessaly while rejecting the usual reordering of the MS reading), Theop. F.35; for the Larisan marriage, Ath. 557c, and for the date, cf. Plut. *Al.* 10.1; for murder of Alexander of Pherae, Xen. *Hell.* 6.4.35ff., and for the date, schol. Aristides *Panath.* 179.6 (= vol. III Dindorf p. 298); for Philip's interventions in 353 and 352, D.S. 16.35.1ff. (rejecting the emendation of the MS at 16.31.6), Poly. 2.38.2, and for Pheraean mercenaries, D.S.16.37.3.
6. J.8.2.1 and 11.3.2; D.1.22.
7. J.8.2.3f., D.S.16.35.4ff.; for the site of the battle, a modern guess, Str. 433C; for the fate of Pherae, D.S.16.37.3 and 38.1.
8. Xen. *Hell.* 7.5.4; D.19.123; *S.I.G.*^{3} 175.
9. D.S.16.23, J.8.1.5, schol. D.19.20; for date of Phocian occupation of Delphi, P.10.2.3. (In my narrative I follow the view that there is a 'doublet' in Diodorus.)
10. D.S.16.24.3, 25.1, 25.3 (= 28.4).
11. D.S.16.30.4.
12. For first reactions to the Phocian occupation, J.8.1.10f., cf. Xen. *Poroi* 5.9 and D.S. 16.23.5.
13. For attitudes to the use of temple treasures, T.1.121.3, Xen. *Hell.* 7.4.33f. and 6.4.30; for pious gifts, cf. *Fouilles de Delphes* III no. 3f.; for reflections of fourth-century feelings, D.S.16.57 and 61ff., J.8.2.5f., P.10.2.6f.; for penalty for temple robbery at Athens, Xen. *Mem.* 1.2.62, etc., and elsewhere, D.S.16.56.5; for pious reparations, Plut. *Mor.* 401f.
14. J.8.2.3.
15. For the defence of Phocis, D.S.16.36.1 and 37.2ff.; for the Athenian expedition, by sea, J.8.2.8–12, D.S.16.38.2, D.19.84 and 319, 4.17 and 18.32.
16. Livy 36.15.10; schol. D.4.17; Hdt. 7.176f.
17. For Thessalian membership of the League of Corinth, *G.H.I.* 177, l.25; for 'critical decrees', D.1.22, 2.11; for Thessalian attitude towards Philip, D.6.22, 8.62, 9.26, D.S.16.14.2 and 69.8, Isoc. 5.20 and *Letter* 2.20; for Thessaly in the Lamian War D.S.18.12.3 and 15.2–4; for Theopompus on Thessalian tastes, Theop. FF.49, 162, and 81.

Notes to Chapter VI (pages 69–90)

1. T.6.24.3; Xen. *Poroi* 1.1, Isoc. 8.5f. (cf. D.15.15).
2. For Sestus, Ar. *Rhet.* 1411a14; for Samos as a naval base, Poly. 6.2.1, and for Athenian desire to retain it after Chaeronea, D.S.18.8.7.
3. T.4.108.1, cf. Hdt. 5.23.
4. For revenues of the Chersonese, D.23.110; for the strategic importance of Amphipolis, T.4.108.1 and Livy 45.30.3, cf. the earlier name of the site, Nine Ways (T.100.3); for the Persian bridges, Hdt. 7.114 (cf. 24f.), and for the division of the army after the crossing, Hdt. 7.115; for the site of the Amphipolis bridge, cf. W. K. Pritchett *Studies in Ancient Greek Topography* Part 1 (1965) pp. 36–8.
5. For 359, Poly. 4.2.17, D.S.16.3.3 and 4.1, D.23.121; for Amyntas' share in the recognition of Athens' claim to Amphipolis, A.2.32; for Athens' preoccupation in 357, D.1.8 (cf. 47.20 and 44); for democracy at Amphipolis, *G.H.I.* 150, and for the appeal to Athens, D.1.8 and Theop. F.42.
6. For the speedy settlement of Euboea, D.8.74f. and A.3.85; for the despatch of Chares to the Hellespont before the outbreak of the Social War, D.23.173.
7. D.4.31; Hdt. 7.188ff.; D.8.14 and 18.
8. Theop. F.30, D.2.6; D.S.16.8.3; *G.H.I.* 123, l.75.
9. For the two 'phases', cf. D.4.43; for Thasos as base, D.4.32 (cf. D.50); for Chares, Poly. 4.2.22 (cf. D.23.183), Theop. F.249, Ath. 532e (cf. Kock *C.A.F.* II pp. 435 and 130); for blockade of Macedonian ports, D.2.16 (cf. 19.153 and 315, 18.145); for Macedonian trade with Olynthus, *G.H.I.* iii; for Macedonian piracy, D.4.34 (cf. *F.G.H.* 324 F.24 and 328F.47).
10. For capture of Sestos and the cleruchy, D.S.16.34.3f., *I.G.* II² 1613 l.297, cf. D.23.103, etc.; for the decree in favour of Charidemus, D.23.8ff.
11. D.23.109; D.4.43.
12. For siege of Heraeum Teichos, D.3.4f. (cf. Hdt. 4.90); for Philip's illness, D.1.1.13 and 3.5.
13. D.10.37; Isoc. 8.37 and Xen. *Poroi* 2.6.
14. For the 'surpluses', cf. *G.H.I.*² 58A l.31; for the use of 'surpluses' for the Stratiotic Fund, D.59.4 which presumably describes the system between 378 and the law of Eubulus; for the law of Eubulus, D.1.19f., 3.11f. and 33, from which its existence is to be inferred; for the uses of the Theoric Fund, A.3.25, Harpocration s.v. *Theorika*, Philoch. F.56a, D.13.30, 3.29, etc.; for the success of Eubulus' law, cf. D.4.28f. with D.1.19 and 10.37f., and for Demosthenes' trierarchy law, D.18.102ff. (cf. A.3.222).
15. For Eubulus and the Rhodian appeal, cf. D.15.31f.; for Eubulus' role in 352, cf. D.S.16.37.3 with A.2.184 (but note D.19.86 and schol.), and for his part in the Euboean War, v.i. p. 89; for attempts to unite the Greeks, D.14.12, 19.10ff. and 303ff., etc.

16. For Demosthenes' attacks on Eubulus, D.13.9f., and 30, 15.31f., 3.29 (with schol.), 23.208; for his attitude to Cersobleptes in 352, D.23.100ff.; for his nature, Plut. *Comparison of Demosthenes and Cicero* 1.4 and 6, D.19.46; for his insinuations of 'corruption', D.15.30; for lack of modesty, D.13.18; for assault by Midias, D.21.1, etc.; for his loss of words in the audience with Philip, A.2.34; for the charge of inconsistency, Theop. F.326.

17. For Cersobleptes' son, A.2.81 with schol.; for the despatch of Charidemus, D.3.5; for the proposal which provoked *The First Philippic*, D.4.14f. and 31.

18. For the strength of the Athenian cavalry, Xen. *Cav. Comm.* 9.3.

19. D.19.266, D.S.32.4.2 (cf. 16.8.4).

20. For trade and prosperity of Olynthus, Xen. *Hell.* 5.2.16, *G.H.I.* iii, Clement and Robinson *Excavations at Olynthus* IX pp. 160f.; for the extent of the Chalcidian state, Suidas s.v. *Karanos* (cf. Str. 7 F.11, D.9.26, and Hyper. F.76); for the constitution, Xen. *Hell.* 5.2.12 and 19; for the title, *G.H.I.* 158 and Bengtson *Staatsverträge* II no. 307, etc.; for Anthemus, D.6.20, and Libanius' Hypothesis to D.1.

21 For the 370s, *G.H.I.* 123, l.101, and 119; for the 360s, D.23.150, Ar. *Pol.* 1303 b 2 and 1306 a 2, Isoc. 15.113, *G.H.I.* 143 and 146.

22. For Chalcidian alliance with Illyrians, see p. 42, and for Anthemus, v.s. n.20; for the promise of Potidaea, D.S.16.8.3 (cf. D.2.6 and 20), etc.; for Olynthian politics in the mid-350s, D.9.56 and 66 (cf. 59.61), 19.265.

23. D.23.109, 3.7.

24. For Pausanias, A.2.27; for the exiled step-brothers, J.8.3.10; for diplomacy, D.9.11, Theop. F.127; for the posited demonstration, D.4.17; for the declaration of war, D.9.11.

25. For dating of the war, Philoch. F.49, D.S.16.55.1 and D.19.192 (cf. A.A. 1.11.1 and 10.4); for Philip's method, D.S.16.52.9 and 53.1, Philoch. F.50; for 'treacherous' surrenders, D.S.16.53.2; for the last appeal to Athens, Philoch. F.51, Suidas s.v. *Karanos* (cf. D.59.3, Aelius Aristides *Panath.* 179.9 with schol.); for Olynthian traitors, D.S.16.53.2, D.9.56 and 66, 19.267, Hyper. F.76.

26. Philoch. FF.49–51, etc. See n. 25.

27. D.1.12, 24f. (cf. 4.50).

28. For date of Euboean War, D.39.16; for earlier contacts between Philip and Euboeans, D.4.37 with schol.; A.3.86 must for various reasons be emended; for course of the war, Plut. *Phoc.* 12–14, A.3.86, D.21.132ff., etc.; for connections of Eubulus with the Euboean War, D.21.205–7 (cf. 110 and 200), 19.290 with schol.; for Euboean connection with Philip in 348, A.2.12.

29. For Demosthenes' opposition to help for Euboea, D.5.5; for Proxenus in 346, A.2.133, D.19.154f., etc.

30. For enslavement, D.S.16.53.3 and 55, A.2.156, D.19.193ff. and 306; for destruction of the cities, D.9.26; for Stagira, Plut. *Al.* 7.3, Diogenes Laertius 5.4; for the step-brothers, J.8.3.11.

Notes to Chapter VII (pages 91–113)

1. A.2.12ff.
2. A.2.14 and 109; for Chares, A.2.90–2, 73; for Macedonian privateers, J.8.3.13, A2.73, D.59.3; for Thrace and the Chersonese, Theop. F.160, J.8.3.12, A.2.73.
3. J.8.4.
4. For nomination of Demosthenes, A.2.18 and 22; for proposals for reception of the Macedonian embassy, A.3.67, D.18.28, A.2.61, 65, 109, etc.; D.19.144, etc.
5. For trial of Timagoras, Plu. *Artox.* 22; I quote J. W. Jones *Law and Legal Theory of the Greeks* p. 141; for condemnation of Philocrates, Hyper. *Euxen.* 29, A.2.6 and 3.79, D.19.116; for Aeschines' assumption of Demosthenes' role, A.1.166–76, especially 174.
6. D.S. 16.56ff.; for financial exhaustion, A.2.131; for Theban appeal to Philip, cf. D.18.19.
7. A.2.132ff., D.S. 16.59.1f., cf. D.19.154f.
8. A.2.131f.; J.8.4.6; D.9.11.
9. A.2.134; for Athens' haste, cf. D.19.163.
10. A.2.57f., 60, 3.58, 64f., 68.
11. See p. 186.
12. D.19.10ff. (esp. § 16) and 302ff., A.2.164 and 79.
13. A.2.22–39, and 82.
14. A.2.60f., 3.69ff.; D.19.159.
15. For the 18th, D.19.14 and 144, A.2.63ff. and 3.71; for the 19th, D.19.16, 291 and 307, A.2.79; for Aristophon, Theop. F.166; for the amendment, D.19.159.
16. D.5.25, 7.26 with schol., 12.22.
17. D.19.40, A.2.15–17, 61; for Philocrates, cf. Theop. F.164.
18. See p. 104f.
19. D.19.150, 154f., A.2.89ff., and 3.73.
20. J.8.4 and A.2.112; for Thebans, D.19.139ff. (cf. D.S.16.59.2); for Phocians, D.9.11, etc.; for Spartans, A.2.104; for obvious military preparations, A.2.103ff., 136, 107, 114 (cf. D.18.32); for Demosthenes' attempts to go home, D.19.323.
21. For Theban and Thessalian pleas, J.8.4.4f., D.19.140f.; for Phocian plea, supported by the Athenians and the Spartans, J.8.4.6f., A.2.108–17; for the price on Aeschines' head, D.19.21, etc.; for Phalaecus' trust in Philip, A.2.135, D.9.11; for Halus, D.19.163.
22. D.19.158.
23. D.19.58.
24. D.19.58, 17f., 31; A.3.85, D.8.74, 75; for the Council's Recommendation, see p. 105. The date of the first embassy's report to the Council is likely to have been the 13th, the date of their return. Demosthenes' published speech claimed that Aeschines had stayed behind with Philip (D.19.175) but Aeschines clearly had a some-

what different charge made against him in court (A.2.124f.). Demosthenes' claim is perhaps complete fiction.
25. D.19.34, 18.32 and 35.
26. D.19.19–51, esp. § 35.
27. D.19.23, 45f., and 6.29f.; cf. 19.43, 52, 77, 123, 318, 322, and 5.10.
28. A.2.119–23; D.19.57ff., cf. A.2.130; A.2.137.
29. For the decree of the 16th, D.19.47ff.; for the free passage for Phalaecus, D.S.16.59.3; for the reference to the Amphictyons, D.S.16.59.4; for date of the news, D.19.60, and for the reaction at Athens, D.19.125ff. and 86 (cf. 18.36), A.2.139; for the third embassy, D.19.121–30, A.2.94ff.; for the two letters from Philip, D.19.51.
30. D.19.64f. and 81; D.S.16.60, J.8.5; A.2.142f. (cf. P.10.2.4).
31. D.5.22; for Sparta, P.10.8.2 and *S.I.G.*[3] 241 B l.76f., cf. l.117 and C l.143; D.19.111 and 5.24.
32. D.S.16.60.4f.
33. D.10.34.
34. A.2.132 and 135; for siege of Halus in February, D.19.163; for Parmenio as ambassador, D.19.69, Theop. F.165, A.3.72; D.19.159 and Second Hypothesis § 7.
35. For Philip's seeming openness, J.8.4.11f. (D.19 Second Hypothesis § 8 is very dubitable, since Demosthenes makes no allusion to the story); for Thessalian hatred of Phocis, A.2.140 (cf. Hdt. 8.27ff. and 7.176); for Philip's alliance with Thebes, D.19.318; for the Greek attitude towards Phocian sacrilege, v.s. p. 65; for the Oetaean proposal, A.2.142 (cf. D.S.16.61–4).
36. D.19.60 and 127, 6.7.
37. A.2.17.
38. D.8.67, 9.27, 10.32; 7.35; Isoc. 5.16f., and 73–5, *Letters* 2 and 3.3.
39. D.S.16.60.3.
40. DS.16.60.4f.

Notes to Chapter VIII (pages 114–37)

1. J.8.5.7; Poly. 4.2.12; A.A.7.9; D.18.89 and for revenue from Thracian ports D.23.110.
2. J. *Prologue* 8, D.S.16.69.7; for the wound, Didymus col. 12.63ff., D.18.67; D.S.16.93.6; for Isoc. *Letter* 2, see p. 43.
3. J.9.3.1.
4. D.9.26 (D.6.22 shows the date of the change, but is mistaken. Cf. Harpocration s.v.v. *dekadarchia*, *tetrarchia*, and Theop. F.208); D.19.260, 18.43.
5. For the fourteen peoples of the Molossian kingdom, Theop. F.382; J.8.6.4ff. and cf. D.1.13; *G.H.I.* 173.
6. See p. 178f; for Alexander's Italian campaign, J.12.2, etc.

7. D.7.32, Theop. FF.206, 207, D.9.27 and 34; for the Athenian expedition, D.48.24 and 26.
8. For the chronology of this period, see p. 187.
9. D.S.16.71, D.8.14 and 35; for the expulsion of Cersobleptes, D.12.8 and 10; for the marriage, Ath. 557d, Jordanes *Getica* 10 (ed. Mommsen *Mon. Germ. Hist.* V.1 1882); for 'the general in charge of Thrace', A.A.1.25.2; for 'the independent Thracians', A.A.1.1.6.
10. D.8.14, 66; 9.34; 18.87.
11. D.S.16.74.2, but cf. D.18.89f.; schol. A.2.81 suggests formal alliance between Philip and Perinthus and Byzantium in 352.
12. D.5.14, 25.
13. For the war-party, D.9.6 and 72, A.3.82, Plut. *Phoc.* 9.9; for 335, A.A.1.10.4 (Hegesippus was alive in 337; cf. *G.H.I.* 178. *I.G.*II² 1629 l.543 proves nothing for 325).
14. D.23.169, 12.11, 5.25, 8.58 and 64, 9.35.
15. A.1.157, D.19.2 with schol.
16. For the situation in the Peloponnese, D.6. esp. §§ 9 and 25, and for the rescript §§ 13 and 26.
17. For Aeschines' change of role, A.1.174; for his acquittal by only thirty votes in 343, Plut. *Dem.* 15.5 (cf. *Mor.* 840C).
18. Isoc. 12.13f.
19. D.S.16.44.4.
20. Isoc. Letter 9.8 (of 356 B.C.) is directed against mercenaries; D.14.3 (with Hypothesis): D.15.11ff.; D.10.34.
21. Isoc. 12.159; Ar. *Rhet.* 1393 a 23ff.
22. The theme of Isocrates' *Letter to Philip* of 346 (Oration 5).
23. For Delius, Plut. *Mor.* 1126D; for Thespians, *Anthology* 4.334; for Theopompus, Theop. F.253; for Alexander's letter, Plut. *Al.* 34.
24. Polyb. 18.14; D.18.295.
25. D.9.36, 19.259ff. etc.; Cic. *ad Att.* 1.16 (cf. Horace, *Odes* 3.16, etc.); D.7.17 (Hegesippus); D.S.16.54 is from a source which was largely influenced by Demosthenes' speeches; A.2.8 (on Demosthenes' sanctimonious self-righteousness); for the allegations about Aeschines receiving bribes, A.2.144ff.; for the law about giving bad advice, Hyper. *Euxen.* 29 (cf. 8); for the gifts to ambassadors, D.19.139f.
26. D.19.259; P.4.28.4 is an apparent exception, on which D.S. 16.63.4 is to be noted.
27. Hypothesis D.6; D.18.136, 7.18ff. (§ 20 for Python's oratory and cf. A.2.125 with schol., etc.), *Ep.* 2.10.
28. Philoch. F.157, D.S.16.44.1; D.12.6; D.10.34.
29. For the main amendment proposed, D.7.30.
30. D.6.34 looked forward to the proposal of Hegesippus; for Hegesippus' account of his proposal and its reception, D.7.19f.
31. For Hegesippus' embassy, D.19.331; for prosecution of Philocrates, D.19.116 and Hyper. *Euxen.* 29; for acquittal of Aeschines, Plut. *Dem.* 15; for Philip's letter of early 342, D.7.32.

32. For Elis, D.19.260 and 294, 9.27; P.4.28.4, 5.4.9; D.18.295; D.S.16.63.4; for Megara, D.19.87, 204, 295, 326 and 334, 9.27.
33. For Elis, cf. D.S.17.3.5; for Megara, Plut. *Phoc.* 15, Dinarchus 1.58f., D.18.48 and 237, Plut. *Mor.* 851 B; for 'confident assertions' by Demosthenes, D.19.288 and 6.14f.; for rumours and rumour-mongers, D.3.5, 4.48f., and cf. Hypothesis D.14, T.6.38.1, Lysias 22.14, A.A.1.7.2, Theophrastus *Characters* 8.
34. D.7.32, 36f.; D.19.204.
35. Isoc. 8.16.
36. For Demosthenes' strategic ideas, D.9.52; for Philip's garrison at Thermopylae, D.9.32, 11.4, and Philoch. F.56 b.
37. For Demosthenes as Theban *proxenus*, A.2.141 and 143; for Demosthenes' claim to have constantly worked for a Theban alliance, D.18.161 and cf. D.16.20 and A.2.106.
38. D.16.4f., 1.26, 6.9–13 and 19, 19.112 and 325, 8.63; for the Theban seizure of Nicaea, Philoch. F. 56 b; for the situation in Thebes in early 339 and for the circumstances in which Demosthenes proposed the Theban alliance, D.18.161–79.
39. For Demosthenes' attitude to Thebes when war was declared, D.11.4; for his belief in Fortune, D.2.22, 4.12, 8.69, 11.15f., 18.194.
40. Polyb. 18.14.
41. For the date of Diopithes' expedition, Philoch. F.158; for Diopithes' connection with Hegesippus' brother, A.1.63; for Diopithes' activities, D.8.6 and 9, 12.3; for Philip's protest to Athens, Hypothesis D.8, and for his help for Cardia, D.12.11.
42. D.9.58ff.; D.S.16.74.1 perhaps draws on a source much influenced by the speeches of Demosthenes (cf. 16.54.2ff., 55.3f., 84.3ff. etc.); Parmenio, Philip's 'only general' (Plut. *Mor.* 177C) was also used as a diplomat, as was Eurylochus (cf. D.19.69 and Second Hypothesis § 5, and Theop. F.165); for Euphraeus, D.9.62 and Ath. 508e.
43. For those, who certainly enough fought in the campaign of Chaeronea, Ael. *V.H.* 6.1, P.7.6.5, Str. 414C, D.18.237, *G.H.I.* 178 (cf. D.S.17.3.3), P.10.3.3f., Poly. 4.2.8, Plut. *Mor.* 851 B; for Euboeans, D.18.237, *I.G.*II² 1623.161ff. and 1629.516ff.; for the cities of the Acte, Troezen and Epidaurus, Ael. *l.c.* (cf. Ar. *Ath. Pol.* 42.3, 61); for abstainers, D.18.64, P.4.28.2, 5.4.9, 7.15.6, 8.6.2 and 27.10; for Demosthenes' complaints, D.10.6.
44. D.9.72 (cf. Plut. *Mor.* 841E), 48.24 and 26, 18.244; for Callias' part, A.3.95ff.
45. A.3.89f.
46. D.9.72, A.3.95ff., *I.G.*II² 225, schol. A.3.83, D.18.64.
47. A.3.100f.
48. For the attack on Oreus, Philoch. F.159; for Sciathus, *I.G.*II² 1623.35 and 1629.484 (cf. schol. A.3.85); for the Megarian share, *F.G.H.* 103 F.19 (cf. Plut. *Phoc.* 15); for the attack on Eretria, Philoch. F.160 and D.S.16.74.1.
49. D.12.5; *I.G.*II² 1623.161ff. and 1629.516ff.

50. D.9.72, 10.33f., 12.6; A.3.238.
51. For the siege of Perinthus, D.S.16.74ff., Plut. *Al.* 70.5; for Persian aid for the Perinthians, D.11.5, A.A.2.14.5, P.1.29.10; for Perinthian defiance of the Persians in the late sixth century, Hdt. 5.1.
52. Cf. D.50.6 and 19 for convoys, and Lysias 28.6 for the importance of Byzantium.
53. D.S.16.77.1; *F.G.H.* 390 § 26ff.; J. *Prologue* 9 and J.9.1; D.11.6; *G.H.I.* 174; *I.G.*II² 1628.421 and 1629.941; D.18.244 and 302; A.3.256.
54. D.12.53 (cf. Didymus col. 10 1.24ff.); D.18.76 (the letter in 77 is fictitious, as was perhaps the other version behind schol. D.11, to be found in Dindorf VIII p. 209); Philoch. F.55, D.S.16.77.1; Plut. *Phoc.* 14 (cf. *I.G.*II² 1628.436 and 1629.957).

Notes to Chapter IX (pages 138–49)

1. D.50.18f.; Philoch. FF.54.162, D.12.16; A.A.2.14.4; Theop. F.292.
2. *F.G.H.* 390 § 27f., D.18.139.
3. See p. 163.
4. P.4.31.5; Dio. 74.10.3; Polyb. 4.45.
5. *F.G.H.* 390 § 26f.
6. Plut. *Phoc.* 14.8; D.18.88f.
7. J.9.1.9 says he went to recoup his losses.
8. For the campaign, D.S.16.1.5 and J.9.2.1–3.3; for the wound, Didymus col. 13 l.3f.
9. Philoch. F.56b.
10. D.18.143ff.; A.3.128ff.
11. Hdt. 8.18; 7.212, 217.2, 218.3.
12. Hdt. 7.215.
13. For rumours of 344, D.6.14; for garrison, D.19.81; for first payment of fine and restoration of Phocian organization, *S.I.G.*³ 230 and 232.
14. Philip was represented by Nicanor at the autumn Pylaia of 339 (*S.I.G.*³ 249); so he had probably not taken Elatea by then. For date of the battle, Plut. *Camillus* 19.
15. D.18.169ff.
16. D.18.213, 175 (cf. Theop. F.210), 211ff. (cf. *F.G.H.* 135/6 F.20), A.3.148–51, D.18.218.
17. A.A.1.10.5f.
18. J.9.4.8; Pindar *Ol.* 6.90 (wih schol.); Cratinus F.310(K); *F.G.H.* 70 F.119 (cf. D.S.15.88.4).
19. Poly. 4.2.8 (cf. Dinarchus 1.74); P.10.36.3; D.18.216.
20. D.S.16.85.5 (cf. 16.74.6 and 17.9.3); J.9.3.9.
21. G.Soteriades *Mitteil. des Deutschen Inst. in Athen* XXVII 1903 pp. 308ff.

22. Plut. *Al.* 9.3.
23. D.S.16.85.5–86.
24. Poly. 4.2.2.
25. For another stratagem, Poly. 4.2.7 (also in Frontinus *Strat.* 2.1.9).
26. Plut. *Pel.* 18.7; P.7.6.5; Lycurgus *Leocrates* 36ff., D.26.11, Plut. *Mor.* 849A.
27. P.9.40.10 (cf. Str. 414C); Plut. *Pel.* 18.7.

Notes to Chapter X (pages 150–65)

1. T.6.67–70.
2. Poly. 1.39.2 is to be rejected.
3. T.4.96.
4. I quote from J. K. Anderson *Ancient Greek Horsemanship* (1961) p. 15.
5. Cf. Hdt. 9.62.2, 67; T.4.93.1 and 96.8, 5.73.4; D.S.16.46.9; for Himera, Hdt. 7.167.1.
6. Hdt. 9.62.2; T.4.96.4.
7. Tyrtaeus F.12 in Loeb *Elegy and Iambus* I; for combat *en promachois*, cf. F.10.
8. Hdt. 9.74.1; for Spartiate and Helot casualties, Hdt. 9.85.2 and cf. 9.29.1; *I.G.* VII 2247.
9. Cf. Xen. *R.L.* 11.6; the work from which Asclepiodotus *Tactica* 4.1. and 3 derive may have been describing Macedonian warfare but the terms belong to the earlier period too (cf. Hdt. 9.18.1 and Xen. *Hell.* 7.4.23).
10. T.2.29.5 is the first mention; T.3.96ff.; for increasing use in large numbers, cf. Xen. *Hell.* 5.2.14; Poly. 3.2.22.
11. T.5.69.2.
12. For training at Athens, Plato *Laches* 178a, 182a and b (Xen. *Mem.* 3.12.5 may be misleading), at Sparta, Xen. *R.L.* 11.5, T.5.66, Xen. *R.L.* 11.2 and 12.5, Hdt. 7.208, T.5.70ff.
13. T.5.67.2 and D.S.12.75.7; Xen. *Hell.* 6.5.23, 7.5.19, and 6.1.15; Plato *Laws* 829b; for a professional general, Xen. *Anab.* 7.1.33 and for theorists, Xen. *Anab.* 2.1.7 and *Mem.* 3.1.1.
14. Cf. T.5.9.8, 6.67.1.
15. Xen. *Anab.* 6.5.9–11.
16. Xen. *Hell.* 4.2.18ff.
17. Xen. *Hell.* 6.4.4–15; D.S.15.55–6; Plut. *Pel.* 20–3; Poly. 2.3.2, 3 and 15; P.9.13.3–12; *G.H.I.* 130.
18. Xen. *Hell.* 7.5.23, cf. Arrian *Tactica* 11.2.
19. Xen. *Hell.* 7.5; D.S.15.82–7; Polyb. 9.8; Plut. *Ages.* 34; Poly. 2.3.10, 14; P.11.5ff.; Plut. *Mor.* 346 B–E.
20. T.5.57.2; Xen. *Hell.* 7.5.23 and *Cav. Comm.* 5.13.
21. For Chaeronea see pp. 144ff.; for Crocus Field, D.S.16.35.2; Poly. 2.38.2.

22. A.A.1.1–7.
23. D.2.17; D.S.16.3.1; Poly. 4.2.10; Frontinus *Strat.* 4.1.6.
24. A.A.1.6.8.
25. A.A.1.1.11, 1.5.10, 1.6.5.; 1.4.2f., 1.6.1.
26. Arrian *Tactica* 11.3 and cf. Asclepiodotus *Tactica* 4.1 and 3.
27. For Mantinea, Xen. *Hell.* 7.5.23f.; for Macedonian formation, Asclepiodotus *Tactica* 7.3, and cf. 7.2.
28. Hdt. 7.40; A.A.7.13.
29. Cf. Anderson *Ancient Greek Horsemanship* p. 153.
30. J.9.2.16.
31. Xen. *Hell.* 5.3.1f.
32. T.1.102.2, 101.3; D.S.12.28, Plut. *Per.* 27.3, T.1.117; T.2.75–8, and 3.20–3.
33. For Carthaginian invention of the ram, Vitruvius *On Architecture* 10.13.1; for the first catapults, D.S.14.42; for use of catapults, Plut. *Mor.* 219A.
34. For Athens, Plut. *Pel.* 2.6, *I.G.*II² 1422 and 120 l.37; for Sparta, Xen. *Hell.* 5.2.16 and 23, and 5.3.26; Aeneas Tacticus 32 and 37.
35. For the Macedonian corps of engineers, Poly. 4.2.20; for Athens, Plato *Gorgias* 512b and c; for Amphipolis, D.S.16.8; for Polyidos of Thessaly, from whom Alexander's technical advisers derived, Vitruvius *On Architecture* 13.3ff., Athenaeus Mechanicus W 10.5 (quoted in translation by Marsden *Greek and Roman Artillery* (1969) p. 58); for date of invention of torsion catapults, *I.G.*II² 1627 l.328f., which records the catapults captured in Eretria in 341 and on which see Marsden *op. cit.* pp. 57 and 60f.
36. For stone-throwing machines, A.A.1.22.2 and D.S.17.42.7; for bullets at Olynthus, D. M. Robinson in *Excavations at Olynthus* X pp. 418–43.
37. For towers at Perinthus, D.S.16.74.3, and at Halicarnassus, D.S.17.26.6; for earlier towers, Aeneas Tacticus 32.8; for height of classical walls, see Winter *Greek Fortifications* p. 134 n.32.
38. For Samos, Isoc. 15.111, etc.; for Perinthus, Philoch. FF.54 and 162.
39. Cf. Poly. 4.2.20.
40. D.S.17.42.7.
41. A.A.6.24.
42. A.A.3.3.2 and 3.14.5.
43. A.A.2.7.1., 1.20.1, and 2.1.1, etc.

Notes to Chapter XI (pages 166–76)

1. Lycurgus *Leocrates* 42 etc.; Lucian *Quomodo historia conscribenda sit* 3; D.S.16.86.5.
2. Papyri Oxyrhynchi 12; A.3.27.

3. P.8.7.4; Plut. *Mor.* 221F, 760AB.
4. D.S.16.87.3; P.1.25.3, and 34.1; Plut. *Al.* 28.1 and D.S.18.56.7; Ar. *Ath. Pol.* 61.6, 62.2.
5. D.S.16.87.1; Suidas s.v. *Demades*; D.18.285; Demades *On the Twelve Years* 9f.
6. J.9.4.4f.
7. J.9.4.6f.; P.4.27.10, 9.1.8 and 37.8 (despite Plut. *Al.* 34 and A.A.1.9.10); Dio Chrysostom 37.42. A.A.1.7.11 and Hyper. *Against Dem.* col. 18 argue against dissolution of the Confederacy.
8. D.S.16.44.2, and 47–8; Isoc. 12.159; D.18.64.
9. Ael. *V.H.* 6.1; Polyb. 38.3.3; for Naupactus, D.9.34, Theop. F.235, Str. 427C; for Achaean losses, P.7.6.5; for Troezen, Hyper. *Against Athen.* 31.
10. P.3.24.6, 2.20.1, 7.11.2; Polyb. 9.28.7 and 33.11f.; Plut. *Mor.* 219F, 233E, 235A; *I.G.*IV^2.128; Tac. *Ann.* 4.43; for statues etc., P.5.17.4, and 20.9f., 6.11.1, 8.30.6 and 31.9; Polyb. 18.14.
11. A.A.1.16.7.
12. J.9.5; D.S.16.89; Plut. *Phoc.* 16; A.A.1.1.1; D.S.17.4; for the advance force, D.S.16.91, J.9.5.8, Poly. 5.44.4.
13. *I.G.*IV^2 68 (= Bengtson *Die Staatsverträge* III no. 446); Plut. *Demetrios* 25.3; for Polyperchon, D.S.18.56.
14. *G.H.I.* 177 (= Bengtson, *op. cit.* no. 403 where the evidence for the league is conveniently set out).
15. For title, *G.H.I.* 192, D.S.16.89.3; for guarantees against attack etc., D.17.8, 6, 16; for freedom of navigation, D.17.19 (cf. Epidaurus inscription l.38); for garrisons, Polyb 4.25.7 and v.i.; for freedom from tribute, Schol. D.18.89 and D.S.17.24.1; for guarantee against revolution, D.17.10 and 15; for *proedri* and synod, Epidaurus inscr. ll.66ff., A.3.161, Polyb. 9.33.11, *S.I.G.*^{3} 261 (?); for sanctions clause, D.17.6 and 30 (cf. D.S.17.63.1).
16. For Ambracia, D.S.17.3.3; for 'those in charge etc.', D.17.15; for Corragus, D.17.10, A.3.165, *Academicorum Philosophorum Index Herculanensis* cols. xi 30ff. and xii 41. The garrison in Sicyon (*I.G.* II^2 448) must have followed the events of D.17.16ff.
17. Polyb. 2.41.6; Epidaurus inscr. l.137; Hyper. *Against Dem.* col. 18.
18. Epidaurus inscr. ll.78, 92.
19. Polyb. 4.59.2, 5.94.1, 38.16.3–4.
20. T.1.19; Ar. *Pol.* 1307 a 13; *G.H.I.* 144 and 147.
21. Plato *Rep.* 551D; Ar. *Pol.* 1316 b 6ff.; Isoc. 6.68; D.S.18.8; for Theopompus, *F.G.H.* 115 T 2; for Philip's colonies, D.7.35.
22. For the deputy of the Hegemon, Epidaurus inscr. l.68, A.A. 1.11.3, 7.12.4.
23. Plut. *Al.* 74, where the complaints against Antipater are not necessarily Greek complaints, in any case hardly a very serious piece of evidence; D.S.18.56 need not reflect on Antipater's rule; for the outbreak of the Lamian War and the motives of the leading states, D.S.18.8, and 17.111.
24. D.S.18.56.

25. P.7.10.10.
26. D.S.16.89.3, cf. 17.4.9; Plut. *Phoc.* 16.6f., cf. 21.1.

Notes to Chapter XII (pages 177–83)

1. J.9.5.8f.; D.S.16.91; A.A.1.17.10; Poly. 5.44.
2. Plut. *Mor.* 1126d.
3. D.S.16.91ff.; for Olympias' absence, J.9.7.10.
4. Ath.557; Plut. *Al.* 9.
5. Plut. *Al.* 9 and 10; A.A.3.6.5 (and 1.5.2.). I reject the view based on J.11.2.3 and P.8.7.7. that the seventh wife produced a son, Caranus, whom Alexander shortly had murdered; her daughter was murdered (J.9.7.13), and there is not enough time for two pregnancies.
6. *G.H.I.* 191.1 and 43; A.A.1.17.10f.; Ael. *V.H.* 5.12 (cf. Dinarchus 1.94).
7. Ar. *Pol.* 1311 b2; J.9.6.4ff.; Plut. *Al.* 10.
8. A.A.1.25.1; Plut. *Mor.* 327C; J.11.2.2.
9. A.A.2.14; D.S.17.51.2.
10. A.3.77; Plut. *Phoc.* 16; A.A.1.5.1.
11. A.A.2.25.
12. A.A.7.20.5.Cf. *Indica* 32.10f.

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